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Previous research has shown that we recognise faces similar in age to ourselves 
better than older or younger faces (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006).  The primary aim of this 
thesis was to investigate this phenomenon in young adults and children to gain further 
insight into the underlying perceptual, cognitive and/or social mechanisms involved in this 
apparent ―own-age bias‖ (OAB) in face recognition.   
Chapter one confirmed that an OAB was present in both young adults and children, 
and the remaining chapters sought to address why this pattern may exist by drawing on the 
plethora of research into why a similar, potentially analogous bias occurs: the own-race bias 
(ORB).  The ORB is the phenomenon that we are more accurate at recognising faces of our 
own race than those belonging to a different, less familiar race (see Meissner & Brigham, 
2001 for review).   
 Perhaps the best known explanation of the ORB is the Contact Hypothesis.  This 
suggests that the own-race memory advantage is due to the fact that people tend to have 
more experience with faces from their own race and, as a direct result, develop greater 
expertise at recognising them (e.g. Chiroro & Valentine, 1995). The second chapter sought 
to investigate whether a similar explanation could be applied to the OAB, and found 
supporting evidence for this claim.  
The remaining studies examined what it is about contact with an age group that 
results in the superior recognition for faces of that age.  By investigating perceptual 
expertise, social-categorisation and motivational explanations of the OAB, this thesis 
concluded that both quantity and quality of contact play an important role in the 
development of this bias.  The findings of this thesis seem to be most consistent with a 
perceptual expertise account of the own-age bias in face recognition.  However, it also 
seems likely that motivation to attend to faces (particularly with the goal of individuation) 
is likely to be a driving factor of this bias. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Recognising people we know is a basic social act and as social animals, the need to 
identify increasingly large numbers of faces on a day-to-day basis makes face recognition 
the acme of perceptual classification skills.  As adults we are highly expert at processing 
faces.  We can readily identify facial expressions, establish a person‘s age, gender and race 
and, perhaps more astonishingly, distinguish between faces with reliability and ease, 
despite the high visual similarity within this particular class of stimuli.  It is something that 
comes naturally to most of us, and it is something that we take for granted, however the 
question of how we develop this expertise for faces is one that is still not fully understood.   
Previous studies that have examined expertise effects in face recognition have 
largely compared our ability to recognise faces and non-face objects (e.g. Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993).  
However, this can only tell us a limited amount about how expertise may influence the way 
in which we process faces.  As such, this thesis will examine the role of expertise in face 
recognition in a different context, investigating its role within the category of faces.  
Specifically, this thesis aims to establish whether expertise effects can offer an appropriate 
account of a phenomenon that has only recently begun to receive attention in the face 
recognition literature: the own-age bias, the finding that we are better at recognising faces 
belonging to our own age group compared to those of a different age (e.g. Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2005; 2006). 
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1.1 Are Faces Special?  Face Specificity versus the Expertise Hypothesis.  
 
One question that has dominated face processing research is whether the perception 
and recognition of faces can be distinguished from that of other visual objects.  That is, do 
we treat faces as a special class of object using highly specialised qualitatively different 
cognitive mechanisms to process them? Or do we recognise them in the same way as other 
objects, but with quantitatively enhanced efficiency as a result of our expertise with faces? 
 
1.1.1  Neuropsychological Evidence 
Case studies of individuals who have congenital or acquired damage to specific 
areas of the brain have provided evidence that the processing of faces and objects may be 
distinguishable at a neural level. For example, some patients have been reported to exhibit 
relatively intact facial recognition, but impaired recognition of everyday objects (Farah, 
1991; McMullen, Fisk & Phillips, 2000; Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997), while 
others have shown the opposite, displaying an apparently specific impairment to processing 
faces (Farah, 1991; Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen & Humphreys, 2008).  This 
face-blindness (prosopagnosia) is associated with damage to an area in the right (Uttner, 
Bliem & Danak, 2002) or, more commonly, bilateral (Delvenne, Braithwaite, Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 2002; Rossion, Caldara, Seghier, Schuller, Lazeyras & Mayer, 2003) occipito-
temporal region, the fusiform gyrus.   
Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini (2000) interpreted this double dissociation as 
evidence that faces are processed in a different manner to other visual objects, using highly 
specialised anatomical substrates and cognitive mechanisms.  However, this is not the only 
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possible interpretation.  Instead, it could be that the regions of the brain that are damaged in 
prosopagnosics are responsible for more general types of processing that just happen to be 
essential in, but not specific to, the processing of faces.  For example, it could be that the 
damaged areas are those required for expertly processing the fine-grained details of stimuli, 
which would be necessary for distinguishing between members of a group of objects which 
are highly visually similar.   
Farah (1991; 1996) has specifically alluded to this idea, suggesting that it may not 
be a specialised face processing system per se that is damaged in prosopagnosia, rather it is 
an impairment of the ability to detect the subtle variations between highly similar 
exemplars of an homogenous class.  As there are few other objects from homogeneous 
categories that we need to recognise at the exemplar level in the same way we do with faces 
(i.e. recognising the identity of an individual member of that class of stimuli), this deficit 
appears face specific as the damaged system is one that is ―not necessary for (or less 
important for) recognising objects other than human faces‖ (Farah, 1996).   The suggestion 
is that recognising and distinguishing between exemplars of a homogeneous class can only 
be successfully carried out once one has developed sufficient expertise with members of 
that group of objects.  Specifically, Farah (1991) suggests that for expert face recognition to 
occur one needs to be able to successfully encode highly similar, complex visual stimuli in 
a configural/holistic manner.  It is this processing system that she suggests is damaged in 
those who have prosopagnosia.   
One of the arguments against the notion that prosopagnosia is the result of damage 
to a face-specific processing region is the fact that most prosopagnosics tend to also exhibit 
disturbances in their processing of other visual objects (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 
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1995; Gauthier, Behrman & Tarr, 1999; McNeil and Warrington, 1993; Rossion et al, 
2003).  A complete dissociation between object and face recognition is, in fact, very rarely 
seen in prosopagnosia, although some researchers have reported incidences of deficits that 
appear to be restricted to faces only (Bukach, Bub, Gauthier & Tarr, 2006; DeRenzi & 
Pellegrino, 1998; Wada & Yamamoto, 2001).  However all of the patients reported in these 
studies, whilst being able to successfully name pictures of visual objects, were not formally 
assessed for their recognition of individual exemplars belonging to non-face homogenous 
categories.  Thus, it is probable that the tasks involved in these object recognition studies 
were not truly analogous to face recognition/processing.  
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of a face specific deficit comes from 
Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen and Humphreys (2008) who found that their 
prosopagnosic patient (F.B.) performed within the normal range for object naming, learning 
and recognition, even at the sub-ordinate level.  However, while F.B. showed normal 
accuracy on all of the object tasks, reaction time data was not taken for all of them.  This is 
a fundamental omission, as this allows for the possibility that ―normal‖ performance for 
object tasks was achieved but at the expense of slow response times.  To demonstrate an 
indisputable dissociation between face and object recognition, it is necessary to gain a full 
picture of F.B.‘s performance, demonstrating both normal accuracy and response speed 
with object items from a homogenous class.    
There is still an ongoing controversy as to how face-specific the visual processing 
deficits actually are in prosopagnosic patients. It is still relatively unclear whether the 
damage is to a truly face specific processing area or whether the deficits are a reflection of 
an impairment to successfully encode cues at a level of detail that is not required for most 
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other classes of objects. This debate is not restricted to prosopagnosia research, but is also 
accompanied by arguments regarding the specificity of the neural substrates involved in 
normal face processing, which are most commonly investigated using functional imaging 
techniques. 
 
1.1.2. Functional Imaging Evidence 
 Numerous studies have identified brain regions that respond more to faces than to 
other objects.  The lateral fusiform gyrus has been dubbed the Fusiform Face Area (FFA) 
due to its relatively increased activation to facial stimuli in comparison to non-face objects 
(e.g. Henson, Goshen-Gottstein, Ganel, Otten, Quayle, & Rugg, 2003; Kanwisher, 
McDermott & Chun, 1997).  The Occipital Face Area (OFA) also demonstrates face 
specific activation (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006).  At first sight one might take these findings 
to support the idea that faces are processed in a qualitatively different way to other objects.  
However, as with the issue of face specificity in prosopagnosia (see above), this is not the 
only interpretation of these observations.   
 Studies on the effects of expertise have been used to argue against the face 
specificity hypothesis.  Generally we do not need to recognise everyday objects at the 
subordinate level, like we do with faces (i.e. recognising individual people).  It is possible, 
therefore, that the brain regions identified above are not unique to face processing per se, 
but instead reflect our expert ability to perceptually distinguish between exemplars of a 
certain homogenous class of stimuli.  As most people are experts with face recognition in a 
way that they are not with other forms of visual objects, this ability appears to be ―special‖.  
However, the expertise hypothesis (e.g. Carey, 1992; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & 
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Tarr, 1997) suggests that this expertise with faces represents a potentially more general 
processing ability that could develop with any class of stimuli with which we have a large 
amount of experience at individuating exemplars.  
 If the FFA is truly face specific (and thus faces are a special type of visual form), 
then one would not expect to see any face-like activation of this region for non-face objects.  
If, however, face processing represents an expert ability to process objects belonging to a 
category with which we have a lot of experience (and therefore expertise), then one should 
be able to see face-like FFA activation for any objects of expertise.  Gauthier and her 
colleagues investigated this idea by training individuals to become experts at differentiating 
novel objects with similar properties to faces (greebles).  They found that greeble experts 
showed increased activation in the FFA when viewing greebles, similar to that seen when 
viewing faces, while novices did not show this pattern (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et 
al, 1999).  Similarly, Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, and Anderson (2000) demonstrated that 
car and bird experts showed enhanced FFA activation to objects belonging to their area of 
expertise (i.e. either cars or birds) compared to the control objects.   
Gauthier and colleagues‘ findings from the functional imaging studies appear to 
support the expertise hypothesis of face recognition.  However while it is important to 
understand how expertise may influence face and object recognition at the neural level, it is 
equally (if not more) important to understand how this might translate behaviourally.  As 
such the observable psychological differences between face and object recognition need to 
be further explored. 
 
7 
 
 
1.1.3. Behavioural Evidence 
 Differences in the way we recognise faces and objects can be described anecdotally 
and seen every day.  We are experts at distinguishing between faces (e.g. knowing Peter 
from Paul), however when it comes to identifying individual members of a non-face object 
category that belong to a similarly homogeneous group (e.g. differentiating between two 
Labradors) we perform markedly worse.  However, there is one notable instance when this 
face-over-object recognition is considerably reduced (or absent): when faces are presented 
upside-down.   
It is well documented in the face processing literature that the recognition of faces is 
dramatically impaired by inversion (cf. Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch 2002; Rossion & 
Gauthier, 2002; Valentine, 1988 for reviews).  In his seminal paper in 1969, Yin observed 
that rotating visual stimuli by 180 degrees disproportionately affected the recognition of 
faces compared to other mono-oriented objects.  This inversion effect has been successfully 
replicated in dozens of studies using traditional recognition memory paradigms (e.g. Carey, 
Diamond, & Woods, 1980; Philips & Rawles, 1979) and in alternative forced choice (AFC) 
paradigms (e.g. Carey & Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 
2000; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Yarmey, 
1971; Yin, 1969) and is present for both familiar and unfamiliar faces (Collishaw & Hole, 
2000; Yarmey, 1971).  The robustness of this effect may be taken as evidence that faces are 
processed in a special manner, and indeed Yin suggested that his findings were indicative 
of a specific mechanism for the processing of faces compared to other visual stimuli.  
However, reviews by Valentine (1988) and Tovée (1998) found little evidence to implicate 
a unique face-processing mechanism, an issue that is one of heated ongoing debate in the 
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literature (for an example of this, see the communications between Robbins and McKone 
(Robbins and McKone, 2007; McKone and Robbins, 2007) and Gauthier (e.g. Gauthier and 
Bukach, 2007).   
In fact, one particularly influential study suggested that this inversion effect may 
just reflect the expertise with which we process faces compared to other objects.  Diamond 
and Carey (1986) showed that the putative face-specific inversion effect could be obtained 
with mono-oriented non-face stimuli when one had extensive experience at discriminating 
between exemplars belonging to that class of non-face object.  They found that dog experts 
showed a face-like inversion deficit for pictures of dogs, while novices did not.  More 
recently Bruyer and Crispeels (1992) have demonstrated similar expert inversion effects 
using handwriting as stimuli.  In addition, Rossion et al (2002) trained participants to 
become experts at differentiating greebles.  They showed that reaction times to Greebles 
were more impaired by inversion following training than before, although there was no 
effect on accuracy.  While this research appears to support the aforementioned expertise 
hypothesis, it is of note that similar research with car (Xu, Liu & Kanwisher, 2005), bird 
(Gauthier et al, 2000) and Labrador (Robbins and McKone, 2007) experts has not yielded 
significant inversion effects with objects of expertise, although it is possible that the 
participants used in these studies were not sufficiently expert with the classes of stimuli 
used.  It is also possible that task confounds may be responsible for the differences in these 
findings.  In contrast to Diamond and Carey (1986) and Bruyer and Crispeels (1992), 
neither Xu et al (2005) nor Gauthier et al (2000) used a traditional memory paradigm in 
their investigations, opting for sequential matching tasks instead.  However, it is important 
to note that in all of the previously described studies (with the exception of Diamond & 
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Carey, 1986) the inversion effects obtained with experts were very small in comparison to 
the typical inversion effect obtained with faces.  
In summary, it seems that faces are always, with Diamond and Carey's (1986) 
contradictory results being an anomaly, disproportionately affected by inversion, compared 
to other non-face objects.  However there does appear to be some evidence of non-face 
objects of expertise showing a similar pattern under specific circumstances.  These findings 
lend support to the idea that expertise with faces plays a key role in the way in which they 
are processed compared to other objects. 
 
1.1.4. Conclusions 
 The question of face specificity is one that has been debated heavily over the last 
few decades.  However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to try and resolve this argument.  
The work of Isobel Gauthier and her colleagues has presented some compelling evidence 
that expertise may play an important role in the processing of facial stimuli.  However this 
work has been restricted to looking only at faces versus non-face objects.  This thesis seeks 
to further explore the role that expertise plays in face recognition, within the domain of face 
processing itself.  That is to say, while we are experts at recognising faces, are there certain 
groups of faces with which we are more expert than others and does this have implications 
for the cognitive and neural mechanisms used to process them?   
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1.2. Expertise and Face Processing: The Role of Configural Processing in Face 
Recognition. 
 
1.2.1.  What Information do we Process in the Face? 
Faces are essentially extremely similar to one another and all share the same first-
order relational features (i.e. they all have the same basic arrangement of features: two 
eyes, above a nose, above a mouth).  To successfully recognise a face we need to be able to 
identify the ways in which individual faces differ from each other.  For this purpose, there 
are two types of facial information which we can rely on (see Figure 1.1.).  The first type of 
information contained in the face is that of the individual components themselves; 
processing information about each of the facial features as a distinct part.  The second type 
pertains to the second order relational information contained in the face (Diamond & Carey, 
1986).  This refers specifically to information about the spatial relationships between key 
features of the face (configural or holistic information
1
).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Configural and holistic processing, while similar concepts, are referred to in the face processing literature as 
two distinct ideas.  Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer (2002) define holistic processing as the ‗glueing‘ together 
of the features such that information about individual features is less accessible.  In contrast, configural 
processing refers specifically to the idea that we encode the second-order relations contained with in the face 
(i.e. the spatial relationships between the individual facial components; Diamond & Carey, 1986) in contrast 
to the more featural/component processes which rely heavily on information about the isolated facial features. 
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     Featural Information           Configural Information 
 
Figure 1.1.  Examples of the type of information present in the face  
 
When asked to describe a face, anecdotally we tend to think in terms of individual 
features (e.g. big blue eyes, pouty lips, pointy noise) which is probably at least partly due to 
the fact that we have accessible vocabulary for describing individual facial features in this 
way.  Trying to describe a face in a way other than breaking it down into its constituent 
parts is far more difficult.  However while we might more easily describe a face in terms of 
its individual features, it seems unlikely that that our perceptual system would represent 
faces simply as a list of features.  Instead there is a wealth of evidence that suggests that in 
face processing, the whole is equal to more than the sum of its parts (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 
1993).  That is to say that the more holistic, or configural spatial relationships between the 
features may play a more important role in face processing than the information about the 
individual facial features themselves. 
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One paradigm that was specifically designed to measure the interdependence of the 
featural and configural information in the face is that of the part-whole face paradigm 
(Tanaka and Farah, 1993).  Tanaka and Farah (1993) asked participants to learn a series of 
faces or houses that were presented either upright, inverted or scrambled.  Participants were 
then asked to recognise target features belonging to the previously presented faces (e.g. a 
nose) or houses (e.g. a door) that were presented either in isolation, or within the whole 
face or house.  The key finding was that participants were better at recognising the features 
from upright intact faces when they were presented within the whole face compared to 
when they were presented individually, demonstrating the importance of showing the 
features within the context of the face.  In contrast, for non-face objects (i.e. houses, 
scrambled and inverted faces), no advantage of presenting the target features in their 
context was found.  This finding lends its support to the notion that while object 
recognition relies heavily on part-based, featural representations, faces are processed in a 
more holistic fashion. 
Further evidence for the importance of configural/holistic information in the 
processing of faces can be seen from the composite face effect (e.g. Young, Hellawell & 
Hay, 1987; Hole, 1994).  This is the effect experienced when faces are divided into upper 
and lower halves and the top half of one person‘s face is then presented with the bottom 
half of someone else‘s face.  When the two halves are shown upside-down or misaligned, 
participants are quite accurate at identifying the top half of the face.  However, when the 
two halves are aligned and joined to produce a new face configuration, participants find it 
very hard to identify either half of the face.  These findings demonstrate that the ability to 
successfully extract identifying information from the individual facial features is overridden 
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by the presence of the new facial configuration.  This supports the idea that configural 
information is more important than featural information in face recognition.   
 
1.2.2.  Effects of Inversion on Configural Processing 
One thing that has become evident through face recognition research is the fact that 
adults rely heavily on the configural information contained in the face (see above).  In fact, 
the robust inversion effect (described in section 1.1.3.) is thought to be the result of a 
disruption to the configural cues contained in the face.  One source of evidence that 
suggests this might be the case comes from the Thatcher Illusion (Thompson, 1980).  In 
this illusion the eyes and the mouth within a pictured face are rotated at 180 degrees 
relative to the rest of the face, resulting in a grotesque distortion which is easily detected 
when the face is presented upright.  However, if that same face is viewed upside-down, the 
perceived degree of distortion no longer appears so great and is sometimes barely 
detectable (see Figure 1.2. for an example of this effect).  
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Figure 1.2  Illustration of the Thatcher Illusion  
 
The Thatcher Illusion illustrates our insensitivity to configural information in 
inverted faces, in this case as demonstrated by our difficulty in detecting a mismatch 
between the orientation of the face and its component features.  Without the ability to use 
the configural cues in the inverted face, we are unable to recognise the bizarre relationship 
between the different facial features, which makes the perceived grotesqueness of the 
Thatcherised faces all but disappear.  Searcy and Bartlett (1996) demonstrated the 
importance of configural information (and the lack of importance of featural information) 
in this illusion by asking participants to rate the grotesqueness of faces that had been 
subjected to either the typical Thatcher-esque spatial alterations or that had had grotesque 
changes made to the individual facial components themselves (e.g. blacking out teeth).  The 
authors found that while participants showed the typical Thatcher Illusion for spatially 
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altered faces (i.e. they rated faces as more grotesque when they were upright, compared to 
when they were inverted), faces with featural alterations were rated as similarly grotesque 
in both orientations. In addition, they concluded that as this effect is a perceptual illusion 
and does not involve memory in any way, it provides evidence that the disruption of the 
configural processing occurs at the encoding, rather than retention, level. 
Further evidence that inverting the face disrupts the configural, but not the featural, 
information in the face comes from work that has examined our ability to detect subtle 
changes made to either the spatial or featural information of faces presented either upright 
or upside-down.  For example Leder and Bruce (1998) showed that relational changes to 
the distances between facial features were better detected when faces were presented 
upright compared to inverted.  When, however, the changes that were made maintained the 
spatial relationships, but altered the individual features (i.e. replacing one feature with that 
from another face), no effect of inversion was found.  Similarly, Freire et al (2000) asked 
participants to discriminate faces that differed either in terms of the shape of individual 
features, or the spatial relationships between them and found that inversion only 
significantly reduced their accuracy when attempting to detect the spatial changes. 
 An additional finding that suggests that inversion disrupts our configural processing 
comes from the observation that the composite face effect disappears when faces are 
inverted (e.g. Young et al, 1987).  In fact, participants actually become better at identifying 
the face halves when the composites are presented upside-down.  Given that our 
recognition ability is poorer when faces are inverted this result may seem strange, however 
it can be explained in terms of the facial information that we use to identify the face.  If we 
rely more heavily on configural information, then aligning two halves of two separate faces 
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will result in the apparent creation of an entirely new facial identity.  The presence of this 
new configural information interferes with our ability to extract the featural information 
from the face, making it difficult to identify the original face halves. If however, we utilise 
more featural/piecemeal cues we can identify the face from its features; and this is what we 
see when the faces are inverted.  By inverting the face it appears that we are reducing our 
reliance on configural processing
2
, giving rise to more featural processing, allowing us to 
see the constituent identities.   
 
1.3 The Role of Familiarity in Face Recognition 
 
One issue that one comes up against when asking how we recognise faces is the fact 
that a plethora of research has suggested that not all faces are treated in the same way.  One 
important factor seems to be how familiar we are with the face(s) being recognised.  
Anecdotally we know that recognising the face of someone we know well is easier than 
recognising the face of someone with whom we have had little experience.  Bruce (1982) 
demonstrated that we are generally very good at quickly and accurately recognising the 
face of somebody we know, despite the potentially huge variations in factors such as 
viewpoint, illumination of the face and facial expression.  In contrast, our ability to 
recognise, or even match, unfamiliar faces is fairly poor (e.g. Burton, Bruce & Hancock, 
                                                 
 
2
 NB – there is also evidence that featural processing plays an important role in expert face processing and 
that inversion disrupts this information to some extent (e.g. Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer et al, 2002; 
Rhodes, Hayward & Winkler, 2006).  However as inversion appears to disrupt featural processing much less 
than configural processing  (e.g. Collishaw & Hole, 2000), this thesis will concentrate on the role of 
configural processing in expert face processing.  Although it is worth acknowledging at this point that the 
inversion effect is likely to be the result of impaired encoding of both the configural and featural cues 
contained in the face.   
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1999; Bruce, Henderson, Newman, & Burton, 2001; Yarmey, 1979).  These differences 
suggest that we may process familiar and unfamiliar faces in a different manner. 
In order to try and shed some light on this issue, a number of face processing 
models have been developed which have tried to account for how faces of different 
familiarity may be processed.  Perhaps the most influential of these models is that proposed 
by Bruce and Young (1986), which is illustrated in Figure 1.3. below. 
 
Figure 1.3  Bruce and Young’s (1986) functional model of familiar face recognition.   
 
In this model Bruce and Young (1986) emphasise that our experience with faces 
plays an important role in face recognition by suggesting that familiar and unfamiliar faces 
are processed in qualitatively different ways.  They suggest that familiar face recognition 
essentially takes place through a process of successfully matching the structural 
information that is encoded upon seeing a face with a stored representation of that face in 
the ―Face Recognition Units‖ (FRUs; the processing component that contains information 
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about all of the faces one knows).  If matching occurs, the appropriate FRU automatically 
fires, sending a signal to the ―Person Identity Nodes‖ (PINs) which then allows semantic 
information about individuals to be accessed.  Through these nodes, name generation can 
be accessed.  In contrast, unfamiliar faces are processed from the early structural 
representations via directed visual processing.  This allows a temporary visual 
representation of the face to be built up, and it is this processing module that is thought to 
be responsible for mediating simple face judgments and recognition of unfamiliar faces 
(Campbell, Brooks, deHaan & Roberts, 1996).   
Evidence that supports the notion that familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed 
using qualitatively different cognitive strategies can be found in the experimental 
psychology literature.  For example, Ellis, Shepherd and Davis (1979) tried to address the 
issue of exactly what it is about a face that gives way to recognition (of both familiar and 
unfamiliar faces), by investigating which facial features/properties are important to these 
processes.  In two experiments the authors presented participants with photographs of either 
familiar (famous) or unfamiliar faces which they were asked to remember.  Using a 
standard recognition memory paradigm, participants were then asked to identify the faces 
that they had seen before from a selection of photographs which were presented either in 
whole, or in part (either showing only the internal facial features or the external facial 
features).  Ellis et al found that recognition accuracy rates of famous faces were higher 
when internal features were presented in isolation compared to when only external features 
were presented.  This ‗internal advantage‘ was not present for the unfamiliar faces.   
In a similar study, although using a face-matching paradigm, Young, Hay,  
McWeeny, Flude and Ellis (1985) also found evidence that the internal features of the face 
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are of relatively greater importance for the processing of familiar faces than unfamiliar 
faces, a pattern which has been replicated by Bonner, Burton, and Bruce (2003). These 
findings support the notion that familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed in qualitatively 
different ways, and suggest that recognition of faces of higher familiarity relies more 
heavily on the configurally rich internal features of the face than the external features.  
  Additionally, neuropsychological studies have provided evidence that we process 
familiar and unfamiliar faces differently.  For example, Warrington and James (1967) 
reported a patient who was specifically unable to recognise familiar faces (prosopagnosia), 
but who was still able to successfully match photographs of unfamiliar faces.  The opposite 
pattern has also been observed.  Benton (1980) described a patient who was unable to 
match unfamiliar faces, but was able to recognise the faces of familiar people.  This double 
dissociation appears to indicate that familiar faces are processed in a qualitatively different 
way to unfamiliar faces, using different mechanisms, a claim that is also supported by 
studies implicating the involvement of different regions of the brain for processing these 
different classes of facial stimuli (George at al, 1999; Wiser et al, 2000).  Thus, the role of 
familiarity in face recognition is one that has important implications for how we process 
and recognise faces. 
However, while it is clear that familiarity plays an important role in face 
recognition, whether the difference between processing familiar and unfamiliar faces is 
truly a qualitative one has not gone unquestioned.  Firstly, while internal features are found 
to be of relatively greater importance in the processing familiar faces, that is not to say that 
they are of no importance in unfamiliar faces.  It may just be that as external features (e.g. 
hair, face shape etc) are more changeable, they are less likely to be useful cues to rely on 
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for the recognition of someone who one has known for a long period of time, and thus 
reliance on these cues quantitatively decreases accordingly; whilst the reliance on internal 
cues, in turn, increases.  In regard to the neuropsychological evidence, research in this area 
often confounds the familiarity of the stimuli with the nature of the task (i.e. face matching 
for unfamiliar faces versus recognition paradigms for familiar faces).  As such, it is unclear 
whether a true double dissociation between the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces 
can really be claimed.   
However, these criticisms do not belittle the influence that familiarity has on face 
recognition.  Instead, it has been suggested that the difference between processing faces of 
different familiarity is a quantitative, not a qualitative one.  For example, Rhodes (1985) 
and Burton, Jenkins, Hancock and White (2005) suggest that the processes involved in 
recognising familiar and unfamiliar faces are essentially the same (i.e. the facial images are 
all mapped onto memory representations), they just take place at different points on a 
continuum that varies with regard to the strength of the memory trace (and other associated 
codes).  If a face is unfamiliar, these authors argue that a representation (albeit a relatively 
rudimentary one) will be formed on first sight, which will be capable of giving rise to 
recognition in subsequent viewings.  This memory representation becomes more robust 
with subsequent exposures to the face, making the face more familiar and easier to 
recognise. 
Regardless of whether the difference that familiarity makes in face recognition is a 
qualitative or a quantitative one, it clearly plays an important role in the processing of 
individual faces.  One question that this thesis seeks to address is whether the influence that 
familiarity has on face processing can be extended from the realm of individual faces, to a 
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more general influence on groups of faces.  For example, there are some groups of faces 
with which we have more experience (and hence are more familiar with) than others; the 
question is, does this extra experience have any implications for the way in which we 
process those faces in comparison to faces belonging to other, less familiar groups? 
 
 
1.4. The Practical Implications Associated with the Recognition of Faces of 
Differing Familiarity. 
 
The ability to successfully recognise faces that we have seen before is extremely 
important in everyday life and research into this area is of great theoretical, personal and 
practical importance.  The understanding of how we encode visual information from the 
face and how we are later able to recall/recognise this information lays the foundations for 
the development of theories of face perception (and also informs our knowledge about 
visual perception as a whole).  The significant role that face recognition plays in terms of 
the more personal and practical domains is perhaps best illustrated using examples of 
instances where face recognition fails.  While there is the obvious embarrassment that is 
associated with the social faux pas of not recognising someone that you have met several 
times before (i.e. a familiar face),  the consequences associated with this kind of error when 
the target face is relatively unfamiliar can be significantly more devastating when 
considered in terms of eyewitness identification. 
Eyewitness testimony is often the most persuasive evidence given in a court case, 
and it has the power to lead to the conviction (or exoneration) of the accused.  Previous 
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research has shown that jurors believe witness statements about 70% of the time (Lindsay, 
Wells & O‘Connor, 1989; Loftus, 1983).  Unfortunately though, further evidence has 
shown that while eyewitness testimony is highly influential, jurors are unable to tell 
whether the testimony given is accurate or not; accurate eyewitnesses are believed about 
68% of the time, in comparison to 70% for inaccurate witnesses (Lindsay, Wells & 
O‘Connor, 1989).  If eyewitnesses were 100% accurate in their memory for an event, then 
this issue would not present a problem, however previous research has shown that we are 
notoriously inaccurate when trying to recall/recognise the face of someone we have only 
seen once before (i.e. an unfamiliar face). 
In order to further understand how reliable eyewitness identifications are, and to 
gain further insight into the real-world implications of this, a number of studies have 
investigated the actual outcomes of lineup identifications by witnesses in the UK.  
Valentine, Pickering and Darling (2003) investigated the outcome of 640 eyewitnesses‘ 
attempts to identify suspects implicated in serious crimes from 302 live lineups.  They were 
particularly concerned with establishing which factors were likely to predict an increased 
likelihood of positively identifying a suspect from a lineup.  The factors they investigated 
were those that a jury has to be legally informed about according to the ―Turnbull 
guidelines‖ (R v Turnbull and others, 1976).  In England, a judge presiding over a case 
where the outcome is substantially dependent on eyewitness evidence is legally obliged to 
notify the jury of the inherently unreliable nature of identification evidence and the need for 
caution when considering this evidence.  In particular, they are obliged to instruct a jury to 
carefully consider the following factors when deliberating: the amount of time for which 
the witness viewed the suspect, the distance between them, the conditions of visibility, 
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whether the witness knew the suspect, if there were any reasons for the witness to 
remember the suspect, the time lapse between seeing the suspect and identifying them and 
whether there were any discrepancies in the descriptions given by witnesses.   
As a result of their enquiry, Valentine, Pickering and Darling (2003) found that only 
two of the above-mentioned factors had a significant effect in predicting whether a witness 
positively identified a suspect: whether or not the suspect was familiar to the witness and 
for how long the witness saw the suspect (which is arguably also a measure of familiarity).  
The effect that familiarity has on eyewitness identifications is evidenced by their findings 
that when the suspect was known to the witness, 73% of witnesses picked the suspect from 
the lineup, 5% picked a foil
3
 while the others made no identifications.  In contrast, when the 
suspect was unknown to the witness, only 41% of the witnesses identified the suspect, and 
21% misidentified a filler.  This latter finding is consistent with the findings of two studies 
that also investigated the outcomes of real lineup identifications in the UK.  In their survey 
of 616 lineups in Greater London (including 1561 witnesses), Wright and McDaid (1996) 
found that 39% of their witnesses identified the suspect, while 20% identified a filler.  
Similarly, in an even earlier study, Slater (1994) found that eyewitnesses picked the suspect 
36% of the time, while 22% picked somebody else from the lineup.   
What is evident from these studies is that witnesses erroneously choose someone 
known to be innocent around 20% of the time (i.e. they choose fillers).  However, this 
                                                 
 
3
 A lineup is a police procedure whereby witnesses to a crime view the person that the police suspect 
committed the crime in amongst a number of members of the public.  The innocent parties are known as foils, 
fillers and distracters in the forensic psychology literature.  The witness is then asked to identify the 
perpetrator from the lineup, after being informed that they may or may not be present.  
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number may well be an underestimate.  This is due to the fact that the person the police 
suspect of committing a crime is not always the perpetrator.  In fact the main purpose of a 
lineup procedure and eyewitness identification is to gather evidence to ascertain whether or 
not the suspect is likely to be the culprit.  This suggests that out of the 40% of witnesses 
who positively identify a suspect, at least some of them are likely to have made an 
erroneous identification.  In fact, through a review of the existing research in eyewitness 
identification, Penrod (2003) estimated that when a suspect is identified as the culprit by 
the witness, the suspect will be innocent 14% of the time.  This is a disturbing statistic, with 
even more disturbing potential real-world consequences.   
The misidentification of a police suspect as the perpetrator of a crime can lead, and 
has led, to the false imprisonment of an innocent person.  Knowing the extent of these 
miscarriages of justice has only recently been made possible, predominantly through the 
advancements in DNA research, which was first introduced into the forensic arena in 1986.  
The development of DNA testing gives those who have been incarcerated for a crime that 
they did not commit a chance of proving their innocence if appropriate samples were 
collected in the original investigation.  Such is the power of DNA evidence, several 
organisations around the world have been set up with the sole aim of exonerating wrongly 
convicted people though DNA testing.   
Perhaps one of the most influential organisations is that of The Innocence Project, 
which is run by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, based in America.  Since its 
inception in 1992, The Innocence Project has overturned 238 convictions (as of 09/05/09).  
The average length of time served by those who were exonerated is 12 years, with 17 of 
those innocent people serving time on death row.  And most worrying is the fact that the 
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leading cause for these wrongful convictions, accounting for 77% of the cases, was 
eyewitness misidentification. This finding has been supported by studies in the forensic 
psychology literature which have reviewed a number of cases that have been overturned 
due to subsequent contrary DNA evidence.  For example, of the sixty-two cases that were 
investigated in two studies, fifty-two of them (85%) involved mistaken eyewitness 
identification as a leading cause of conviction (Conners, Lundregan, Miller & McEwen, 
1996; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000).  It is for this reason alone that understanding the 
circumstances under which a witness is likely to be reliable (or not) is of the utmost 
importance. 
This section has examined the real world impact that familiarity can have on 
eyewitness identification and, as the face is the most important key to person‘s identity, 
face recognition accuracy.  As stated at the end of Section 1.3., this thesis seeks to 
investigate whether this influence of familiarity extends beyond that of increasing the 
accuracy with which we recognise individual faces.  While we are more likely to positively 
identify the face of someone we are more familiar with, than of someone we are not, does 
this familiarity effect have a more general influence on face recognition?  For example, are 
there some groups of faces which we are likely to be better at recognising than others?  If 
familiarity plays a more general role in face recognition then we would expect this to be the 
case, as there are some groups of faces with which have more experience than others (for 
example, we tend to be more familiar with faces from our own demographic, as we tend to 
spend more time with people of our own age, race etc).   
If we are better at recognising people from our own age group, then this could have 
several implications for how reliable an eyewitness is likely to be in court and how much 
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weight should therefore be given to an individual‘s testimony.  Given that the British Crime 
Survey for 2001 revealed that the majority of persons accused of a crime (cautioned, 
charged or summoned 1999-2000) by the Metropolitan Police force are males aged between 
16-24 years of age (Bolling, Clemens, Phelps & Smith, 2002), it might be that young adults 
(who are more familiar with people of this age group) are more likely to be accurate 
eyewitnesses than people belonging to a different age group.  It is this notion that will be 
further discussed and analysed throughout this thesis.  And it is one that certainly merits 
further investigation.   
In their study investigating the effects of various factors on the likelihood of a 
witness positively identifying a suspect from a lineup, Valentine et al (2003) noted that in 
their London-based sample, the accuracy of the witness significantly decreased with age.  
That is, while 48% of witnesses under 20 and 45.7% of witness between 21-30 years of age 
(the age brackets containing the most common age band of offenders in the Metropolitan 
area) positively identified the suspect from a lineup, this was only the case for 35.6% of 31-
40 years olds and 27.9% of those over 40.  Interestingly though, age did not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of the witness identifying a foil.  While this may be a bit 
of a theoretical leap at this stage, these findings suggest that increased familiarity with an 
age group may give rise to better recognition of faces belonging to that age group (even 
though the faces are individually personally unfamiliar).  However at this juncture it is 
difficult to make these claims without knowing the exact ages of the suspects/foils included 
in this study.  It is also impossible to rule out the fact that the decreasing accuracy with age 
might just be a product of the ageing process itself, and nothing to do with the age of the 
suspects.   
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Before further discussion of this effect takes place, it is first important to ascertain 
1.) whether it is likely that faces belonging to different age groups might be processed in a 
distinct manner (that is, whether faces of differing ages are sufficiently different from one 
another to be treated in different ways by our perceptual system) and 2.) how our ability to 
recognise faces changes with age. 
 
1.5  Are Faces of Different Ages Physiognomically and Perceptually Distinct? 
  
 In order to ascertain whether it is likely that faces belonging to different age groups 
may be processed in differing ways, it is first necessary to determine whether the variation 
between faces of different age groups is sufficient enough to allow them to be treated as 
separate by our perceptual system.  Unless there are noticeable physiognomic facial 
changes with age, it is unlikely that we would process faces of different age groups 
differently, making it very unlikely that familiarity effects would be possible with faces of 
different age groups. 
 
1.5.1  The Ageing Face 
While there has been a substantial body of research into how we recognise faces and 
other face processing abilities, comparatively little attention has been given to age 
perception and the role that facial age may play in face recognition.  For example, existing 
models of familiar face recognition have largely failed to include consideration of how 
face-processing systems manage to recognise a face as being familiar despite age-induced 
changes (e.g. Bruce and Young, 1986; Burton, Bruce and Johnston, 1990).  As George and 
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Hole (1998) point out, this is a major omission in our understanding of the processes 
underlying face perception.  The issue of how our visual system manages to recognise faces 
despite age related changes is one instance of a more general issue that researchers in this 
field face.  That is, how do we establish a match between a face that we see and an internal 
stored representation of that face, considering all of the changes that take place between 
one encounter with the face and the next (e.g. light, position, expression, age, etc)?  
Familiar face recognition is not the only domain in which the role of facial age has gone 
relatively unexplored.  Research into unfamiliar face processing has also failed to give due 
attention to the process of facial ageing.   
This omission in the face processing literature is surprising, especially given the 
importance of age as a facial characteristic: Shepard, Davis and Ellis (1981) identified age 
as one of only three major dimensions that seem to account for all perceived variation 
between faces (along with hair and face shape).  And why shouldn‘t age be important?  
After all, the facial changes brought about by ageing are by no means subtle.  From when 
we are born all the way through to old age our faces are constantly changing in a number of 
ways.  Our facial appearance is determined by both the underlying shape and growth of our 
skull, and also by muscular tone, the distribution of fatty tissue and the texture and 
pigmentation of our skin, all of which are factors that change with age. 
From birth through to adulthood some substantial structural and textural changes to 
the shape of the face and skull take place (review in Enlow, 1982).  As infants we have 
smooth skin, small noses and relatively large eyes, set lower down in the face.  Throughout 
childhood and into adolescence our cranio-facial shape is subject to considerable alteration 
due to a cardiodial strain transformation, which results in seemingly longer facial features 
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(especially as our nose and nasal bridge grows), a more defined face shape (particularly the 
chin and jaw line) and a reduced forehead.  Beyond adolescence and throughout adulthood 
our hair starts to grey and thin out, nose and ears continue to grow and our bones thin.   
Like all organs, our skin is also subject to the degenerative process of ageing.  
Levels of elastin decrease with age, and without it skin loses elasticity resulting in changes 
to our skin texture.  Dermal tissue atrophies as part of the ageing process and decreases by 
approximately 20% in older people and the collagen content of the dermis decreases by 
about 1% per year throughout adult life (Rigel, Weiss, Lim & Dover, 2004).  These 
biological changes to the facial soft tissue, coupled with the repeated traction exerted by 
our facial muscles over expression lines, produce increased wrinkling as we progress 
though adulthood.  In addition, the collaborative effects of the reduction (and redistribution) 
of subcutaneous facial fat and the persistent gravitational forces we are subjected to 
throughout our lifetime combine to produce sagging, loose skin (Nigam and Knight, 2008).  
In short, we look very different at various points throughout our life. 
One study that has provided evidence of how the facial changes brought about by 
age can substantially alter our appearance is that of Bruck, Cavanagh and Ceci (1991).  In 
their face recognition study, participants were asked to match high-school photographs with 
pictures of the same people 25 years later.  Participants were either former classmates of the 
people depicted in the photographs, or they were complete strangers (controls).  While 
those who had prior familiarity with the faces performed more accurately than the controls, 
their performance was far from perfect, achieving a mean of only 49% accuracy (compared 
to 33% for the controls; chance performance was 10%).  Despite performance being above 
chance, this performance is still pretty poor, especially considering that some of the 
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participants had once been personally familiar with the photographed subjects.  In addition, 
these accuracy rates are considerably lower than those usually seen in either familiar or 
unfamiliar face matching tasks when there are no age differences between the photographs 
of the targets, where we normally achieve around 90% and 70% accuracy respectively (e.g. 
Bruce et al, 1999; Bruce, Henderson, Newman & Burton, 2001).  As such, this study 
illustrates that even when we have been personally familiar with a face, the changes 
brought about by ageing make it difficult for us to recognise them.   
 
1.5.2  The Perception of Facial Age 
  As the previous section discussed, our face can look very different at different 
points throughout our life.  The changes brought about by ageing are varied and plenty.  
However one question that has not yet been addressed is whether we are successfully able 
to extract age information from a face allowing us to accurately estimate a person‘s age.  
To this end a number of studies have asked participants to view facial photographs 
belonging to different age bands and estimate their ages.  For example a couple of recent 
studies by George and Hole (2000) and Sörqvist and Eriksson (2007) have demonstrated 
that that we are fairly accurate at perceiving facial age, with estimated age only deviating 
from actual age by a magnitude of about 3-4 years.  These studies are in line with those that 
have illustrated our ability to estimate the age of photographic stimuli to within a few years 
of the actual ages of individuals (Burt & Perrett, 1995; George & Hole, 1998; Pittenger & 
Shaw, 1975). 
However, there is evidence that some groups of people are better able to accurately 
estimate facial age that others.  For example, Dehon and Bredart (2001) showed black and 
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white participants photos of individuals belonging to both racial groups, aged between 20-
45 years old. They found that while black participants were equally accurate at assessing 
the ages of both groups of photographs, white participants performed significantly more 
accurately with own-race faces.  The authors concluded that this asymmetrical own-race 
advantage for age perception may have been the result of the fact that the participants had 
lived in a majority Caucasian population for at least 5 years.  Thus higher inter-racial 
experience had eliminated such a perceptual advantage for the black participants. 
It appears that there may be an experience-based own-group age perception 
advantage, at least in terms of race.  Another dimension along which age estimates have 
been found to vary is in terms of the age of the perceiver themselves.  For example, some 
studies have shown that participants are more accurate at estimating the age of facial 
photographs when the faces belong to the same age bands as themselves (Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2006; George & Hole, 1995).  This own-age age estimation advantage has also 
been found with children as young as 6 years old (George, Hole & Scaife, 2000).  Using a 
slightly different procedure than that usually used for assessing age estimation accuracy, 
the authors showed children pairs of facial stimuli, aged between 1-80 years old, and asked 
them to identify which was the oldest face.  They found that children performed 
significantly more accurately when both photographs were of child age (the cohort which 
they are arguably most familiar with).   It is of note, however, that while these studies have 
found evidence of an own-age age perception advantage, a study investigating the ability of 
participants to estimate the ages of facial stimuli spanning 35 years and in seven distinct 
age groups showed no such effect (Burt & Perret, 1995).   
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 In summary, research has shown that we are able to estimate facial age to a high 
degree of accuracy.  In addition, there is some evidence that we may be better at this age 
estimation when the faces we are perceiving belong to the same in-group as us (e.g. they 
are of the same race, age group etcetera).  Although given the dearth of research that has 
been carried out in this area, further work may be necessary to establish whether this is 
truly is the case. 
 
1.6 Becoming a Face Expert: The Development of Face Recognition 
 
1.6.1. Face Recognition Accuracy from Birth to Adulthood. 
 As adults we are experts at processing faces.  From viewing a single face we can 
quickly and efficiently gain a plethora of information; we can tell someone‘s age, gender 
and race, gauge someone‘s mood from their expression, read their lips, follow their gaze 
and, perhaps most impressively, identify who they are.  However the question of how we 
develop this expertise is still the subject of some debate.  From as early as 9 minutes after 
birth we do appear to show some rudimentary face processing skills (e.g. Goren, Sarty & 
Wu, 1979).  Newborns attend more to face-like stimuli than non-face patterns (Goren et al, 
1979; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & Morton, 1991; Mondloch et al, 1999; Valenza, Simion, 
Cassia, & Umiltà, 1996) suggesting that we may be born with a reflex-like sub-cortical 
mechanism that encourages infants to direct their attention towards faces immediately after 
birth (Johnson and Morton, 1991).  Johnson and Morton proposed that this mechanism 
(termed conspec) is effective during the first two months of life and contains an innate 
representation of the human face that essentially comprises information about the first-
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order spatial arrangement of the main facial features (e.g. two eyes above the nose, which is 
above the mouth).  The main function of conspec is hypothesised to be to ensure infants 
orient to toward face-like patterns, so that the correct input is provided for the rapidly 
developing cortical circuitry, and it is this that may well lay the foundation for our expert 
face processing abilities in adulthood.  This theory suggests that the information contained 
in the face about the spatial relationships between the constituent features are important 
from the moment we are born. 
 In addition to orienting towards faces, neonates have also been seen to exhibit more 
complex face recognition abilities.  Visual preference and habituation techniques have been 
used to show that neonates, averaging between 12 and 78 hours old, are able to discriminate 
their mother‘s face from a stranger‘s (Bushnell, 2001; Bushnell, Sai & Mullen, 1989; Field, 
Cohen, Garcia & Greenberg, 1984; Pascalis, Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fabre-Grenet, 
1995; Walton, Bower & Bower, 1992).  Not only did infants prefer to look at their mothers 
in visual preference tasks, but after repeated exposure, habituation to their mother‘s face 
occurred, followed by a renewal of interest when the stranger‘s face was presented.  This 
illustrates that even very young infants are able to discriminate between faces, and 
preference for their mother‘s face suggests that despite extremely limited exposure, infants 
can recognise at least some aspect of their mother‘s face.   
 So it would appear that within moments of being born we are able to demonstrate at 
least some evidence of face processing and recognition skills.  Obviously this does not 
necessarily mean that neonates process information about faces in the same way as adults 
do, but it does seem that newborns come into the world with some rudimentary face 
processing mechanisms.  However, young children are not as proficient as adults at 
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processing faces, particularly with regard to face recognition.  Even when memory 
demands are eliminated (for example, when using face matching tasks rather than 
traditional memory paradigms to measure facial recognition ability), children still perform 
worse than adults (see Bruce et al, 2000).   
Over the last 40 years, a number of studies have sought to track the development of 
face recognition abilities in children.  Using either two alternative forced-choice (e.g. Carey 
& Diamond, 1977; Carey, Diamond & Woods, 1980; Goldstein & Chance, 1964; 1965) or 
old/new recognition paradigms (e.g. Ellis & Flin, 1990) face identification accuracy has 
been shown to increase steadily between the ages of 6 years old and 9-10 years old.  
Beyond age ten, face recognition abilities continue to improve into adolescence and 
following a slight dip around age twelve, reaches asymptote in the mid-to-late teens (e.g. 
Carey et al, 1980; Flin, 1980; 1983; George, Hole & Scaife, 2000).  
While studies using traditional research methodologies have suggested that 
children‘s face recognition abilities are relatively poor, research from the more forensic 
spheres has produced very different results.  For example, in their meta-analysis of studies 
employing either target present or target absent line-ups to assess face recognition, Pozzulo 
and Lindsay (1998) found that by 5-6 years of age children were able to correctly identify a 
target with adult-like accuracy.  This is possibly due to the fact that task demands in these 
types of study are considerably less than those involved in more traditional recognition 
memory paradigms, where participants are typically asked to recognise a relatively large 
number of photographic facial stimuli.  However, while this study appears to suggest that 
children‘s face recognition abilities may have been underestimated by the more lab-based 
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studies, it is of note that all age groups of children (between 4-13 years of age) performed 
worse than adults with target-absent line-ups, misidentifying significantly more foils.   
In addition, at least one study using a traditional memory paradigm has found 
evidence that previous work may have underestimated children‘s face recognition abilities.  
In a study by Feinman and Entwisle (1976) it was found that children reached adult levels 
of identification accuracy by the age of 11 years old.  One potential reason for this finding 
may be due to the nature of the stimuli that were used in this study.  While most recognition 
studies present participants with faces of adults, this study used children‘s faces.  The 
suggestion is that children may find the recognition of own-age faces easier than that of 
adult faces, possibly as a result of the fact that they have more experience with (and 
therefore more knowledge of) faces belonging to their own age group.  This idea is 
supported by the finding that children perform in a more adult-like fashion in face 
processing studies when the facial stimuli are similar in age to themselves (e.g. George, 
Hole & Scaife, 2000).  In addition, it is possible that adults are less familiar with children‘s 
faces and are therefore slightly impaired in their performance.  This idea is certainly 
supported by the finding that adults are less accurate at recognising faces of children than 
faces of adults (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; Kuefner, Cassia, Picozzi & Bricolo, 2008).  
 The majority of developmental face recognition studies show that our ability to 
accurately recognise faces increases throughout our childhood, reaching an asymptote in 
our teenage years.  However it is possible that we can perform with adult-like accuracy at 
an even earlier age if the task demands are made relatively easier, particularly if the faces 
used as stimuli are of a more familiar age group (i.e. consist of own-age faces).  Once 
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adulthood is reached, we are experts at recognising faces (Carey & Diamond, 1977; 1994) 
and we remain face experts for most of our adult lives. 
 
1.6.2. Becoming a Face Expert; The Development of Configural Processing 
One of the key issues that is discussed in the face recognition literature is whether 
children process faces in the same way as adults and simply get more efficient at doing so 
as they get older (a quantitative difference) or whether they use different processes and 
strategies to adults (a qualitative difference).  One source of research that suggests the 
difference between adult and child performance is a qualitative one is that of Diamond and 
Carey (1986).  They suggested that the developmental pattern observed for face recognition 
was due to a difference in the encoding strategies employed at different ages, with older 
children and adults relying more on configural processing and younger children encoding 
more piecemeal/featural characteristics.  One study that lends itself to this notion of a 
qualitative encoding switch is that of Diamond and Carey (1977) who investigated age 
differences in the recognition performance for disguised faces.  Their results revealed that 
children under 10 made significantly more recognition errors than older children and adults 
when facial images were disguised using misleading paraphernalia such as clothing, wigs, 
hats and glasses, supporting the idea that these children relied more on paraphernalia 
(piecemeal) cues than those older than 10 years of age.   
Carey and Diamond (1977) further strengthened the encoding switch hypothesis 
using a recognition paradigm for upright and inverted faces.  They found that children 
under the age of 10 recognised inverted faces as accurately as upright faces, whereas older 
children displayed an inversion effect similar to that of adults, with poorer performance on 
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inverted faces compared to upright faces.  As inversion disrupts the encoding of configural 
features, older children and adults have to use a featural encoding strategy to recognise 
inverted faces, which is less efficient than a holistic strategy, hence the drop in 
performance.  Carey and Diamond concluded that, as younger children‘s recognition is not 
affected by face inversion, they must be using featural encoding for upright faces as well as 
for inverted faces, therefore supporting the notion of a qualitative difference in facial 
processing.   
However Carey and Diamond‘s interpretation of their findings has not gone 
unchallenged.  For example, Flin (1985) suggested that the observed pattern of results may 
have been attributable to the difficulty of the task that Carey and Diamond employed.  
Specifically, Flin claimed that Carey and Diamond‘s inability to find an inversion effect in 
young children may have been the result of floor effects.  Using a smaller selection of 
stimuli and longer exposure times to control for task difficulty, Flin found that children 
under the age of 10 years old do indeed demonstrate an adult-like inversion effect.  In fact a 
more recent study has shown that when the task is appropriate for the age of the participant, 
children as young as 5 years old exhibit this adult-like pattern (Brace et al, 2001).  In 
addition, Diamond and Carey (1977) themselves showed that children as young as 6 years 
old were able to perform in an adult-like manner when the faces used were suitably familiar 
to them, a finding replicated by Young and Bion (1981).   
Studies using the Composite Face Effect have produced similar results.  Carey and 
Diamond (1994) presented 6 and 10 year olds with composite (aligned) and non-composite 
(not aligned) photographs of personally familiar faces (their classmates) and asked them to 
identify the upper face portion of the face.  The authors found that, like adults, both age 
38 
 
 
groups of children were slower to recognise composite faces than the non-composite faces.  
The presence of a composite face effect suggests that children as young as six exhibit an 
adult-like configural form of processing, perceiving the upper half of the face in 
conjunction with its lower counterpart and in the context of the face as a whole.  This is a 
notion that is certainly supported by Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield and Szechter (1998) 
who, using a part-whole face paradigm, found children as young as six performed best at 
recognising target features when they were presented within the whole face rather than in 
isolation. 
Together these findings suggest that while they are not as proficient as adults at face 
recognition, young children may still be able to use the configural information in the face.  
One study specifically sought to track the development of both featural and configural 
processing throughout childhood.  Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer (2002) carried out a 
face-matching task, where adults, and children aged 6, 8, and 10 years were asked to 
identify whether upright and inverted faces were the same, or if they had been altered in 
some way.  Faces either differed in terms of the shape of the facial features (featurally 
different), the spacing between the features (configurally different), or in the external shape 
of the face.  The authors found that children performed with adult-like accuracy by age 10 
for the featural task.  In contrast, while children demonstrated an ability to use the 
configural information in the face (i.e. they performed better than chance with the 
configurally changed faces and they exhibited an inversion effect) their accuracy on the 
configural task increased with age and did not reach adult levels.  This suggests that while 
featural processing is fully developed at a young age, the ability to expertly use the 
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configural information in the face, an ability that is the hallmark of expert face processing, 
is not fully developed until after 10 years of age.   
 
1.6.3. Beyond Expertise: Age Related Deficits in Face Recognition 
While, as young adults we are face experts, a number of studies have shown that as 
we approach old age our abilities appear to wane.  A number of lab-based studies have 
investigated the face recognition abilities of elderly adults compared to young adults 
following the presentation of a large number of faces (e.g. Bartlett & Fulton, 1991; Bartlett, 
Strater & Fulton, 1991; Smith & Winograd, 1978).  The main finding of these studies was 
that recognition performance was poorer for the elderly participants, and was particularly 
characterised by an increase in false recognitions of never-seen-before faces (and an 
increased perceived familiarity of those faces).  A later study by Crook and Larrabee (1992) 
sought to shed more light on the decline of face recognition accuracy in late adulthood by 
tracking the performance of adults at every decade of their lives from 18-80 years old.  
Using a face recognition and delayed matching task, the authors found that age decrements 
in performance occurred as early as 50 years of age, with the sharpest decline occurring 
amongst those over 70 years old.  This finding demonstrates that the age-related decline in 
face memory does not follow a linear pattern and is in line with more general memory 
research which has illustrated a similar acceleration in memory deterioration in those over 
the age of 70 years old (Parkin, 1997). 
Evidence for an age-related decline in face recognition accuracy also comes from 
the eyewitness testimony literature.  For example, in a study by Adams-Price (1992) young, 
middle-aged and older adults watched two short films in which a theft occurred.  Following 
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each video, the participants were shown 15 mugshots of people, one of whom was the 
perpetrator, who they were asked to try and identify.  The author found that age was 
significantly negatively related to identification accuracy, with older adults performing 
worse than the younger groups.  This finding was similar to that of O‘Rourke, Penrod, 
Cutler and Stuve (1989) who asked 18-74 year olds to identify the perpetrator of a 
previously viewed crime from a video line-up.  O‘Rourke et al found that this age-related 
deterioration in identification accuracy was most noticeable for adults over the age of 50 
years old, and their performance was particularly impaired when the perpetrator was not 
present in the line-up.  More recently, a number of further eyewitness-type studies using 
both target–present and target–absent lineups have replicated these findings confirming an 
increase in false identification rates and in many cases, a decrease in hit rates in old age 
(Memon, Hope, Bartlett & Bull, 2002; Memon & Bartlett, 2002; Searcy, Bartlett & Seipel, 
2000; Searcy, Bartlett & Memon, 2000; Searcy, Bartlett, Memon, & Swanson, 2001).   
An age-related decline in face recognition accuracy may not, in itself, be surprising 
given the amount of literature there is on the general memory and cognitive deficits related 
to old age (e.g. Grady & Craik, 2000; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Salthouse, 2003; 2004).  
However, this observation may be misleading.  The apparent decrease in face identification 
accuracy may not be entirely due to the characteristics of the observer (in this case their 
age), but may in fact, at least in part, be the result of the facial stimuli used in most face 
recognition studies.  It is of note that in all of the above-mentioned studies, the facial 
stimuli and/or actors that were used were young adults.  As a result, the younger adult 
groups were being asked to identify own-age faces, while the older groups were not.  It 
may, therefore be the case that older adults are not necessarily worse at recognising faces 
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than younger adults, but are instead hindered in some way by the fact that the faces in the 
photographs do not belong to the same age group as themselves.  
 
1.7 An Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition?  
 
 Previous research has suggested that young adults are better at recognising faces 
and make more accurate eyewitness identifications than older adults (e.g. Adams-Price, 
1992; Searcy, Bartlett & Memon, 2000; Searcy, Bartlett, Memon, & Swanson, 2001; 
Yarmey, 1993).  While it is known that cognitive performance deteriorates with age (see 
Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004 for a review), this apparent difference in facial memory 
performance might be partly due to the nature of the stimuli that are commonly used in face 
recognition studies.  For example, most of the studies that have looked at face recognition 
performance of different age groups have compared undergraduates (or those of a similar 
age group) with older adults.  However the targets and distractors used in these studies are 
usually faces of college age.  It is therefore possible that younger adults' superior 
recognition accuracy is the result of some kind of own-age processing bias.  
It is of note that many of the studies investigating the phenomenon conceptualise 
the ―own-age bias‖ differently.  While some take it to refer to a recognition advantage for 
own age faces over other age faces, others take it to indicate an advantage of one group of 
participants over another when presented with faces belonging to their own age group.  
While initially these two interpretations may appear to be similar, they are in fact referring 
to two very different effects.  For example, younger and older adults may be shown faces 
belonging to both age groups.  Young adults may exhibit a recognition advantage for own-
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age faces over faces of the older adults, and they may perform better than the older adult 
participants for the young adult faces.  In this case, young adults would exhibit an own-age 
bias in terms of both definitions.  In contrast, the older adults may perform better with faces 
belonging to their own-age group compared to faces of the younger adults, however their 
accuracy for recognising the older adult faces may be at an equivalent level to that of the 
younger adults.  In this case, an own-age bias for the older adults would only exist in terms 
of the first definition offered.  While both conceptualisations are important when 
researching the own-age bias, it is equally important to draw attention to and clarify these 
two meanings.  As such, this thesis will refer to the ―own-age bias‖ as meaning the relative 
advantage of recognising own-age, compared to other-age faces (the first of these two 
definitions), however as illustrated by the above example, both effects may occur 
simultaneously.   
 
1.7.1. The Own-Age Bias in Adults  
Relatively little research has been performed on this topic, but the few studies that 
have been carried out do appear to provide evidence for an own-age bias in person 
recognition.  For example, one of the earliest studies that sought to highlight the age of the 
witness as an important variable in eye witness testimony found that the age of the 
perpetrator interacted with how well the witness performed.  List (1986) showed school 
children, university students and older adults sixteen videotaped vignettes of two 
shoplifting events, one of which was carried out by a young actress, and the other by a 
middle-aged actress.  She found that when the actress was young, the older adults were 
significantly impaired at remembering the information about the perpetrator, however no 
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differences in memory were found when the older actress was used.  In addition, both 
young and older adults performed best when the perpetrator was closer in age to 
themselves.  List (1986, p. 56) suggested that this: 
 ―differential memory advantage for information concerning the actress 
more relevant to themselves [might be] because self-reference enabled more 
elaborate encodings of this information… that is, information that is particularly 
meaningful in terms of the self may have created more associations in memory, thus 
enhancing performance‖.   
However, while this study certainly gives an indication of an own-age bias in face 
recognition, it did not investigate memory for faces per se.  Instead, participants were asked 
to recall and recognise person characteristics, a task which, while relevant to face 
recognition, does not necessarily tap into their face recognition abilities.  In addition, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about own-age biases in person recognition when the two 
actresses were not matched to the ages of the participants.  While no information is given 
about the actual age of the actresses, it is assumed that the young actress was approximately 
the same age as the young adult participant group.  However, the older of the two actresses 
was described as middle-aged, and not as an older-adult, indicating that it is unlikely that 
she was in the same age band as the older adult participants.  Given these two issues, it is 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions from this study in terms of an own-age bias in face 
recognition. 
In a more recent study, the face recognition abilities of differently aged participants 
were specifically investigated using a similar eyewitness-style paradigm. Wright and 
Stroud (2002) presented young adults and middle-aged participants with videos of a crime 
in which the perpetrator was either similar or dissimilar in age to themselves. All 
participants were more likely to correctly identify the perpetrator from a line-up comprising 
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people belonging to their own age group.  Both groups were likely to make a positive 
identification (approximately 47% of the time) when the perpetrator was of a similar age to 
themselves.  However, when the targets belonged to the other age group young adults were 
only likely to recognise the culprit 37% of the time, compared to 24% of the time for the 
middle-aged adults.  Further analysis revealed that while young adults were better than the 
older  adults at recognising young adult faces, this difference did not reach significance for 
the older adult faces.  While within-participant group analyses were not carried out in this 
study, the pattern of results indicate that an own-age bias may only have been present for 
the older adult group.  
 Similar results were found by Perfect and Harris (2003) using a paradigm to 
investigate unconscious transference.  Following the presentation of four ―mugshots‖ of 
people that participants were told had committed a crime, participants were asked to 
identify the perpetrators from four separate lineups.  Perfect and Harris (2003) found that 
young adults were significantly better at recognising a young perpetrator (with 73% 
accuracy) than were the older adults (37% accuracy).  In contrast, when the lineups 
comprised older adults, the performance for both age groups was comparable (80% for 
young and 83% for older adults).  In addition, older adults were more likely than younger 
adults to misidentify a bystander as the perpetrator of a crime when the line-ups consisted 
of younger adults. This difference was eliminated when the line-ups were comprised of 
older adults.   
Thus both of the above studies suggest that young adults out-perform older adults 
when viewing young faces, but this own-age advantage disappears when faces of older 
adults are used.  And while not specifically analysed in either study, the accuracy scores 
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reported suggest that while older adults show an advantage for recognising own-age faces 
over other-age faces, younger adults may not.  However before one accepts this 
interpretation there are a number of points to consider.  Firstly, in an additional study using 
a similar procedure to that of Wright and Stroud (2002), no such effects of age were found 
(Memon, Bartlett, Rose and Gray, 2003), calling into question the reliability of these 
findings.  Compounding this is the possibility that the study designs themselves may have 
been the cause of the effects that were found (or not).  All three studies used forensic style 
methodologies which, while ecologically valid, are lacking in power (due to the small 
amount of data each participant contributes).  In addition, the main issue with these 
eyewitness paradigms is that each face-age category is only represented by a small number 
of faces (two in all cases) and as such the accidental use of atypical exemplars may have 
biased the participants‘ performance in some way.  To reduce the possibility of this 
occurring and to increase the power of the studies, more traditional recognition memory 
tasks following exposure to a large number of photographic facial stimuli have also been 
used to investigate the own-age bias. 
In one of the earliest studies to be carried out on the possible own age bias in face 
recognition, Bartlett and Leslie (1986) investigated the recognition performance of young 
and old adults for younger and older faces.  In two experiments the authors presented 
participants with 48 faces which they were then required to remember and later identify 
from a larger pool of facial stimuli.  Using signal detection theory to analyse the findings 
the results of both experiments showed that the younger participants were more accurate at 
recognising faces of their own age compared to faces of the older age group.  In contrast, 
no such own-age advantage was shown for the older adult group.  These findings are in line 
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with those of Mason (1986), Fulton and Bartlett (1991) and Wiese, Schweinberger and 
Hansen (2008) who all found that young adults were better at recognising younger adult 
faces than older ones, while older adults' performance was similar for faces of all age 
groups.   
These findings suggest that while young adults exhibit an own-age bias, older adults 
do not.  However, this may not necessarily be the case.  In all four of the aforementioned 
studies the matching of ages between the facial stimuli and the participants may have been 
flawed, particularly for their older adult groups.  For example, Fulton and Bartlett (1991) 
grouped together participants aged 59-82 years old and showed them photographs of ―own-
age‖ faces with an average age of 62.7 years.  Similarly, Mason (1986) used 62-88 year 
olds to make up their older adult group.  However it is highly unlikely that adults aged in 
their late 50s and early 60s would consider themselves to be in the same age band as 
somebody in their 80s (and vice versa).   
In addition, the changes that happen to the face during those years are quite 
substantial (see Section 1.5.1).  Bartlett and Leslie made a similar mistake with the age 
band they used to make up their ―older adult‖ facial stimuli, using faces between 40-79 
years old.  This is a huge age range and is unlikely to constitute a single conceptual, or 
perceptual, age band.  Similarly, while the study by Wiese et al used slightly ambiguous 
phrasing to describe the age bands of the faces they used (stating that ―240 pictures 
showing 120 old (mean age 69 ± 7.2 SDs) and 120 young faces (mean age 22 ± 3.0. SDs))‖, 
personal communication with the author revealed that this equated to a range of 55-82 years 
(almost double the age-range for the older participants, who were 61-76 years old) and 18-
29 years respectively.  Considering this, it is possible (if not likely) that the pattern seen for 
47 
 
 
the older adults‘ face recognition abilities in these studies is not indicative of a lack of own-
age bias in this group, rather it is due to the fact that there is no coherent ―own age‖ facial 
stimuli group. Thus the pattern observed is that of two other-age group recognition effects.   
One study that has shown a full cross-over own-age bias is that of Bäckman (1991).  
In this study there were four groups: young adults (19-27 year olds), older adults (63-70 
year olds), 76 and 85 year olds.  Each group was shown photographs of younger (mean = 
29.5) and older (mean = 76.2) adults.  While the two elderly groups performed generally 
badly (in line with the general effects of ageing on memory performance) and showed no 
effects of face age overall, the other two age groups both showed significant own-age 
biases, recognising faces belonging to their own age group better than those belonging to 
the other age group.  While the age bands used for the older adult groups were suitably 
small for both the participants and the photographs used, they hardly overlapped.  This lack 
of matching again makes it difficult to interpret these results as showing an unequivocal 
own age bias in younger and older adult age groups. 
One recent study that sought to eliminate the issue of inappropriately aged stimuli 
investigated the ability of young (18-25 years old), middle-aged (35-45 years old) and older 
adults (55-78 years old) to recognise faces belonging to those exact three age bands 
(Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006).  The authors found that adults belonging to each age group 
exhibited superior recognition for own-age faces compared to other-aged faces (although it 
is of note that using in excess of a 20 year age band to represent the older adult group may 
be problematic).  This full cross over own-age effect has also been replicated by Perfect and 
Moon (2005) who found a robust age x face-age interaction for upright faces, characteristic 
of the own-age bias, after showing photographs of younger (mean = 22.2 years old) and 
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older adults (mean = 73.4 years old) to two groups of similarly aged participants (means = 
20.2 and 73.9 years old, respectively). Both age groups showed enhanced performance with 
own-age faces. 
The above review illustrates that previous research into the own-age bias in young 
and older adults has produced contradictory findings.  While some studies have reported an 
own-age bias only in young adults (e.g. Mason, 1986; Barlett & Leslie, 1986; Fulton & 
Bartlett, 1991), others have reported the additional presence of an own-age bias for older 
adults (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006; Perfect & Harris, 2003).  One of the main reasons for 
these inconsistencies may be the fact that the majority of these studies have failed to 
successfully match the age of the participants with the ages of the stimuli used.  As such, it 
is possible that the lack of own-age bias in the older adults is actually a product of the fact 
that they have not actually been presented with any ―own-age‖ faces.  This notion is 
supported by the fact that the only two studies managed to successfully match their stimuli 
and participant age groups have shown an own-age bias in both the younger and older 
participants.  It therefore seems likely that when the stimuli are well matched to participant 
age and a robust experimental design is used, all adult age groups exhibit an own-age bias 
in face recognition. 
 
1.7.2. The Own-Age Bias in Children 
 The majority of work with the own-age bias in face recognition has explored the 
issue using younger and older adults, both in terms of participant and stimulus ages.  Very 
few studies have extended this work to investigate whether this own-age bias exists in 
children, and indeed whether young adults exhibit a similar own-age bias when presented 
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with own-age and children‘s faces.  As with older adults, children are generally thought to 
perform relatively badly in face recognition tasks, only reaching adult-like levels of 
performance in their teenage years.  However, as discussed in Section 1.6. (and in a similar 
way to older adults), this may, at least in part, be a product of the fact that the majority of 
face processing studies use young adult faces as their facial stimuli.  Indeed, some studies 
have shown that children perform in a more adult-like fashion in face processing studies 
when the facial stimuli presented are similar in age to themselves (e.g. Feinman and 
Entwisle, 1976; George, Hole & Scaife, 2000).   
 One study that sought to investigate the potential presence of an own-age bias in 
children (and in a group of older adults) was that of Anastasi and Rhodes (2005).  In this 
study the two groups of participants were shown photos of children and young, middle and 
older aged adults and later asked to try and identify them from a larger group of facial 
stimuli.  Both groups showed superior recognition for faces belonging to their own-age 
group, compared to faces of the other age groups.  However, part of the procedure of this 
study involved categorising the facial stimuli into age groups at the learning stage.  This 
may have actively drawn participants' attention to the ages of the faces and encouraged a 
related processing bias.  So while both children and older adults exhibited an own-age bias, 
this may have been induced by the categorisation process in the learning phase of the study.   
Two other studies have also investigated the possibility of an own-age bias in 
children.  Chung (1997) tested children aged 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 years, and adults for their 
recognition of adult and children‘s faces.  While the results showed a general increase in 
recognition accuracy with age, they also revealed that adults recognized adult faces more 
accurately than children‘s faces.  In contrast no own-age bias was found for the child 
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participants.  In contrast to this Crookes & McKone (2009) found the opposite pattern, with 
children demonstrating better recognition of child faces than adult faces, while adults 
exhibited no such bias.  However as with the studies conducted with only adult groups, it is 
possible that these findings may have been the result of the methodologies used.  While 
both used traditional old/new recognition paradigms, and thus power is unlikely to be a 
problem, the latter two studies may not have successfully matched the participant ages to 
those of the facial stimuli used.  Indeed Crookes and McKone themselves admit that they 
―only defined ‗own-age‘ broadly to simply mean child versus adult status, rather than 
attempting to match exact age[s]‖.  As such, these studies may not have truly been 
investigating the presence of an own-age bias in the face recognition abilities of children 
and it remains unclear whether such a bias exists for this age group.  Clarifying this issue 
was one of this initial aims of this thesis. 
 In addition to the above study, two more have investigated the possibility of an 
own-age bias in young adults who are presented with both own-age and children‘s faces.  
These will be further discussed in Section 1.9.2.   
 
1.8 Reasons for an Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition: What Other Biases in Face 
Recognition Can Tell Us. 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, previous research has shown that we 
recognise faces similar in age to ourselves better than older or younger faces (e.g. Anastasi 
& Rhodes, 2006).  However, while this research has provided evidence for an own-age bias 
in face recognition, the question of why this phenomenon might occur and what underlying 
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mechanisms may produce it, remains unclear.  In order to try to establish possible reasons 
for the existence of an own-age bias, it might be informative to consider other processing 
biases that appear in the face recognition literature.  Perhaps the most well known of these 
is the own-race bias (or cross race effect).  It is well established that people are generally 
more proficient at recognising faces belonging to their own racial group compared to those 
from a different, less familiar race (for reviews see Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer, 
2001; Brigham, Bennett, Meissner & Mitchell, 2007).  And, while a lot less researched, 
there is also evidence that we may be better at recognising faces of our own gender relative 
to those of the other gender (e.g. Wright and Sladden, 2003).  It may or may not be the case 
that the own-race and/or own-gender biases are analogous to the own-age bias, however the 
theories put forward to explain these biases in face recognition serve as a useful starting-
point for this research. 
 
1.8.1. The Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition 
 People find it more difficult to accurately recognise the faces of people of other 
races relative to their own.  For example, Meissner and Brigham‘s (2001) seminal paper on 
the own-race bias reported a meta-analysis of thirty-nine studies which investigated the 
cross-race effect and found that participants were approximately 1.40 times more likely to 
correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face than an other-race face.  Indeed, there 
was a large effect size of .82 for this own-race recognition advantage, indicating that the 
own-race bias is a robust phenomenon.  In addition to a recognition deficit for other-race 
faces, Meissner and Brigham also found an increased tendency for participants to classify 
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faces belonging to a different race as ―seen before‖, irrespective of whether or not they had 
been previously seen, indicative of a shift in response bias for other-race faces.   
In a forensic setting these findings suggest that if a suspect is of a different race to a 
witness, then the witness will have a decreased probability of making a correct 
identification and an increased probability of making a misidentification.  Additionally, a 
shift in response bias to a lower criterion threshold for other-race faces means that a witness 
is more likely to make a false positive identification if the lineup comprises members of a 
race that is not their own.  In fact, it is this phenomenon that has been labelled as one of the 
main causes of faulty eyewitness identifications.  As discussed in Section 1.4. eyewitness 
misidentification has been identified as the leading cause of wrongful convictions for cases 
where DNA evidence has led to the exoneration of the falsely accused (Brandon & Davies, 
1973; Conners, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000).  
Compounding this, Wells and Olson (2001) and Scheck et al (2000) have suggested that the 
own-race bias may play a large role in these faulty identifications, both studies 
demonstrating that a for a large proportion of these exonerations, one of the key witnesses 
involved was of a different race to the perpetrator.   
Although the own-race bias has been replicated numerous times and is accepted as a 
reliable and robust phenomenon, its genesis remains unclear.  However we know that it 
does not occur as a result of faces from one racial group having a different amount of 
physiognomic variability than another.  For example, Goldstein (1979) found that 
Caucasian, Black and South-East Asian faces showed similar amounts of variability 
between same-race faces.  However, Goldstein also found that there were differences in the 
types of facial variability that were important for distinguishing between faces of each race 
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(for example, while eye and hair colour may play an important role in discriminating 
Caucasian faces, this may not be the case for African faces; Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 
1975).  It therefore seems possible that the own-race bias occurs as a result of learning what 
facial features/properties are important to attend to when recognising and distinguishing 
between faces.  If this is the case, then it follows that this learning experience is most likely 
to be the result of the facial stimuli that we are most commonly exposed to. 
 
1.8.1.1. The Contact Hypothesis and the Own Race Bias in Face Recognition 
While there is no unified theory of what causes the own-race bias, perhaps the best 
known explanation is that of ―the contact hypothesis‖.  This proposes that people become 
experts at differentiating faces of their own race as a result of increased contact with 
members of their own race compared to those of other races (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 
1985; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995).  It is therefore not the result of the faces belonging to 
the same race as the perceiver per se, but a function of the fact that we tend to have 
relatively more experience with own-race faces.  This explanation of the own-race bias has 
been supported by a number of studies that have demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship between memory for faces of individuals from a certain race and the amount of 
contact the participant has had with that race.  For example, Meissner & Brigham‘s (2001) 
meta-analysis of 29 studies that used self-report measures of inter-racial contact found a 
significant relationship between this measure and other-race discrimination.  Though, it is 
of note that their finding only explained about 2% of the variability in the data, calling into 
question the robustness of this explanation of the other-race effect.   
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However, using self-report measures to estimate exposure may be problematic, as 
self report may be distorted by inaccuracies of memory and response biases (i.e. a tendency 
to over or underestimate).  The accuracy of this contact information could be called into 
question, given that participants were being asked to provide details of exposure to other-
race faces, some extending back in time over the course of their lifetime.  It is likely that 
this kind of report inaccuracy would reduce the chance of finding significant associations 
between other race contact and the ability to recognise faces belonging to that racial group.  
Thus the finding of any significant relationship between these two variables suggests that 
contact may indeed play an important role in the own-race bias. 
An additional issue one is faced with when attempting to find a relationship 
between contact and memory performance with other-race faces is that this kind of analysis 
assumes a linear relationship between the two variables, which may well not be the case.  
The concept of ―contact‖ as a variable is not just as a quantitative measure of time spent 
with other race faces; there are also more qualitative aspects to consider, such as attentional 
and motivational factors.    
Given the potential problems with self reported contact information, some studies 
have investigated the effects of other-race experience by operationalising contact frequency 
into ―high‖ and ―low‖ contact groups.  One example of this can be seen in an unpublished, 
but frequently cited study by Li, Dunning & Malpass (1998).  They found that white 
participants who frequently watched NBA basketball (where the majority of players are 
black) exhibited less of an own-race bias than participants who were basketball novices.  
This finding certainly supports the contact hypothesis, although it does not distinguish 
between the aspects of contact that may be responsible for such an effect.  For example, the 
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basketball fans would no doubt have an increased quantity of contact with black faces, 
however they would also have an increased quality of contact with them, specifically 
attending to the individuals on the basketball court as a result of following the sport.  It is 
this issue of quantity versus quality that needs to be further explored when considering the 
role of contact in the own-race bias. 
One study that gives us further insight into the contact hypothesis is that of Chiroro 
and Valentine (1995) who investigated the own-race bias in four groups of participants with 
varying inter-racial contact.  In this case, the amount of contact with other races was 
estimated based on the participants‘ geographical whereabouts and opportunities to interact 
with members of other races.  The two high contact groups comprised students from a 
multiracial college in Zimbabwe, which allowed for a high degree of daily contact with 
other-race faces.  One group consisted of white Africans, the other of black Africans.  For 
the white low contact group, British students from a college in a small village in England 
were recruited (although due to the ubiquitous nature of the media in the UK, it is likely 
that these students would have had some exposure to other-race faces).  The low contact 
black participant group comprised students from a small school in a remote village in 
Zimbabwe (in contrast to the white low contact participants, this group was unlikely to 
have seen any white faces through any media sources).   
Using A-prime as a measure of accuracy, Chiroro and Valentine found that both of 
the low contact groups were significantly more accurate at recognising own-race faces 
compared to other race faces.  For the black participants, this own-race bias was completely 
eliminated for the high contact group, suggesting that contact does mediate the own-race 
bias.  However, while the effect of contact was significant for the black participants, this 
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was not the case for the white high contact group who still exhibited an own-race bias 
(albeit slightly attenuated).  While this latter finding may initially appear to contradict the 
hypothesis that contact mediates the own-race bias, it is worth considering the differences 
between the groups of participants that were used in this study.  The differences between 
the amount of inter-racial contact for the two groups of black participants may have been 
significant (in that high contact group had daily exposure to white faces, while the low 
contact group had almost no contact with white faces over their lifetime, and no televisions 
that might allow exposure to white faces in the media).  However, this difference may not 
have been so pronounced between the two white contact groups.  Unlike the remote village 
in Zimbabwe, the rural village in the UK would not have guaranteed such low-levels of 
contact with other race faces due to the pervasiveness of the media in England, and the 
amount of black celebrities who regularly feature in the media.  As such it is possible that 
the difference between the white participant groups may not have been large enough to 
produce a significant effect of contact. 
While this line of reasoning can explain why there was a significant effect of 
contact for the black, but not white participants, it does not explain why the high contact 
white group still exhibited an own-race bias.  Surely if contact plays an important role in 
the own-race bias, this increased daily contact with black faces should have resulted in a 
similar pattern of results to that exhibited by the high-contact black participants.  However, 
before assuming this, one really needs to take the results of this study in terms of a wider 
context.  In a country like Zimbabwe where racial segregation was practiced under white 
minority rule until only three decades ago, it is possible that the two races would have had 
very different motivations for interacting with members of the other race.  It is possible that 
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due to the country‘s history, even though white participants encountered black 
Zimbabweans, they may not have been attending to them.  If this was the case, then it could 
be said that it is not only the quantity, but also the quality of contact that may play an 
important role in the own-race bias. 
A more recent study by Wright, Boyd and Tredoux (2003) provides further 
supporting evidence for the interplay between quantity and quality of contact in mediating 
the own-race bias.  Three groups of University students with varying levels of inter-racial 
contact took park in this study.  Two groups comprised white students; one from Bristol 
University and one from the University of Cape Town.  Both of these groups were assumed 
to have relatively little contact with other-race (in this case black) faces as a result of there 
being few black students at Bristol University and due to the recent abolition of apartheid in 
South Africa.  The third group comprised black students from the University of Cape Town 
who, in contrast to the other two groups, had a higher degree of other-race contact, most 
likely due to the high proportion of white individuals at the University.   
Using an old/new paradigm, Wright et al (2003) asked participants to look at, and 
later identify a number of black and white faces.  Indicative of an own-race bias there was a 
significant group x race of face interaction, with white participants performing more 
accurately for white faces than black faces.  Interestingly, however, the black participants 
also performed better with white faces, although this advantage was much less pronounced 
than for the other two groups.  This pattern emerged despite the black participants most 
likely having quantitatively more exposure to own-race faces compared to white faces (the 
population of South Africa being approximately 79% black and only 10% white; 
Developmental Indicators 2008 
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http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=85218).  Wright, Boyd & Tredoux 
(2003) suggest that this finding may be the result of the fact that a disproportionate amount 
of people in positions of power and of academics within the University of Cape Town are 
white, implying that quality of contact may play an important role in mediating the own-
race bias.  In addition, the authors also provided evidence for the quantitative influence of 
contact in the own-race bias in this group.  Using a short questionnaire to estimate the level 
of inter-racial contact this group had, they found a significant positive relationship between 
contact and the black students‘ other-race recognition accuracy.  
In summary it appears that experience may play an important part in the own-race 
bias, and that both quantity and quality of contact may make significant contributions to 
this relationship.  However the contact hypothesis is a ―high level‖ theory that gives a 
general account of the own-race bias without explicitly referring to any of the processes 
that may give rise to this phenomenon.  As such it remains unclear precisely what 
cognitive, perceptual and/or social mechanisms may underlie this effect.   
 
1.8.1.2. Perceptual Expertise and the Own Race Bias in Face Recognition 
A number of explanations have been put forward to try and detail the cognitive 
mechanisms that may be responsible for the own race bias.  The most popular explanation 
of this kind is couched in terms of a lack of perceptual experience (and therefore expertise) 
with encoding the facial properties of other, less familiar races.  Essentially this account 
proposes that increased contact with a race (usually our own) gives rise to improved 
perceptual processing for that particular facial group as a result of learned perceptual 
expertise.   
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As described in Sections 1.1. and 1.2., as adults we are experts at processing faces.  
According to the expertise hypothesis of face recognition, our ability to process faces at a 
superior level to other objects is a result of a wealth of experience with recognising and 
distinguishing between faces at exemplar level (e.g. Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 2002).  If this 
expertise with faces depends on perceptual leaning experience, then this explanation may 
also be appropriate in explaining the own-race bias in face recognition.  For example, if we 
have more experience and contact with certain groups of faces (i.e. those of our own race) 
than others (i.e. those of another race), does this mean that we are more expert with that 
group of faces? 
In order to investigate the possibility that the own-race bias is a function of 
expertise for own-, but not other-, race faces we can look at participants‘ performance on 
tasks which tap into our ability to successfully use the facial information which is known to 
be at the heart of expert face processing: the configural information.  Section 1.2. describes 
how inversion, part-whole and composite face manipulations can interfere with our ability 
to process faces configurally.  If own-race faces are processed in a more expert (and hence 
more configural) manner than other race faces, then one would expect to see these 
manipulations interfere with the processing of own-race faces to a greater extent than other-
race faces.  
One of the earliest studies to address this configural-expertise explanation of the 
contact hypothesis was that of Rhodes, Tan, Brake, and Taylor (1989).  In the first 
experiment reported in this study, European and Chinese participants were presented with 
photographs of faces belonging to both racial groups.  Following the study phase, 
participants were then given a forced choice recognition test where they had to identify 
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which of the faces they had seen before.  In the recognition tests half of the faces were 
presented upright, while the other half were inverted.  Both groups of participants showed a 
larger effect of inversion (as measured by a percentage increase in reaction time relative to 
upright performance) for own-race faces.  In a second experiment Rhodes et al (1989) 
attempted to eliminate ceiling effects through the reduction of exposure time and increase 
in the amount of stimuli used in the study phase.  In doing this they extended their findings 
to show a larger inversion decrement for own-race faces in terms of accuracy.   
In a more recent study of the inversion effect, Hancock & Rhodes (2008) 
specifically sought to track how inter-racial contact affected the size of the own-race bias 
and the use of configural processing.  By assessing inter-racial contact using a seven item 
questionnaire, the authors found that participants with higher other-race contact exhibited a 
reduced own-race bias for both Caucasian and Chinese participants.  In addition, these 
participants exhibited a significantly larger inversion effect for own race faces, again 
supporting a configural-expertise explanation of the own-race bias.  Using inversion 
decrements as an index of configural processing, the authors found that participants with 
higher inter-racial contact displayed little difference in the amount of configural processing 
they used to process faces belonging to either racial group.  Crucially, Hancock and Rhodes 
found that the difference in the amount of configural processing used to process own and 
other race faces significantly predicted the size of the own-race bias the participants 
exhibited.  These findings directly lend support to the hypotheses that 1.) the own race bias 
is mediated by inter-racial contact and 2.) that this stems from enhanced configural 
processing as a result of learned perceptual expertise.  
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The perceptual expertise account of the own-race bias has also been investigated 
using paradigms other than inversion.  As the inversion effect is an indirect measure of 
configural processing, other researchers have sought to use more direct methodologies.  For 
example, while inversion is assumed to be an index of configural processing, this is based 
on previous research showing a disproportionate disruption of face recognition performance 
compared to recognition of other objects following rotation.  In fact little is known about 
the exact nature of inversion and the disruption it produces to the processes involved in face 
recognition.   
While previous researchers have interpreted large inversion decrements as 
indicative of enhanced configural processing, implying that inversion selectively disrupts 
this type of information in the face (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Valentine, 1988), more 
recent evidence has intimated that featural processing is also affected by this manipulation 
(e.g. Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer et al, 2002; Rhodes, Hayward & Winkler, 2006).  It is 
therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions about the degree of configural processing that 
has taken place based purely on inversion studies.  Instead, one would need to use a 
methodology that specifically manipulated the spatial relationships between the facial 
features. 
One of the most convincing demonstrations of the role of configural processing in 
face perception is the composite face effect (described in Section 1.2.1.).  In this paradigm, 
the recognition of the top half of a person‘s face is made more difficult by aligning it with 
the bottom half of a different face.  This creation of a composite face produces a new facial 
configuration and the perception of this whole, apparently novel face overrides our ability 
to recognize its constituent parts (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 1993).  Using this paradigm, 
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Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung and Caldara (2006) showed Caucasian and Asian participants 
twenty faces from each racial group which they were told to commit to memory.  Following 
this, they were asked to identify the top halves of those faces from composite faces that 
were presented either in alignment, or out of alignment.  Not only were both groups of 
participants better at recognizing faces of their own race, they also showed a greater 
composite face effect for those faces (i.e. recognition of own-race faces was impaired to a 
greater extent than that of other race faces when they were presented as a perceptually 
aligned whole, compared to when they were misaligned).  This finding demonstrates that 
own race faces elicit more configural processing than other race faces. 
Similar conclusions have been drawn from studies using the part-whole paradigm 
(described in Section 1.2.1.), where Caucasian and Asian participants were asked to 
recognize features belonging to faces of both races presented either in isolation, or set 
within the whole face (Michel, Caldara & Rossion, 2006; Tanaka, Kiefer & Bukach, 2004).  
In both studies Caucasian participants were found to show a classic whole face advantage 
only for own race faces, while Asian participants performed comparably for faces 
belonging to both racial groups.  In both cases the Asians reported having higher interracial 
contact than the Caucasians. As such, this pattern of results was interpreted by both sets of 
authors of being indicative of the important role that experience (and expertise) plays in the 
development of efficient configural processing skills for other race faces.   
Expertise has also been identified as an important factor in the development of the 
own-race bias by research outside of the behavioural research domain.  In a functional 
imaging study, Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, and Eberhardt (2001) carried out a standard old/new 
face recognition paradigm with European-American and African-American participants for 
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faces of both racial groups.  Participants were scanned during the initial viewing stage of 
the stimuli and the recognition test took place outside the scanner.  The authors found that 
both groups of participants performed better for faces that belonged to their own-racial 
group, exhibiting the classic own-race bias behaviourally.  In addition, the Fusiform Face 
Area (the brain area associated with greater perceptual expertise with a homogenous class, 
see Section 1.1.2. for further discussion of this) showed a significantly greater activation 
pattern when participants viewed own-race faces compared to other-race faces.  The 
authors also found that differential FFA activation for same- and other-race faces was 
significantly correlated with memory score differences for own- and other-race faces.  This 
further supports the notion that expertise with own-race faces may be responsible for the 
own-race bias.  However, in themselves, differences in the pattern of activation in the FFA 
do not necessarily present direct support for an increased perceptual tuning explanation of 
the own-race bias.  Blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) responses are known to be 
modulated by the degree of visual attention paid to the stimuli (O‘Craven, Downing, & 
Kanwisher, 1999; Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998), so it is possible that the 
differential pattern of activation seen in this study may have been the result of relatively 
increased interest in and attention to own-race faces.  This type of account could also 
explain the own-race bias in general, with increased attention to own-race faces giving rise 
to better memory for those faces.  This idea will be discussed further in Section 1.8.1.4. 
Another explanation of the own-race bias that hypothesises enhanced perceptual 
processing as its basis is Valentine's (1991) multi-dimensional face space model.  Rather 
than suggesting a difference in the amount of configural and featural processing that occurs 
for own- and other-race faces, this account suggests that all faces are encoded in the same 
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way, but that experience modulates the efficacy with which this is done.  Valentine 
suggests that all faces are represented as points in a multidimensional space, whose 
dimensions consist of the facial characteristics that would best serve to discriminate 
between faces.  Exactly what these dimensions are is speculative, however it is suggested 
that they develop as a result of our experience with faces.  The idea is that through 
experience we learn what aspects of a face are important for successfully differentiating 
them and dimensions develop accordingly.  Essentially this theory explains the own-race 
bias by suggesting that a lack of exposure to other-race faces results in poor development of 
the dimensions necessary for individuating those faces compared to those necessary for 
discriminating between own-race faces.   
For example, previous research has shown that different facial features are of 
varying importance when distinguishing between faces of different races. Shepherd and 
Deregowski (1981) identified the internal lower facial features as being most important in 
differentiating black faces, but as being relatively unimportant for white faces, accounting 
for approximately 75% of the variation in black faces, but only 35% for white faces.  In line 
with this, Ellis et al (1975) found that black and white participants relied on very different 
facial features when describing a face.  While black participants commonly referred to 
facial outline, eye size, eyebrows, chin and ears as important identifying features, white 
participants relied more heavily on hair colour, texture and eye colour.   
According to a perceptual expertise account of the own race bias, our experience 
with faces leads to the development of the most appropriate dimensions needed to 
successfully individuate those faces.  As we are typically most exposed to faces of our own 
race, this would mean that while white participants may develop robust dimensions along 
65 
 
 
which they can successfully encode other white faces (e.g. according to their hair colour, 
texture and eye colour), dimensions which would best serve to discriminate other race faces 
go relatively under-developed.  As such, while own-race faces are individuated with ease, 
other-race faces are more difficult to recognise. 
In order to test this explanation of the own-race bias, Hills & Lewis (2006) carried 
out a perceptual learning task in which Caucasian participants were trained to identify faces 
using the cues in the lower facial features.  Their reasoning was that if white participants 
were taught how to use the cues that are most useful in differentiating other-race faces, in 
this case black faces, then they should exhibit a reduced own-race bias after training.  
Consistent with a perceptual expertise account of the own race bias, the authors found that 
after only one hour of this type of training, participants exhibited a smaller own -race bias, 
while those who did not receive any training and those who did receive training, but with 
non-critical facial features (i.e. those that differ according to features extraneous to the 
face) showed no such reduction.   
In summary, a couple of theories have been put forward that attempt to explain the 
own-race bias in terms of enhanced perceptual face processing mechanisms for own-race 
faces as the result of greater experience.  This may be the result of different types of 
processing strategies associated with differing amounts of expertise (i.e. enhanced 
configural processing for own-race faces) or the result of a better developed, more 
appropriate encoding mechanism for own-race faces.  While contact is obviously important 
for the development of expertise, it may not necessarily be the quantity of contact that is 
important, rather the quality of this contact that plays a pivotal role.   
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1.8.1.3. Social Categorisation and the Own Race Bias 
An alternative type of explanation for the own-race bias focuses on the social 
psychology of person recognition. These types of theories suggest that automatic social 
categorization of faces according to whether or not they belong to our own in-group (e.g. 
our own race), may influence the way in which we subsequently process these faces (e.g. 
Levin, 1996, 2000; Sporer, 2001).  Social psychology research has suggested that people 
think categorically about out-group members, processing them according to social 
categories (e.g. race, sex and age) at the expense of individuating information (e.g. 
Bodenhansen, Macrae & Hugenberg, 2003).  Exactly which facial characteristics are 
deemed important for categorisation is unclear, although  List (1986) suggested that 
broadly categorical self-referential information and socially important shared characteristics 
are most likely to be at the heart of this process (e.g. age, sex, race, attractiveness).  This is 
in line with research in the social psychology domain which has illustrated that the act of 
using self-referent encoding strategies (i.e. relating viewed stimuli to the self) results in 
better recognition memory for stimuli (Symons and Johnson, 1997).   
One theory that concentrated specifically on the effects of categorizing faces 
according to race is Levin‘s Race-Feature Hypothesis (1996; 2000).  Levin suggested that 
on viewing a face we immediately determine whether or not it belongs to our own-racial 
group or whether is of another race.  This work was primarily based on his findings from 
experiments in which participants were asked to classify faces as belonging to their own or 
another race.  Levin (1996) found that in addition to exhibiting the cross-race recognition 
deficit, almost paradoxically, participants were faster at identifying the race of other race 
faces (the so called Other-Race Classification Advantage; ORCA).  As a result of this 
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Levin hypothesized that the own-race bias and ORCA occur as a result of an automatic 
emphasis of visual information specifying race at the expense of individuating information 
when recognising other-race faces (Levin, 2000).  He suggested that for other-race faces, 
people code race-specifying information as an important facial feature, while own-race 
faces have no such feature.  When processing an other-race face, the presence of this racial 
feature is detected and further visual processing does not take place, so that individuating 
facial features are not encoded.  This essentially results in other-race faces being processed 
according to prototypical information, while own-race faces are individuated and processed 
at an exemplar level.  Consistent with this theory is the ‗out-group homogeneity effect‘, 
where out-group members are perceived as being more homogeneous than in-group 
members in terms of both personal and physical attributes (e.g. Judd & Park, 1988; 
Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989; for a review, see Mullen & Hu, 1989).  
In an attempt to extend Levin‘s work and to include a more detailed explanation of 
the underlying cognitive processes that may be involved in this type of social 
categorization, Sporer (2001) developed his In-group/Out-group Model (IoM) of the own-
race bias.  The IoM suggests that in-group faces are encoded in an automatic, configural 
manner (typical of expert face processing) according to the dimensions of the face that are 
particularly useful for discriminating it from other in-group faces.  In contrast, out-group 
faces automatically trigger a categorisation of that person as belonging to an ―out-group‖.  
This categorisation process leads to these faces being processed in a different, less efficient 
manner than in-group faces, resulting in poorer recognition.  Specifically, Sporer suggests 
that this out-group categorisation may result in fewer cognitive resources being given to 
those faces, leading to more shallow (e.g. featural) encoding strategies.  One of the merits 
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of the IoM in terms of this thesis is that Sporer specifically claims that it can be extended to 
explain other own-group biases in the facial memory literature, such as the effects of age 
(e.g. Wright & Stroud, 2002) and gender (e.g. Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000). 
MacLin and Malpass (2001) also investigated the nature of categorisation in the 
own-race bias by examining whether this categorisation strategy depended on physical 
facial properties or whether it stemmed from more socially driven mechanisms.  In order to 
do this, ambiguous race (half Hispanic, half African-American) face morphs were shown to 
participants belonging to both racial groups.  These faces were then given either typically 
Hispanic, or typically African-American hairstyles to test whether the alteration of one 
simple visual cue could lead to the differential categorisation and processing of what is 
essentially the same face.  The authors found that both groups of participants showed better 
recognition for faces that were shown with the hairstyles that were characteristic of their 
own racial group.  Interestingly, altering the apparent race of the face also altered some of 
the perceived physical properties of that face.  For example, composites that were 
categorized as African-American were described as being darker skinned, having wider 
mouths and less protruding eyes than the same faces that were categorized as Hispanic.  
Thus, changing the categorisation of a face based on the alteration of one simple cue can 
affect the way in which that face is perceived, processed and subsequently recognized.   
Based on these findings MacLin and Malpass (2001) suggested that the recognition 
deficit for other-race faces is not necessarily caused by a lack of experience with members 
of that race as the perceptual learning hypothesis would predict, but by the categorisation of 
a face as belonging to another race.  However, it is of note that changing the hairstyle of a 
face to influence its apparent race is still altering a physical feature of that face.  As it has 
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previously been shown that external features play an important role in the processing of 
unfamiliar faces (e.g. Ellis et al, 1979), it is possible that the pattern of results found in this 
study may still have been an effect of expertise with one racial group over another.   
Hilliar and Kemp (2008a) furthered this research by investigating the effect of an 
entirely non-physical racial cue on race perception and memory.  Again the authors used 
identical ambiguous race face morphs, in this case producing South-East Asian and 
European-Australian morphs, as well as facial stimuli belonging to each racial category.  
On presenting participants with the faces, facial stimuli appeared paired with a randomly 
assigned name.  South-East Asian and European-Australian faces were assigned race-
congruent names, while half of the ambiguous race faces were given typically South-East 
Asian names and the other half, European-Australian names.  Appearance ratings revealed 
that ambiguous multi-racial faces given more European-Australian names appeared to be 
more European, while the opposite was true for those same faces given typically South-East 
Asian names.  Thus the authors conclude that the perception of the faces could be 
influenced by non-physical racial cues.  This suggests that the presence of a race feature (be 
it physical or otherwise) leads to the automatic categorisation of that face as either own- or 
other- race which subsequently affects how that face is perceived and processed.   
Further unpublished work by Hilliar and Kemp (2008b) has shown that the 
presentation of racially stereotypical names with ambiguous faces can induce a perceived 
own-race bias for those faces, however they only found this pattern when they used a 
specific blocked design. For example, if they presented participants with ambiguous faces 
given Caucasian names, they first had to expose them to Asian faces given Asian names 
(and vice versa with the ambiguous faces given Asian names). When a blocked design was 
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not used, no induced own-race bias was found.  The authors suggest that blocking the 
stimuli allowed them to take advantage of perceptual after-effects; that is, after showing 
participants Asian faces, ambiguous faces appeared more Caucasian (and similarly when 
they were first presented with Caucasian faces, ambiguous faces look more Asian).  
Interestingly Hilliar and Kemp also note that while these perceptual after-effects are not 
enough to induce an own-race bias for ambiguous faces on their own, when combined with 
a racially-typical name, it can occur.  While it should be noted that this finding is yet to be 
replicated, it presents an interesting case for the importance of categorisation in the own-
race bias.   
If categorisation is at the heart of the own-race bias then it might also offer a 
different solution to reducing its effects than that offered by the perceptual expertise 
account.  While the expertise model relies on other-race training to ameliorate the own-race 
bias, a social-cognitive model where in- and out- group categorisation elicits either the 
processing of individuating or categorical/prototypical information (respectively) does not 
necessarily have a place for contact/experience (although it may play some part in the 
development of socially defined in- and out- group categories).  In this case, if 
categorisation into in- or out-groups is responsible for the own-race bias then one may be 
able to reduce it by altering the social categorisation process.   
A study by Hugenberg, Miller and Claypool (2007) sought to investigate exactly 
this claim.  Over three experiments the authors presented European-American participants 
with photographs of black and white individuals.  Before the learning phase participants 
received one of three sets of instructions.  The control condition instructions only informed 
the participants that they would be undertaking a memory test, while the experimental 
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instructions were either aimed at encouraging participants to individuate other-race faces, 
or at increasing their motivation to attend to the faces.  The authors found that when given 
instructions to individuate other-race faces, the own-race bias (that was present for both the 
control and motivation condition) was eliminated, supporting a social categorisation 
explanation of the own-race bias in face recognition. 
In summary, the social categorisation account of the own-race bias suggests that 
upon viewing a face, we automatically categorise it according to whether or not it belongs 
to our social in-group (e.g. our own race, age, gender) and this influences the way in which 
we subsequently process that face.  This categorisation leads to the processing of out-group 
faces according to category-specifying/prototypical information at the expense of 
individuating information.  In terms of the own-race bias, faces that are characterized as 
belonging to our in-group are therefore processed more efficiently and deeply, at an 
exemplar level, while out-group members are processed in a shallow, featural manner.  As 
a result, own-group faces are better encoded and subsequently recognized, thus the own-
race bias occurs. 
 
1.8.1.4. Motivation, Attention and the Own Race Bias 
A final explanation of the own-race bias in face recognition, which was alluded to 
in Section 1.8.1.2., also suggests that contact per se may not affect face processing directly.  
Instead, it may reflect or drive the degree of interest a person has in faces of a particular 
kind and the resultant amount of attention allocated to them. It is this motivation to attend 
to certain types of faces (e.g. own-race faces) that may be the important factor in 
determining how expert we become at processing those faces, perhaps due to the social 
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rewards and punishments associated with being able to effectively (or not) distinguish 
between and recognise people belonging to one‘s own ―in-group‖ (i.e. own race faces).   
As discussed in Section 1.8.1.1., two studies have demonstrated that the own-race 
bias should be considered in a wider social and political context (Chiroro & Valentine; 
1995; Wright, Boyd and Tredoux; 2003).  In countries where racial segregation and 
asymmetrical power relationships exist, the motivations to attend to black and white faces 
are very different.  For example, within a South African society where a disproportionate 
amount of academics and people in power are white, there may be an increased incentive 
for black students to recognise other-race (i.e. white) faces, while the opposite may not be 
true.  In line with this idea, Chiroro and Valentine (1995) and Wright, Boyd and Tredoux 
(2003) found that of the black and white students who attended multi-racial 
universities/colleges in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively and thus had an 
opportunity for high daily inter-racial contact, only the black students exhibited a 
significantly reduced own-race bias.  Thus the own-race bias arises not as a result of 
automatic categorization or perceptual expertise, rather it is a result of the attentional 
resources towards faces that we are motivated to distinguish between. 
One of the earliest suggestions of this kind, and a theory on which the social 
categorization hypotheses were based, was put forward by Rodin (1987) who suggested 
that we are ―attentional misers‖ when it comes to processing visual information.  As such, 
we only assign attentional and cognitive resources to individuals who are deemed important 
or relevant to us in some way.  Rodin suggested that we determine who merits this 
attention/cognitive effort according to our social purpose.  She suggests that if a ―disregard 
cue‖ is present, it serves as a signal to direct our attention elsewhere.  What exactly 
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constitutes a disregard cue is not specified, however Rodin suggests that these cues may be 
based on broad categorical judgments, such as those of age, race or attractiveness.  
However she emphasized that these categorical cues are not necessarily in- or out- group 
categorizations, but that they are constantly evolving according to the observer‘s 
motivations and as such are entirely situation dependent. Those deemed unimportant to us 
are then cognitively disregarded, which essentially halts the processing of these individuals, 
rendering them practically invisible to us.  In contrast, further attentional resources are 
allocated to those who we are motivated to ―see‖, and as such individuating information is 
processed. 
This type of theory does not depend on social groupings according to self-referential 
information, nor does it necessarily depend on the amount of contact one has with different 
groups of faces.  Instead it focuses on the underlying motivations one may have to attend to 
certain groups of faces.  If there is a suitable amount of motivation to attend to a face, then 
the cognitive resources will be made available to that face. 
 
1.8.2. The Own-Gender Bias in Face Recognition 
Another bias that has been discussed in the face recognition literature, albeit to a 
much lesser extent than the own-race bias, is that of the own-gender bias.  For example, in a 
couple of studies using a forensic-style paradigm Shaw and Skolnick (1994, 1999) showed 
male and female participants videos of simulated crimes in which the perpetrator was either 
male or female.  The authors found that the participants were generally more accurate at 
correctly identifying the culprit when they were of the same gender as themselves.  
However, as previously discussed eyewitness paradigms, while ecologically valid, can be 
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problematic due to the small amount of data each participant contributes to the study and 
the potential problem of atypical exemplars being used as stimuli (see Section 1.7.1.). 
Studies using more traditional old/new recognition paradigms have yielded more 
mixed results.  While a meta-analysis of face recognition studies reporting both the gender 
of the participants and the gender of viewed faces found a significant own-gender bias in 
terms of correct identification measures, no such effect was found for false alarms (Shapiro 
& Penrod, 1986).  In addition, while some studies have shown an own-gender bias in both 
male and female participants (e.g. Wright & Sladden, 2003), others have found it only to be 
present in females (e.g. Lewin & Herlitz, 2002; McKelvie, 1981; 1987) while others have 
found no evidence of a gender by face-gender interaction at all (e.g. Perfect and Moon, 
2005).  Thus the own-gender bias is a lot less reliable and robust in comparison to the own-
race bias in face recognition.   
 
1.8.2.1. The Possible Mechanisms Underlying the Own-Gender Bias. 
Although the own-gender bias has received relatively little attention in the face 
recognition literature, at least one study has attempted to identify the possible mechanisms 
underlying this bias.  Using an old/new paradigm with Tulving‘s (1985) remember/know 
distinction, Wright and Sladden (2003) asked participants to recognise both male and 
female faces, half of which were presented as whole faces and half of which had their hair 
removed. While the authors found a full cross-over own-gender bias, they also found that 
the removal of hair cues substantially impaired participant‘s ability to recognise own-
gender faces (and other-gender faces, but to a lesser degree).  Specifically, they found that 
memory for hair accounted for approximately half of the own-gender bias.   
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As the own-gender bias appears to be mediated by the differential usage of a single 
featural cue (hairstyle), it seems unlikely that a configural-expertise type explanation of this 
bias (like that so often given for the own-race bias) would be appropriate in this case.  
Indeed, such an explanation is difficult to justify, as an expertise hypothesis assumes 
greater experience with one gender over another, however males and females are equally 
prevalent in our society.  And while it may be true that it is quality rather than quantity of 
experience that is important to develop such a bias, this too presents a problematic account 
of the own-gender bias.  In fact, from an evolutionary stand-point one might be inclined to 
predict greater interest in and motivation to attend to faces of the opposite sex for mate 
selection purposes (thus a motivational account of this bias is also likely to fall short).    
Instead, it seems that the own-gender bias can most readily be explained in terms of 
the differential feature processing (namely of hair cues) for own- and other- gender faces.  
Indeed studies investigating gender differences on person description tasks that rely heavily 
on featural aspects of appearance (as is the nature of verbal descriptions, see Section 1.2.1.) 
have found an own-gender bias, while a face recognition task with the same participants 
yielded no such effect (e.g. Shaw and Skolnick, 1994), supporting a featural-processing 
account of this bias. 
Why differential featural-processing might best explain the own-gender bias in face 
recognition is unclear, although parallels could be drawn with Levin‘s (1996; 2000) race-
feature processing model.  This hypothesis suggests that the recognition deficit for other 
race faces occurs as a result of people automatically emphasising category-specifying 
features for out-group faces (e.g. skin tone in the case of race) to the detriment of 
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individuating information.  It is possible that this explanation may also apply to the 
processing of own- and other- gender faces, with hairstyle serving as the salient gender cue.  
 
1.9. Thesis Aims:  Implications for the Own-Age Bias 
 
The over-arching aim of this thesis was to investigate the possible explanations for 
the own-age bias in face recognition.  By referring to the own-race and own-gender bias 
literature, it has been established that there are a number of suggested mechanisms by 
which these biases may occur.  Using these hypotheses as a starting point, the possible 
mechanisms responsible for producing the own-age bias will be investigated and evaluated. 
However, before the possible reasons for the own-age bias in face recognition can 
be explored, one needs to establish that this bias does, in fact, exist.  As described in 
Section 1.7. previous work in this area has been riddled with methodological problems, the 
most notable being the lack of successful matching of the ages of the facial stimuli with that 
of the participants.  One area that has been particularly neglected is investigation of  the 
ability of children and young adults to recognize faces that have been successfully matched 
to their age groups.  As such, the first experimental chapter of this thesis aimed to establish 
whether or not an own-age bias exists in these two age groups.   
 
1.9.1. The Contact Hypothesis and the Own Age Bias in Face Recognition 
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of contact in the own-age 
bias in face recognition (see Chapters 2-4).  However, considering the role of exposure in 
this bias is not as straightforward as it is in the own-race bias literature and may be the 
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reason why this type of explanation has thus far gone relatively unexplored.  Age is not a 
stable characteristic, unlike race.  The age band to which we belong is constantly changing; 
one cannot dismiss the fact that, as adults, we were all once members of a different, 
younger age group with high exposure to faces belonging to that group.  If the own age bias 
is due to cumulative, quantitative experience alone then one would expect children to show 
an exaggerated recognition advantage for own-age faces (which they are more familiar with 
as a result of schools comprising large numbers of similarly aged children) compared to 
faces belonging to older age groups (with which they have had relatively little experience).  
In contrast, one might expect adults who have had high levels of contact with both own and 
child age faces at various points throughout their lifetime, not to show any advantage for a 
particular age group (except those which they had not yet belonged to).   
Initial research suggests that this may not be the case.  As previously discussed, 
Anastasi & Rhodes (2005) showed that children exhibited an own-age bias of a similar 
magnitude to older adults.  However, the methodological flaws associated with this, and 
similar studies (described in Section 1.7.) make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about 
the nature of the own-age bias across different age groups.  It is of note, however, that in 
the only three studies that did successfully match the age of the stimuli used to the age of 
their participants, own-age biases were found for all age groups (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006; 
Kuefner et al, 2008; Perfect & Moon, 2005).  This suggests that contact, in terms of a 
cumulative measure of experience with age groups of faces, may not be responsible for the 
own-age bias. 
However, as suggested in the own-race literature, it is possible that the index of 
contact that is important in the own-age bias is not one that is a quantitative cumulative 
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measure, rather it could refer to more recent contact with groups that are qualitatively more 
salient.  If this were the case then one would expect to see an own-age bias in both child 
and adult populations, as most recent and socially important exposure is likely to be with 
faces of one‘s own age-group.  In addition, if recent exposure is important in the own-age 
bias, then one would expect the size of this bias to be reduced or absent in people with high, 
recent exposure to other age groups (e.g. teachers).  As such, Chapter 3 sought to establish 
whether recent, high quality exposure to other age groups had any effect on the magnitude 
of the own-age bias. 
One factor that has yet to be mentioned, but should be noted within this thesis is to 
do with the role quality of contact may play in mediating the own-race bias.  The idea that 
quality of contact may be important in this bias has been researched by those investigating 
attitudes and prejudices held for other-race faces.  For example, Brigham (1993) found that 
negative attitudes towards other-races was significantly negatively correlated with levels of 
inter-racial group contact.  Thus racial attitudes may play an indirect role in the mediation 
of the own-race bias.  However, in terms of this thesis, it is unlikely that differential 
attitudes for own- and other-age will be as extreme as they are sometimes found to be in the 
own-race bias literature (e.g. Slone et al, 2000).  As such, it is unclear how analogous these 
biases are really likely to be.  However, investigating a face recognition bias that does not 
have strongly associated differential in-group/out-group attitudes is of great theoretical 
interest. 
Admittedly this latter study design does not allow for the separation of (recent) 
quantitative and more qualitative aspects of exposure.  As such, the fourth chapter aimed to 
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tease apart the different aspects of contact that may be important for producing, or 
reducing, the own age bias. 
 
1.9.2. The Possible Mechanisms Underlying the Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition. 
The second main aim of this thesis was to use the own-race and own-gender bias 
literature as a platform from which to explore the possible mechanisms that might be 
responsible for the production of the own-age bias in face recognition.  As discussed above, 
research into these biases essentially offer three possible types of explanation that could 
apply to the own-age bias.  Specifically, these theories would predict that better own-age 
face recognition occurs as a result of one of (or a combination of) the following 
mechanisms: 
1. Improved perceptual processing as a result of increased expertise, most 
likely characterised by enhanced configural processing for own-age faces (e.g. Rhodes et 
al, 1989) 
2. The social categorisation of other-age faces as out-group members, possibly 
due to the presence of a category-specifying feature (e.g. Levin, 1996; 2000), resulting in 
the processing of this categorical information at the expense of individuating information 
3. Increased motivation to attend to own-age faces as a result of social rewards 
and punishments (e.g. Rodin, 1987) 
  
To date, as far as this author is aware, only three studies have specifically sought to 
investigate the possible underlying mechanisms responsible for producing the own-age bias 
in face recognition (deHeering and Rossion, 2008; Kuefner et al, 2008; Perfect & Moon, 
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2005).  All three studies aimed to identify the role of perceptual expertise in this bias.  For 
example, Perfect and Moon (2005) investigated whether the own-age bias was affected by 
inverting faces (see Section 1.2.2.).  If the own-age bias is the result of increased expertise 
with own-age faces (and more efficient configural processing as a result of that expertise), 
then one would expect to see inversion affect own-age faces to a larger extent than other-
age faces, resulting in the reduction (or even removal) of the own-age bias that is seen in 
upright faces.  This, however, was not the case. Instead of inversion reducing the own-age 
bias, Perfect & Moon found that inverting the faces in fact did the opposite.  As a result, the 
authors concluded that a social-categorisation account might offer a better explanation of 
the own-age bias (e.g. Levin, 1996; 2000), and as feature-based processing is less impaired 
by inversion (e.g. Leder & Bruce, 1998), a hypothesis that relies on the identification of a 
category-specifying feature might be better suited to explain this effect.   
However, before one accepts this interpretation, it should be noted that a recent 
study has found a very different pattern of results.  In another inversion study that 
specifically investigated expertise with own- and other- age faces in terms of inter-age 
contact levels, Kuefner et al (2008) found supporting evidence for the perceptual-expertise 
hypothesis.  Using adults who either had low or high contact with other age faces (in this 
case children: i.e. participants were either undergraduate students or teachers respectively), 
the authors investigated participants' ability to recognise adult and children‘s faces, 
presented both in the upright and upside-down position.  When the faces were upright, 
those in the low contact group performed with higher accuracy to own-age faces, while the 
high contact group were similarly accurate for both stimuli groups.  The authors also found 
that inverting the faces produced a greater inversion effect for adult faces compared to child 
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faces in the low contact group, while the inversion cost was similar for both facial age 
groups for the high contact participants.   
These results appear to support a perceptual expertise explanation of the own-age 
bias in face recognition, but as with most studies in this area, there are methodological 
problems.  The main issue in this case was that the ―own-age‖ stimuli (comprising photos 
of 20-30 year olds) were not matched with the age of the participants in the high contact 
group (who were 24-56 years old).  As a result it is possible that the lack of ―own-age bias‖ 
in this cohort is actually just a display of two ―other-age‖ effects.  Thus it is difficult to 
make claims about the role of contact and perceptual expertise in the own-age bias.  
The final study of this kind was carried out by deHeering and Rossion (2008), who 
used the composite face effect (CFE; see Section 1.2.1) to investigate the role of perceptual 
expertise in the own-age bias.  Again, the authors used pre-school teachers with experience 
of children‘s faces to represent other-age face experts and compared them to similarly aged 
novices.  Using a face matching task, the authors presented participants with pairs of child 
and adult composite faces (comprising different individuals in the top and bottom halves of 
the faces) and asked them to identify whether the individuals in the top halves of the faces 
were the same or different.  Face halves were either presented aligned, or misaligned.  In 
line with previous research on the CFE, participants performed more accurately when face 
halves were presented out of alignment with one another, suggesting holistic/configural 
processing of the perceptual whole face was interfering with the successful identification of 
its parts.  However, in terms of accuracy, there was no three-way interaction between 
alignment, face age and group that would have been indicative of a perceptual-expertise 
account of the own-age bias.  As the accuracy measure that was used in this study only 
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included ―same‖ face decisions, this measure may not have been sufficient enough to truly 
represent perceptual ability.  Failure to take into account performance on ―different‖ face 
trials may have under- or over- represented group accuracy, as it fails to take into account 
discriminibility or possible response biases. 
The authors also investigated response time (again, only for same face pairs).  As 
before, participants performed worse for aligned face halves.  However, this time there was 
a significant three-way interaction with novices showing a much larger CFE for adults 
compared to children‘s faces.  That is, their performance was significantly more impaired 
by face-half alignment when faces were of the same age group to them compared to a 
different, younger age group.  In contrast, experts showed no significant difference in the 
magnitude of their CFE for the two stimuli age groups.  Perhaps even more compelling 
evidence for the role of expertise in the own-age bias was the finding that the magnitude of 
the experts‘ CFE significantly correlated with the number of years experience they had 
working with children; with the CFE becoming larger for the children‘s faces compared to 
adult faces after about 10 years of ―other-age‖ experience.   
This finding could potentially support a contact-type explanation of the own-age 
bias and specifically a perceptual-expertise account. However, yet again these authors 
failed to successfully match the ages of the facial stimuli to the participants.  In fact, the 
age-bands of the two participants groups (novices: 27-35 years old; experts: 29-37) did not 
even overlap with the stimuli age-band (18-25 years of age).  As such, it is difficult to make 
claims about the implications of this study in terms of an ―own-age‖ bias.   
Given the mixed findings and methodological problems with the three above-
mentioned studies, it is still unclear whether a perceptual expertise account offers a suitable 
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explanation of the own-age bias, or whether a social categorisation account, or indeed a 
motivational account, may be more appropriate.  Thus, this thesis sought to establish which 
of these three accounts might best explain the own-age bias in face recognition.  Using 
paradigms that have previously been used in the own-race and own-gender bias literature to 
investigate these perceptual, social and motivational accounts, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
systematically explored these theories using successfully age-matched stimuli with a view 
to offering a suitable explanation for the own-age bias in face recognition.   
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Chapter 2  
 
2.1. Experiment 1: Introduction 
 
Previous research has suggested that young adults are better at recognising faces 
and make more accurate eyewitness identifications than older adults (e.g. Adams-Price, 
1992; Searcy, Bartlett & Memon, 1999; Searcy, Bartlett, Memon, & Swanson, 2001; 
Yarmey, 1993).  While it is known that cognitive performance deteriorates with age (see 
Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004 for a review), this apparent difference in facial memory 
performance might be partly due to the nature of the stimuli that are commonly used in face 
recognition studies.  For example, most of the studies that have looked at face recognition 
performance of different age groups have compared undergraduates (or those of a similar 
age group) with older adults.  However the targets and distractors used in these studies are 
usually faces of college age.  It is therefore possible that younger adults' superior 
recognition accuracy is the result of some kind of own-age processing bias.  
Relatively little research has been performed on this topic, but the few studies that 
have been carried out do appear to provide evidence for an own-age bias in face 
recognition.  For example, Wright and Stroud (2002) presented young adults and middle-
aged participants with videos of a crime in which the perpetrator was either similar or 
dissimilar in age to themselves.  All participants were more likely to correctly identify the 
perpetrator from a line-up comprised of people belonging to their own age group.  Further 
analysis showed that when the line-up comprised younger adults, the younger adults 
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showed superior recognition accuracy compared to the older adults, but age group 
difference disappeared when the line-up consisted of older adults.    
Similar results were found using a paradigm investigating unconscious transference.  
Perfect and Harris (2003) found that younger adults were significantly more likely to 
correctly identify a young perpetrator than the older adults, however there was no 
difference between the two groups‘ performance when the ―line-up‖ comprised older adult 
faces.  In addition, the authors also found that older adults were more likely than younger 
adults to misidentify a bystander as the perpetrator of a crime when the line-ups consisted 
of younger adults, and again this difference was eliminated when the line-ups were 
comprised of older adults.   
 Both of these studies suggest that when viewing young faces, young adults out-
perform older adults, but this difference is eliminated when the facial stimuli are 
photographs of older adults.  However neither of these studies formally analysed the own-
age bias as defined for the purpose of this thesis (a recognition advantage for own age faces 
over other age faces).  Despite this, the accuracy scores reported in these studies (and seen 
on page 44) suggest that while older adults show an advantage for recognising own-age 
faces over other-age faces, younger adults do not.  Obviously it is difficult to conclude this 
without undertaking the suitable statistical comparisons, and there is evidence that such a 
conclusion may not be justified.  In a study similar to that of Wright and Stroud (2002), no 
effects or interactions were found for participant and/or face age, calling into question the 
reliability of these findings (Memon, Bartlett, Rose and Gray, 2003).   
 One possible reason for the conflicting results above may be the study designs that 
were used.  While all three above-mentioned studies can be given merit due to their 
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ecological validity, the use of line-up procedures to measure face recognition can be 
problematic.  The main problem with these forensic style paradigms is that each face-age 
category is only represented by a small number of faces (in all three studies only two faces 
were used for each age group) and thus findings can easily be skewed or biased by the 
unintentional inclusion of atypical exemplars.  In order to minimise the possibility of this 
happening and to increase the power of the analyses, more traditional recognition memory 
paradigms following exposure to a large number of photographic facial stimuli have also 
been used to investigate the own-age bias. 
One example of this is Perfect and Moon‘s (2005) study.  They showed photographs 
of younger and older adults to two groups of similarly aged participants. The authors found 
a robust age x face-age interaction, characteristic of the own-age bias, with both age groups 
performing best with own-age faces. Anastasi and Rhodes (2006; Experiment 1) found a 
similar pattern of results with three adult groups: younger, middle-aged and older adults all 
exhibited superior recognition for own-age faces compared to other-age faces.  However 
other studies have produced inconsistent results (see Table 2.1. for a summary of all adult 
own-age bias studies and their outcomes).  For example some studies have found evidence 
of an own-age bias in younger, but not older adults when using younger and older adult 
faces as stimuli (e.g. Bartlett & Leslie, 1986; Fulton & Bartlett, 1991; Mason, 1986; Weise 
et al, 2008) while others have found the reverse to be true (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006 
Experiment 2).  In addition, one study has found evidence of an own-age bias in young 
adults when viewing own-age and child faces (Kuefner et al, 2008). 
Thus studies investigating the own-age bias in adults have produced varied results.  
However it is possible that this is due to poor matching of the participant age groups to the 
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Table 2.1  Summary of studies investigating the own-age bias in face recognition in adult participants                                             
  Group 
Mean Age of 
Participants 
Age of "Own-Age" Faces 
(mean or age-range) 
Are Ages Matched? Is there an OAB? 
Studies with Adult Participants 
Barlett & Leslie, 1986 (Exp 1) Young Adults 18 20-39  
 Older Adults 74 40-79  
Barlett & Leslie, 1986 (Exp 2) Young Adults 27.2 20-39  
 Older Adults 66.5 40-79  
Mason, 1986 Young Adults 17-29 20  
 Older Adults 62-88 70  
Bäckman, 1991 
Young Adults 19-27 29.5  
Older Adults 63-70 76.2 (69-85)  
76 year olds 76 76.2 (69-85)  
 85 year olds 85 76.2 (69-85)  
Fulton & Bartlett, 1991 Young Adults 20-36 29.5  
 Elderly 59-82 62.7  
Wright & Stroud, 2002 Young Adults 18-25 21-23  - 
 Middle-aged Adults 35-55 48-51  - 
Memon et al, 2003 Young Adults 22.3 - - - 
 Older Adults 69 - - - 
Perfect & Harris, 2003 Young Adults 20.1 21  - 
 Older Adults 66.6 71  - 
Perfect & Moon, 2005 Young Adults 20.2 22.2  
 Older Adults 73.9 73.4  
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006 (Exp 1) 
Young Adults 18-25 18-25  
Middle-aged Adults 35-45 35-45  
 Older Adults 55-78 55-75  
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006 (Exp 2) 
Young Adults 18-25 18-25  
Older Adults 55-91 55-75  
Kuefner et al, 2008 (Exp 2) Young Adults 19-30 20-30  
Weise et al, 2008 Young Adults 19-28 18-29  
 Older Adults 61-76 55-82  
  - indicates information was not specified  
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ages of the facial stimuli used.  While all of the studies claim to be studying an own-age 
bias in face recognition, only three of them successfully matched all of their facial 
stimuli ages to that of the participants: Anastasi and Rhodes (2006; Experiment 1), 
Kuefner et al (2008; Exp 2) and Perfect and Moon (2005).  All three studies found a 
significant own-age bias for each age group tested.  These findings suggest that adults 
are generally better at recognising faces belonging to their own age group than those 
belonging to another.  However, it should be noted that one methodological 
shortcoming of Kuefner et al‘s study (2008, Exp 2) was that they failed to use 
alternative-pose photographs as their stimuli.  As such, it is possible that their findings 
are reflective of participants‘ picture identification abilities (e.g. recognising an 
idiosyncratic feature in a picture) rather than their face recognition skills per se (Bruce, 
1982). 
So it may well be the case that older adults are not, in fact, worse at recognising 
faces than young adults, but are instead disadvantaged by the fact that most studies use 
young adult faces as their stimuli.  Children are another group who may suffer from the 
same disadvantage.  As discussed in Section 1.6., children are frequently cited as being 
poorer eyewitnesses and as being worse at recognising faces than young adults (e.g. 
Chance & Goldstein, 1984; Wells & Olson, 2003).  However, again the majority of face 
recognition studies with children have used young adult faces as their stimuli (see 
Chung & Thomson, 1995 for review), presenting the possibility that their recognition 
abilities have been underestimated as a result of the fact that they are being asked to 
recognise ―other-age‖ faces while young adults may have an own-age advantage.   
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Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) extended their work on the own-age bias in face 
recognition to include children and elderly adults and found a comparable own-age bias 
with both of these groups.  This suggests that an own-age bias may be present in 
children as well as adults.  However part of the procedure of these studies involved 
categorising the facial stimuli into their age groups at the learning stage. This may have 
actively drawn participants' attention to the ages of the faces and encouraged a related 
processing bias, so these findings should be interpreted with caution. 
Two other studies have investigated the possibility of an own-age bias in 
children, with conflicting outcomes.  Chung (1997) tested children and adults for their 
recognition of adult and child faces and found that while adults recognized adult faces 
more accurately than children‘s faces, no own-age bias was present for the child 
participants.  However, in direct contrast, Crookes and McKone (2009) found the 
opposite pattern with children demonstrating superior recognition of child faces 
compared to adult faces, while adults exhibited no such bias.  However, as with the 
adult studies, the latter two studies may not have successfully matched the participant 
ages to that of the facial stimuli used as the authors only broadly defined ―own-age‖ to 
mean child versus adult.  Thus, there is no clear pattern in the research that suggests 
whether or not an own-age bias truly exists in children, and indeed whether it exists in 
young adults when the ―other age‖ of facial stimuli used is of child age.  As such, the 
primary aim of this study was to clarify whether there is an own-age bias in children 
and young adults when faces belonging to the same, successfully matched age groups 
are viewed. 
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2.2. Method 
 
2.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used, with age group as the between subjects variable (with 
two levels: children and undergraduates) and age of facial photograph as the repeated 
measures variable (again, with two levels: child – 8-10 years old and young adult – 18-
25 years old).  Measures of accuracy and reaction time (RTs) were taken for the 
dependent variables.   
 
2.2.2. Participants 
There were 66 participants in total.  The undergraduate group consisted of 23 
females and 10 males (total mean age 20.09, SD 1.55, range 18-24 years) and the group 
of children comprised 17 females and 16 males (total mean age 8.76, SD .44, range 8-9 
years).   Undergraduate participants were all psychology students from the University of 
Sussex who received research credits for their participation.  The children were all 
recruited from Year 4 at Goldstone Primary School in Hove after obtaining parental 
consent. 
 
2.2.3. Materials 
Photographs of 64 Caucasian males were taken. Half were between 8-10 years 
old, and half were between 18-25 years old.  Two photographs were taken of each 
individual, one in a smiling pose and the other neutral.  This was done to ensure that 
participants were being tested on their face recognition abilities, and not their ability to 
recognise pictures (Bruce, 1982).  All photographs were close up, frontal face images 
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without glasses, jewellery, facial hair or other identifying features.  Each photograph 
was then converted to greyscale and edited to a standard size (300 x 350 pixels) using 
Adobe Photoshop software.  The background of each picture and any information 
outside of the head outline and the contour of the chin were removed and made solid 
white (see Figure 2.1. for an example of the stimuli used).  
 
 
Figure 2.1  Examples of the facial stimuli used. 
 
2.2.4. Procedure 
For the initial learning phase participants were presented with 32 upright 
photographs (16 from each age group) in a random order at a 3 second rate, using 
Superlab 2.01 (Cedrus Corporation) on a desktop computer, with a viewing distance of 
approximately 45cm. The participants were instructed to try and remember the faces as 
best they could, as they would later be asked to identify them.  Following the learning 
phase, participants completed a three minute filler task.  This was the F-A-S verbal 
fluency task (Benton & Hamsher, 1977), where participants were given a minute per 
letter to name as many words as they could beginning with either F, A or S.   This 
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particular task was chosen as it was thought to be appropriate for both age groups taking 
part in the study.   
This was followed by the recognition test which consisted of 64 photographs, 32 
of which had previously been seen in the learning phase in the alternate pose (targets) 
and 32 of which were new (distractors).  Photographs appeared in a different random 
order for each participant and were counterbalanced with respect to pose and old/new 
status.  Using the computer keyboard, participants were asked to indicate whether or not 
they recognized the individuals in the photos.  A fixation dot was displayed in the centre 
of the screen for 500ms before each face appeared.  The photographs appeared 
individually and the rate of presentation was determined by the participant‘s speed of 
response, with each face remaining on the screen until a response was made or after 
2500ms had elapsed.   
 
2.3. Results 
 
2.3.1. Accuracy 
Hit rates (proportion of correctly detected targets), false alarm rates (proportion 
of mistakenly identified distractors) and a combination of these measures (d-prime 
scores (d‘)) were calculated to investigate accuracy.  Estimates of d‘ were used for 
analysis, rather than the percentage of correct responses, as d' is thought to be a better 
index of recognition discriminability.  D-prime is a parametric test statistic that is used 
to determine how accurate participants are at making binary decisions about test stimuli.  
The formula for d‘ considers both the proportion of responses on which participants 
report a target stimulus as being present when it is present (hits), and the proportion of 
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responses that participants report a test stimulus as being present when it is absent (false 
alarms).  A d‘ score of 0 indicates chance performance and the higher the score, the 
more accurate the performance. 
In calculating d', a flattening constant was used so that z scores could be 
calculated when the hit or false alarm rate was either 0 or 1.  In order to do this, Wright 
and Sladden's (2003) procedure was used.  Hit rates (HR) and false alarm rates (FAR) 
were calculated for each person for both face-age groups, by adding 0.5 to their total 
amount of hits (or false alarms), and then dividing the total by the number of trials they 
could have got correct (the sum of hits and misses for HR; the total false alarms and 
correct rejections for FAR) plus 1.  Since there was no effect of pose type on accuracy, 
data were collapsed across this variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
2.3.2. Hit Rates 
Figure 2.2. shows the mean proportion of hits for both experimental groups for 
both face age conditions.   
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Figure 2.2  The effect of face age on the mean proportion of correctly detected targets made by the different 
contact groups (error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
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A two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) (two levels of group x two 
levels of face age) revealed that there was no overall significant main effect of face age 
(F<1) on the proportion of hits made.  However, there was a significant main effect of 
age group (F(1,64)=57.60, p<.001, ηp
2
= .47), with undergraduates detecting more 
targets (mean =.82, .10) than children (mean = .63, .16).  In addition to this, there was 
also a significant interaction between face age and age group (F(1,64)=20.13, p<.001, 
ηp
2
= .24) such that the undergraduates produced more hits for the young adult faces 
(mean = .85, .09) than the children‘s faces (mean = .78, .10), while children showed the 
opposite pattern, scoring more hits on children‘s faces (mean = .67, .14) than young 
adult faces (mean = .58, .17).  
This significant interaction was examined further, using follow-up Bonferroni 
corrected paired t-tests
4
. These demonstrated a significant effect of face age for both the 
children (t(32) = -3.06, p<.01, d =-.58) and the undergraduates (t(32) = 3.37, p=.001, d 
=.74), thus showing an own-age bias for both groups in terms of hit rates.  Further 
independent t-tests (with Bonferroni correction) revealed that undergraduates performed 
significantly better than children for both children‘s faces, (t(64) = -3.68,  p= .001, d =-
.92 and young adults' faces (t(48.06) = -8.42, p<.001, d =-2.11). 
 
                                                 
 
4
 All follow-up t-tests in this chapter are 1-tailed tests due to the directional hypotheses associated with 
the own-age bias. 
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2.3.3. False Alarms 
Figure 2.3. shows the mean proportion of false alarms for both experimental 
groups for both face age conditions.   
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Figure 2.3  The effect of face age on the mean proportion of false alarms made by the different contact groups 
(error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
 A two-way mixed ANOVA (two levels of group x two levels of face age) 
revealed a significant main effect of age group (F(1,64)=12.98, p=.001, ηp
2
= .17) on the 
proportion of false alarms made, with undergraduates wrongly identifying significantly 
fewer distractor faces as having been seen before  (means =.20, .11) than did children 
(mean = .29, .15).  No significant main effect of face age (F(1,64)=3.11, p=.08) was 
found, nor was there a significant interaction between face age and age group 
(F(1,64)=3.38, p=.07).  
 
2.3.4. D-prime 
Figure 2.4. shows the mean d‘ score for both experimental groups for the two 
stimulus conditions.  Both groups appear to have been able to identify whether a face 
was familiar or not across all conditions at above chance levels (d‘ > 0).   
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Figure 2.4  The effect of face age on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different contact groups (error bars 
show mean ±1 standard error) 
  
A two-way mixed ANOVA (two levels of group x two levels of face age) 
revealed that there was no overall significant main effect of face age (F(1,64)=2.22, 
p=.14, ηp
2
= .03) on d‘ scores.  However, there was a significant main effect of age 
group (F(1,64)=56.21, p<.001, ηp
2
= .47), with children performing significantly less 
accurately (mean = .97, .67) than the undergraduates (mean = 1.90, .60) overall.  This 
finding was further qualified by a significant interaction between face age and 
participant age-group (F(1,66)=22.86, p<.001, ηp
2
= .47) such that children performed 
more accurately with children‘s  faces (mean = 1.23, .73) than with the young adult 
faces (mean = .71, .49), while undergraduates showed the opposite pattern (child face 
mean = 1.77, .66,  young adult face mean = 2.04, .51).  These results are consistent with 
an own-age bias in face recognition, as both groups performed more accurately with 
faces of their own age group. 
This pattern of results was further examined using follow-up Bonferroni 
corrected paired t-tests which demonstrated a significant effect of face age for both the 
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children (t(32) = -5.01, p<.001, d =-.84) and the undergraduates (t(32) = 2.11, p<.05, d 
=.46), showing an own-age bias for both groups in terms of accuracy.  Further 
independent t-tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed that undergraduates performed 
significantly better than children with both children‘s faces, (t(64) = -3.13,  p< .01, d=-
.78) and young adults' faces (t(64) = -10.77, p<.001, d=-2.69). 
 
2.3.5. C Response Bias 
Estimates of c were analysed to investigate the strategies that participants were 
using for the different face types, for example how likely a participant was to respond 
―yes‖ when asked if they recognised a face.  A participant who always responds ―no‖ to 
a face will never make a false alarm error, but will have a hit rate of 0; on the other hand 
a participant who always responds ―yes‖ to a face is guaranteed a 100% hit rate.  Like 
d', this parameter is based on false alarm and hit rates.  The ideal participant would not 
show a response bias and would have a c score of 0.  A participant who tends to respond 
liberally with ―yes‖ would have a negative c score, whereas a participant who may 
favour a more conservative approach, tending to respond with ―no‖, would have a 
positive score.   Like d', response bias is based on false alarm and hit rate.  Figure 2.5. 
shows the mean c score for both experimental groups for the two face age stimulus 
conditions.   
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Figure 2.5  The effect of face age on c response bias scores for the different contact groups (error bars show 
mean ±1 standard error) 
 
 A 2x2 mixed ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of age 
group (F(1,64)=7.21, p<.01, ηp
2
= .10) with undergraduates performing generally more 
liberally (mean = -.03, .32) than children (mean = .14, .36).  No significant main effect 
of face age (F(1,64)=2.15, p=.15, ηp
2
=.03) was found, nor was there a significant 
interaction between face age and participant age-group (F(1,64)=2.72, p=.10, ηp
2
=.04).    
The results show that undergraduates have a more conservative response bias 
than children.  It is unclear why a conservative strategy might have been employed by 
the undergraduates (particularly for undergraduate faces), while a more liberal strategy 
was adopted by the children.  However, it is of note that while differences in response 
bias patterns were found, none of the mean values falls outside c = ± 0.15 indicating 
that the magnitude of these biases is extremely small and may, therefore, not be all that 
meaningful. 
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2.3.6. Latency 
To minimize the variability often found in reaction time (RT) data, each 
individual‘s performance was examined for every trial.  Any RTs longer than the 
individual‘s mean +/-2.5 standard deviations were replaced by that participant‘s mean 
RT (a method advocated by Ratcliff, 1993).  2.1% of the children‘s responses and 2.3% 
of the undergraduate‘s responses were replaced in this way. Corrected mean RTs are 
shown in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age stimuli for both age groups 
(bars show mean ±1 standard error).  
 
 Mean RTs for correct responses were entered into a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA with 
group and face age as variables of interest.  This revealed no significant main effect of 
face age (F(1,64)=2.35, p=.13), however there was a significant main effect of age 
group (F(1,64)=14.07, p<.001, ηp
2
=.18), with undergraduates (mean = 984.42, 160.22) 
performing faster than children (mean = 1169.23, 238.96) overall.   A significant 
interaction between these two variables was also found (F(1,64)=10.10, p<.01, ηp
2
=.14), 
with children performing faster with children‘s  faces (mean = 1161.02, 239.93) than 
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with the young adult faces (mean = 1177.45, 241.42), while undergraduates showed the 
opposite pattern (child face mean = 1007.93, 168.63; young adult face mean = 960.90, 
150.21).  These results are consistent with an own-age bias in face recognition, as both 
groups performed faster when correctly responding to faces of their own age group. 
 Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests revealed a significant effect of face age for 
undergraduates (t(32)=-3.69, p=.001, d=-.29), but not for children (t(32)=1.07, p=.29, 
d=.07).  Further independent t-tests revealed that undergraduates performed faster than 
children for both age groups of faces (children‘s faces, (t(64)=3.00, p<.01, d=.75; young 
adult faces t(64)=4.38, p<.001, d=1.10).  
 These results suggest that in terms of reaction time data, while undergraduates 
show significant differences in their performance for the different facial stimuli, 
exhibiting an advantage for own-age faces, the same cannot be said for children who 
respond at similar speeds to both face age conditions.  This result is not exactly 
unexpected.  While carrying out the study, it was noted that the younger age group did 
not put as much effort and concentration into their performance as the older age group, 
typically talking and fidgeting throughout the experiment.  It is also unclear how 
representative the children‘s response times are of the cognitive processes involved in 
this recognition task.  It is likely that there were time lags and inconsistencies between 
when a child made a decision about the familiarity of a face and when they made the 
appropriate motor response.  This is believed to be an issue, because the children often 
verbally identified the faces as familiar or not before pressing the corresponding button.  
These observations indicate that perhaps reaction times are not the best measure of 
recognition performance for children. 
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2.3. Discussion 
  
 Previous research has suggested that adults are better at recognising faces of 
their own age group than those of a different age (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006; Perfect 
& Moon, 2005), however whether children also show this own-age bias remains 
unclear.  The three studies that had previously been employed to investigate this issue 
contained methodological flaws that make interpretation of the findings difficult.  For 
example, while claiming to investigate an ―own-age‖ bias in face recognition, Crookes 
and McKone (2009) failed to successfully match the participant ages to that of the facial 
stimuli used, themselves acknowledging that that they ―only defined ‗own-age‘ broadly 
to simply mean child versus adult status, rather than attempting to match exact age[s]‖.  
In addition, Chung (1997) provided no information about the ages of the facial stimuli 
they used, nor the age of their ―adult‖ participants. As such, stating that these studies 
were truly investigating an own-age bias in face recognition may not have been entirely 
appropriate. 
 While Anastasi & Rhodes (2005) did successfully match their child participants 
and facial stimuli in terms of ages, their methodology presented a problem.  When 
encoding the facial stimuli, participants were asked to categorise each photo into its 
appropriate age band.  This encoding task may have induced an artificial ―in-group‖ 
processing bias (e.g. Sporer, 2001) by drawing the participants‘ attention to the age of 
the photographs and therefore may not be representative of the participants‘ normal face 
recognition abilities. 
 In order to address these issues the present study aimed to investigate the own-
age bias in face recognition for children and young adults by successfully matching the 
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ages of the participants with those of the facial stimuli.  As with previous studies a 
traditional old/new recognition paradigm was used, as it offers better statistical power 
than forensic-style eyewitness testimony paradigms.  However in contrast to Anastasi 
and Rhodes‘ (2005) study, participants were not told that they would be viewing faces 
of different ages, and they were not asked to classify faces in the initial learning phase.   
 Accounting for these former methodological problems, the results obtained from 
this study were nevertheless consistent with those of Anastasi and Rhodes (2005).  Both 
children and young adults exhibited an own-age bias in face recognition, as they both 
exhibited superior accuracy when recognising own-age faces.  And while children were 
found to perform worse than adults overall, the presence of an own-age bias in this 
cohort indicates that previously cited age-related deficits in children‘s face recognition 
abilities may, at least to some extent, be exaggerated. 
 This enhanced ability to discriminate own-age faces is a similar pattern to that 
observed for the well documented own-race bias, where participants are better at 
recognising faces belonging to their own race, than those of another race (see Brigham, 
Bennett, Meissner & Mitchell, 2007 for a recent review).  As such, previous studies 
investigating the own-age bias have suggested that the two biases in face recognition 
may be analogous (e.g. Wright & Stroud, 2002).  If this is the case, then we may be able 
to gain some insight into the mechanisms responsible for the own-age bias by 
consulting the plethora of literature investigating the own-race bias. 
 The most popular explanation of the own-race bias proposes that our ability to 
recognise faces of a particular race is mediated by the amount of contact we have with 
members of that race (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 1985).  As we tend to spend more time 
with members of our own racial group, and are therefore more familiar with members of 
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this group, we have better memory and recognition for own-race faces
5
.  With a slight 
adjustment this theory could easily be applied to explain the results of the current study.  
It is possible that the own-age bias seen here is the result of increased exposure to (and 
more familiarity with) individuals belonging to the same age group as the participants.  
Both age groups were recruited from settings where participants would have been 
subject to high levels of daily contact with members of their own age group: children 
were recruited from schools and adults were university students.   
 However, while this contact-type explanation of the own-age bias is intuitively 
appealing, it cannot be accepted without one obvious caveat.  Studies which have 
investigated the role of contact in the own-race bias have, more often than not, taken 
cumulative, quantitative metrics to estimate contact levels (see Meissner & Brigham, 
2001 for a review).  This method may not be entirely appropriate when considering the 
own-age bias, namely due to the fact that the older age group has previously belonged 
to other, younger age groups.  As such, throughout their lifetime they should have 
acquired enough experience with faces of younger age groups that these faces should be 
suitably familiar to them, allowing them to recognise them at levels similar to own-age 
faces.  Given that the young adults in this study exhibited better recognition of own-age 
faces than children‘s faces, this does not appear to be the case.  Thus, the contact 
hypothesis as it stands struggles to satisfactorily account for the own-age bias.  If 
however we suggest that it is only recent exposure to faces that is important, then the 
contact hypothesis can be saved (this is discussed further in the next chapter). 
                                                 
 
5
 As a ―high-level‖ theory the contact hypothesis does not specifically allude to the underlying 
mechanisms through which contact might exert its influence, however this issue is addressed further in 
Chapter 3.   
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 It may be also be of note that these findings present a slightly different pattern of 
results to that usually seen in studies on the own-race bias.  Concentrating on studies 
which used signal detection measures (d‘ and A‘), Meissner & Brigham‘s (2001) meta-
analysis of the own-race bias found a robust cross-race effect.  Breaking the effect down 
into its constituent hit and false alarm rates showed that this pattern was due to own-
race faces being correctly identified 1.40 times more than other-race faces, while other-
race faces were 1.56 time more likely to be misidentified than own-race faces.  In 
addition, the authors found that participants tended to use a significantly more 
conservative response criterion when recognising own- compared to other- race faces.  
In contrast, while the current study found a significant own-age bias in terms of both 
discriminability and hit rates similar to that seen in the own-race bias literature, no such 
effects were found for either false alarm rates or response criterion.  These findings 
suggest that while the own-race bias literature is a good starting point for investigating 
the own-age bias, the two biases may not truly be analogous phenomena. 
 The current study found an own-age bias in both young adults and children for 
successfully age-matched facial stimuli.  While the data from the current study do not 
allow us to identify the specific underlying mechanisms that may be responsible for this 
effect, it is possible that a contact-type explanation may be appropriate.  This will be 
further investigated in the next chapter.  But regardless of the drivers of this effect, the 
pattern of results obtained in this study does have significant practical implications in 
terms of eyewitness testimony.  As Wright and Stroud (2002) note, most studies 
investigating the eyewitness identification abilities of different age groups have largely 
ignored the age of the perpetrator as an influential factor.  However the current study 
suggests that individuals may be worse at identifying a suspect/unfamiliar face when 
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they are of a different age to the perceiver.  As such, the age of the witness and the age 
of the perpetrator (and particularly the interaction between these variables) may be 
important factors to consider when trying to assess how well an individual is likely to 
perform when recognising previously seen unfamiliar faces.   
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Chapter 3  
 
3.1. Experiment 2: Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, previous research has identified the 
existence of an own-age bias in face recognition (e.g. Wright & Stroud, 2002) and this 
has been found in children, young and older adults (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; 
2006).  However, while a number of studies have shown this bias to exist, little is 
known about its exact nature and the underlying mechanisms that produce it.  In order 
to try and establish possible reasons for the existence of an own-age bias, it may be 
useful to consider the wealth of existing research on the own-race bias
6
. It is well 
documented that people are more accurate at recognising faces of their own race than 
those of a different, less familiar race (see Section 1.8.1. for an in depth discussion of 
this phenomenon; Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for a review).   
  While an all-encompassing, generally accepted theory for the own-race bias 
does not yet exist, perhaps the most popular explanation for it is the ―contact 
hypothesis‖.  This high-level theory proposes that people become experts at 
differentiating between faces of their own race due to increased contact with members 
of their own race compared to those of other races (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 1985; 
Chiroro & Valentine, 1995).  This account of the own-race bias has been supported by a 
number of studies showing that there is a significant positive relationship between 
                                                 
 
6
 The own-age and own-race biases may or may not be analogous phenomena, but the theories put 
forward to explain the own-race bias make a useful starting-point for this type of research. 
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memory for faces of individuals from a certain race and the amount of contact the 
participant has had with that race (e.g. Slone, Brigham & Meissner, 2000; Wright, Boyd 
& Tredoux, 2003).  Meissner & Brigham‘s (2001) meta-analysis also found a 
significant, though small (accounting for approximately 2% of the variability in the 
data) relationship between other-race discrimination and self-report measures of inter-
racial contact. However, it remains unclear precisely what aspect of contact is important 
for the development of an own-race bias to occur. 
One class of explanation proposes that increased contact with a race (usually our 
own) somehow produces improved perceptual processing for that particular facial group 
in some way.  For example, Rhodes, Tan, Brake, and Taylor (1989) suggested that 
exposure to own-race faces enhances our ability to appropriately extract the configural 
information which is at the heart of expert face recognition (Diamond & Carey, 1986). 
This configural-expertise explanation of the contact hypothesis appears to be supported 
in both behavioural and neurological domains.  Evidence using inverted (Rhodes et. al., 
1989), part-whole (Tanaka, Kiefer & Bukach, 2004) and composite (Michel, Rossion, 
Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006) faces suggests that other-race faces are processed less 
configurally or holistically (and hence perhaps less efficiently) than own-race faces. 
Differential activation of the Fusiform Face Area for same- and other-race faces is also 
consistent with this claim (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001).  
Another account based on perceptual processing is Valentine's (1991) multi-
dimensional face space model. This suggests that faces are represented as points in a 
multidimensional space, whose dimensions consist of the facial characteristics that 
would best serve to discriminate between faces.  It is thought that the dimensions 
develop in accordance with the individual‘s experience of faces.  The theory explains 
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the own-race bias by suggesting that a lack of exposure to other-race faces means that 
the dimensions necessary for individuating them are less well represented than those 
needed to distinguish between own-race faces.  Both of these theories assume that 
perceptual face processing mechanisms become better tuned for the types of faces with 
which we have a greater amount of experience. 
An alternative, although not mutually exclusive, class of explanation for the 
own-race bias focuses more on the social psychology of person recognition. These 
theories suggest that we automatically categorize faces according to whether or not they 
belong to our own in-group (e.g. our own race), and that it is this process of 
categorization that has consequences for how we subsequently process those faces (e.g. 
Levin, 1996, 2000; Sporer, 2001).  For example, Sporer's (2001) In-group/Out-group 
Model (IoM) suggests that in-group faces are encoded in an automatic, configural 
manner (typical of expert face processing), while out-group faces automatically trigger a 
categorisation of that person as belonging to an ―out-group‖.  This categorisation in turn 
leads to the faces being cognitively discounted (or even disregarded), resulting in a 
reduced, less efficient processing strategy and associated recognition deficits.  "Contact" 
has a role to play in this process only insofar as it might lead to the development of in-
group and out-group relationships
7
.  This type of explanation could clearly be extended 
to explain recognition deficits for out-groups other than race, such as age and gender.  
Yet another possibility is that contact per se does not affect face processing 
directly; instead, contact may reflect or drive the degree of interest a person has in faces 
                                                 
 
7
 Note that the quality of contact, rather than merely the amount of contact, might be the important 
variable here:  see Wright, Boyd and Tredoux (2003) for a demonstration of this in the context of the 
own-race bias. 
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of a particular kind and the resultant amount of attention allocated to them. It is this 
interest/attention that may be the important factor in determining how expert we are at 
processing faces of a particular category (e.g. own-age faces), and may depend on the 
incentives for doing so (e.g. social rewards or punishments). This theory is admittedly 
speculative; however, Wright, Boyd and Tredoux (2003) found that although white and 
black university students had similar opportunities for experience with the alternate 
race, only the white students showed an own-race bias. Perhaps, due to the 
asymmetrical power relationships within South African society, the black students had 
an incentive for trying to recognise white faces, while the opposite was not true.   
Since this current study was carried out in 2006, two other studies investigating 
the role of contact in the own-age bias have been carried out.  Both Kuefner et al (2008) 
and deHeering and Rossion (2008) investigated the ability of adults who had either low 
or high contact with children (i.e. they were either undergraduate students or teachers 
respectively) to recognise adult and children‘s faces.  Using an inversion paradigm  (a 
manipulation known to disrupt configural processing, the hallmark of expert face 
processing, e.g. Diamond & Carey 1986; see Section 1.2. for further discussion of this), 
Kuefner et al (2008) found that low contact participants were more affected by 
inversion of own-age faces than children‘s faces, while high contact participants showed 
no such difference.  In addition, they found an own-age bias present for upright faces 
only with the low contact participants, apparently supporting a contact-type explanation 
of the own-age bias based on perceptual expertise.  deHeering and Rossion‘s (2008) 
study of the composite face effect (another effect that taps into configural processing, 
see Section 1.2.1.) appears to further support this claim.  They found that while the low 
contact participants showed a much larger composite effect for adult compared to 
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children‘s faces, no difference was found for the high contact group.  In addition, these 
authors found that the size of the high contact participants‘ composite face effect was 
modulated by the amount of time the participants had been working with children, and 
therefore the amount of experience they had with these other-age faces. 
While these two studies initially appear to support a contact-type explanation of 
the own-age bias (and specifically a perceptual-expertise account), neither study 
successfully matched the ages of the facial stimuli to the high contact participants (or to 
the low contact participants in the latter study).  As a result, it is possible that the lack of 
differences found between the recognition of ―own-age‖ and ―other-age‖ stimuli in the 
high contact groups are actually just a result of participants viewing two groups of 
―other-age‖ stimuli.  Considering this, it is difficult to make claims about the 
implications of either of these studies in terms of an ―own-age‖ bias.  As such, it is still 
unclear whether either contact or perceptual expertise (or both) play an important role in 
this phenomenon. 
The present study investigated the role of contact in the context of the own-age 
bias.  Two groups were compared in terms of their ability to recognise children's faces 
and faces of their own age: trainee teachers, who had high occupational exposure to 
primary school children together with a strong interest in them; and similarly-aged 
controls, who had little exposure to children (or interest in them). By analogy with the 
explanations proposed for the own-race bias, we can make several competing 
predictions: 
1. "Improved perceptual processing" explanations (e.g. Valentine 1991, Rhodes 
et al 1989) might predict that teachers and controls will perform similarly with both 
children's faces and adult faces. During their own development, both groups should 
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presumably have had sufficient experience to become "face experts" with children's and 
adult's faces alike. Note that this prediction would only be true if one assumes that 
exposure to a certain class of face has enduring effects. If recent exposure to faces 
carries more weight than past experience, then "perceptual expertise" explanations 
would predict that the controls should perform as well as the trainee teachers with adult 
faces, but the teachers should perform better than the controls with children's faces. I 
shall return to this point in the discussion.  
2. "Social categorisation" explanations (e.g. Levin, 1996, 2000; Sporer, 2001) 
predict that teachers and controls will be similar in performance, however in this case 
both groups should show better recognition for own-age faces. This is because the two 
groups of participants are the same age and children should constitute an "out-group" in 
both cases. 
3. A third explanation is in terms of motivation to attend to faces (e.g. Wright, 
Boyd & Tredoux 2003). This would predict that teachers and controls will be similar in 
performance with adult faces, but not with children's faces: because of trainee teachers' 
increased interest in, and attention to, children, they should be better than controls at 
recognising children's faces. 
 
3.2. Method 
 
3.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used, with one between subjects variable: group (two 
levels: trainee teachers and controls) and one repeated measures variable: age of 
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photograph (two levels: child – 8-11 years old and own age – 19-30 years old). 
Measures of latency and accuracy (d‘) were calculated. 
 
3.2.2. Participants 
There were 66 participants in total: 33 in the trainee teacher group (mean age 
24.21, SD 2.46, range 21-30 years) and 33 controls (mean age 22.94, SD 2.94, range 19-
30 years).   To ensure that contact was successfully operationalised into high- and low-
contact groups, the amount of occupational contact of participants with 8-11 year-old 
children since leaving school was recorded.  Controls had no contact of this type. 
Trainee teachers had a mean contact score of 16.50 months (SD=17.05). 
All participants were University of Sussex students, either undergraduates, 
postgraduates or trainee teachers (students on a Postgraduate Certificate of Education 
course). Sixty eight participants originally took part in the study, however the data from 
one of the trainee teachers and one of the controls were excluded as one failed to follow 
the instructions and the other performed at chance.     
 
3.2.3. Materials 
Digital photographs were taken of 64 Caucasian males. Half were between 8-11 
years old, and half were between 19-30 years old.  Two photographs were taken of each 
individual, one smiling and the other neutral.  All photographs were close up, frontal 
face images without glasses, jewellery, facial hair or other identifying features.  Using 
Adobe Photoshop, each photograph was converted to greyscale and resized to 300 x 350 
pixels.  As in experiment one, the picture's background and any information outside the 
external face outline was removed (see Fig.2.1 on page 91 for an example of this).   
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 To ensure that the faces belonging to both age groups were similarly distinctive, 
18 volunteers (aged 18-30 years old) rated each face on a 5 point scale (1 = ―extremely 
distinctive‖, 5 = ―not at all distinctive‖).  There was no significant difference in the 
distinctiveness ratings for the two groups of faces, paired samples t(17) =.23, p =.82, 
d=.05 . 
 
3.2.4. Procedure 
For the initial learning phase participants were presented with 32 photographs 
(16 from each age group) in a random order at a 3 second rate, using Superlab 2.01. A 
fixation cross was displayed in the centre of the screen for 500ms before each face 
appeared. The participants were instructed to try and remember the faces as best they 
could, as they would later be asked to identify them.  Following the learning phase, 
participants completed a 3-minute filler task which consisted of the F-A-S verbal 
fluency task (where participants are given a minute per letter to name as many words as 
they can that begin with either F, A or S).   
This was followed by the recognition test which consisted of 64 photographs, 32 
of which had previously been seen in the alternative pose during the learning phase, and 
32 of which were new.  Photographs were counterbalanced with respect to pose and 
old/new status and appeared in a different random order for each participant.  Using the 
computer keyboard, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they recognized 
the individuals in the photos.  A fixation cross was displayed in the centre of the screen 
for 500ms before each face appeared.  The photographs appeared individually at a 
presentation rate that was determined by the participant‘s speed of response. Each face 
remained on the screen until either a response was made or for a maximum of 2500ms.  
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3.3. Results 
 
Since there was no effect of pose type on either accuracy or reaction time, data were 
collapsed across this variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
3.3.1. Accuracy 
Estimates of d‘ were used for analysis, rather than the percentage of correct 
responses: d' is a better index of recognition discriminability since it takes into account 
false alarms (false recognition of distractor faces). Table 3.1. shows hit rates (correct 
identification of target faces) and false alarm rates. In calculating d', a flattening 
constant was used (as in Wright & Sladden, 2003) so that z scores could be calculated 
when the hit or false alarm rate was either 0 or 1. 
Figure 3.1. shows the mean d‘ score for both experimental groups for the 
stimulus conditions (children and own age photos).  Both groups performed at above 
chance levels (d‘ > 0) throughout.   
 
 
Table 3.1  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy and response bias (c) scores  
Participant   Photograph  Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') Bias (c)  
Controls   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Own Age 0.85 0.10 0.16 0.10 2.27 0.64 0.00 0.37 
  Children 0.78 0.11 0.16 0.11 1.95 0.64 -0.14 0.32 
Trainee Teachers               
  Own Age 0.82 0.12 0.14 0.07 2.17 0.73 -0.04 0.28 
  Children 0.85 0.09 0.13 0.08 2.35 0.61 -0.03 0.30 
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Figure 3.1  Mean accuracy scores and reaction times for both groups for the different facial stimuli (bars show 
mean ±1 standard error) 
 
 
 A two-way mixed ANOVA (two levels of group x two levels of face age) 
revealed that while there was no significant main effect of group (F(1,64)=1.24, p=.27, 
ηp
2
=.02) or face age (F(1,64)=.57, p=.45, ηp
2
=.01), there was a significant interaction 
between these two variables (F(1,64)=7.70, p<.01, ηp
2
=.11), indicative of an own-age 
bias. 
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 Bonferroni corrected follow-up paired t-tests
8
 demonstrated a nominally 
significant effect of face age for the controls (t(32) = 2.04, p<.05, d =.50), however this 
finding did not survive the Bonferroni corrected alpha level (α=.025). The trainee 
teachers showed no effect of face age (t(32) = -2.00, p=.05, d =.27).  Further 
independent t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that trainee teachers were 
significantly more accurate than controls for children‘s faces, (t(64) = 2.59,  p< .01, d 
=.64) while the two groups performed similarly with faces of their own age (t(64) = -
.62, p=.54, d = -.15). 
 
3.3.2. Latency 
To minimize the variability often found in reaction time (RT) data, each 
individual‘s performance was examined for every trial. Any RTs longer than the 
individual‘s mean +/-2.5 standard deviations were replaced by that participant‘s mean 
RT (Ratcliff, 1993).  2.2% of the values for the trainee teachers and 2.4% for the control 
group were replaced in this way. Corrected mean RTs are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 Mean RTs for correct responses were entered into a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA with 
group and face age as variables of interest.  This revealed no significant main effect of 
group (F(1,64)=1.61, p=.21, ηp
2
=.02) or face age (F(1,64)=.05, p=.83, ηp
2
<.01), but 
there was a significant interaction between these two variables (F(1,64)=39.44, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.38), indicative of an own-age bias. 
                                                 
 
8
 All t-tests reported in the results section are two-tailed tests due to unknown influence of contact on the 
direction of a face-age recognition bias. 
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 Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests revealed a significant effect of face age for 
both experimental groups (trainee teachers: t(32)=4.29, p<.001, d=.50; controls: t(32)=-
4.64, p<.001; d=-.28): controls reacted faster for own-age faces, whereas trainee 
teachers responded faster to children‘s faces.  Curiously, further independent t-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected alpha=.025) revealed that both groups performed at similar 
speeds for children‘s faces, (t(64)=-.19, p=.85, d=-.05), but controls were faster than 
trainee teachers at responding to own age faces (t(64)=2.71, p<.01, d=.67). I have no 
explanation for why the controls were faster than the trainee teachers with own-age 
faces. However, in terms of the difference in speed of responding to own- and other-age 
faces, the results for the control group are consistent with an own-age bias, while those 
for the trainee teachers are not. 
 
3.3.3. Correlations between Contact and Own-Age Bias Indices 
 As part of the procedure to ensure operationalisation of contact had been 
successfully carried out, participants were asked to indicate how many months 
experience they had working with children.  The relationship between this level of 
contact and the magnitude of own-age bias was investigated for the trainee teachers.  To 
create an index of the size of the participant‘s own-age bias in terms of accuracy, each 
participant's d’ score for children‘s faces was subtracted from their score for own age 
faces.  Thus the larger the score, the more pronounced the own-age bias.  The same was 
done for the RT data, creating difference RT scores. A negative score represented a 
faster response to own age faces, while a positive score indicated the opposite.  
Spearman correlations revealed no significant relationship between contact and own-age 
bias for either accuracy (rs=.24, p>.05) or RT data (rs=-.15, p>.05). 
118 
 
 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
Previous research has suggested that we are better at recognising faces of our 
own age group than those of a different age (e.g. Wright & Stroud, 2002), however the 
reasons for this remain unclear. Inspired by explanations of the own-race bias, the 
present study investigated the role of contact in the own-age bias in face recognition. It 
was found that the controls exhibited a significant own-age bias in terms of response 
speed (and of nominal significance in terms of accuracy).  In contrast, trainee teachers 
(who had high exposure to primary school children) showed no own-age bias; in fact 
they were faster at recognising children's faces than own-age faces, although this pattern 
was not borne out in terms of accuracy.   
Correlations yielded no significant relationships, however this may have been 
due to the fact that participants did not have enough variability in their experience with 
children, as they were all only at the start of their careers.  For example, deHeering and 
Rossion (2008) found a significant relationship between the magnitude of the 
differential face composite effect for adult versus child faces and experience with 
children when participant‘s experience was measured in years (range of experience: 1-
17 years of teaching).  So it may be that a greater range and magnitude of experience is 
needed to see evidence of a correlational relationship between contact and the own-age 
bias.  However, the lack of significant correlations within this study may also be due to 
fairly crude self-report estimates of contact (months working with children) which may 
be distorted by inaccuracies of memory and response bias. As such, the accuracy of the 
exposure information provided may be open to question and thus it may be more 
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beneficial to consider the results of the analysis operationalising contact into ―high‖ and 
―low‖ groups.  
In terms of reaction times, the results of this study appear to support a contact-
type explanation of the own-age bias.  A review of the current literature on the own-age 
bias also suggests that this might be a valid account.  By looking at where each of the 
own-age bias papers recruited their participants from, they could be classed as either 
―high own-age exposure‖ settings, or not (see Table 3.2.).   
For example, undergraduates recruited from universities, school children 
recruited from schools and older adults recruited from retirement communities are likely 
to have high levels of daily exposure to own-age faces.  In contrast, groups recruited 
from the local community or through advertisements placed in the media are likely to 
have more varied own-age exposure levels.  What is apparent from the summary of 
these papers in Table 3.2. is that of the 18 cases where there was an observed own-age 
bias, 89% of them involved groups recruited from ―high own-age exposure‖ settings. 
Clearly contact has a role to play in the own-age bias, but how exactly does it 
exert its effects?  In light of the results of this study, let us reconsider the possible 
explanations for biases in face processing that were outlined in the introduction.  The 
"improved perceptual processing" explanations (e.g. Valentine 1991, Rhodes et al 1989)  
suggest that, in terms of the own-race bias, the increased exposure to faces of our own 
racial group allows us to acquire more expertise in the perceptual processing of those 
faces. This, in turn, leads to better representation (e.g. Valentine, 1991) and/or enhanced 
configural/holistic processing of these faces (e.g. Rhodes et al.1989; Tanaka, Kiefer & 
Bukach, 2004; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006).   
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Table 3.2  Summary of the role of own-age contact in studies investigating the own-age bias in face 
recognition                                      
  
Age of 
Participants 
Age-Matched 
Stimuli? 
High Own-Age 
Contact Setting? 
Is there an 
OAB 
Barlett & Leslie, 1986  
(Exp 1) 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Barlett & Leslie, 1986  
(Exp 2) 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Mason, 1986 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Backman, 1991 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
76 year olds   
85 year olds   
Fulton & Bartlett, 1991 
Young Adults   
Elderly   
Chung, 1997 
Children   
Young Adults -  
Wright & Stroud, 2002 
Young Adults   - 
Middle-aged Adults   - 
Memon et al, 2003 
Young Adults -  
Older Adults -  
Perfect & Harris, 2003 
Young Adults   - 
Older Adults   - 
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005 
Children   
Older Adults   
Perfect & Moon, 2005 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006  
(Exp 1) 
Young Adults   
Middle-aged Adults   
Older Adults   
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006  
(Exp 2) 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Kuefner et al, 2008  
(Exp 2) 
Young Adults   
Weise et al, 2008 
Young Adults   
Older Adults   
Crookes & McKone, 2009 
Children   
Young Adults   
  - indicates information was not specified  
 
This is a viable explanation of the own-race bias. It could also explain 
demonstrations of the own-age bias by younger people trying to recognise older faces 
with which they have not yet had much experience (e.g. Wright and Stroud 2002). 
However at first sight, "improved perceptual processing" accounts struggle to explain 
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the own-age bias shown by the controls in the present study and the existence of own-
age biases for all age-groups (e.g. Perfect & Harris 2003; Anastasi & Rhodes 2005, 
2006).  This is because adults have presumably had ample opportunity to develop the 
most efficient mechanisms for processing faces younger than themselves when they 
themselves were young. 
The "improved perceptual processing" class of explanation could explain own-
age biases by older people for younger faces if one allows for the possibility that face 
representations are continually updated on a day-to-day, moment-to-moment basis; 
where expertise is not maintained in the absence of exposure. Facial adaptation studies 
(reviews in Clifford and Rhodes, 2005) show that recent exposure can markedly affect 
our subsequent perception of faces. This might explain why adults find it harder to 
recognise children's faces: current experience with adult faces, and correspondingly less 
experience with children's faces, could lead to perceptual tuning that is optimised for the 
former. Such an explanation could also account for the trainee teachers' enhanced 
performance with children's faces, because they have had more recent experience with 
them.  
However, there is also evidence against "perceptual expertise" explanations: 
Perfect and Moon (2005) investigated whether the own-age bias was affected by 
inverting faces.  Previous research has shown that inversion affects own-race faces to a 
larger extent than other-race faces, resulting in the reduction (or even removal) of the 
own-race bias that is seen in upright faces (Rhodes, et al.1989; Sangrigoli & de 
Schonen, 2004). Similarly, if the own-age bias is the result of more efficient configural 
processing as the result of increased contact, then one would expect to see a comparable 
pattern observed for own- and other age faces.  This, however, was not the case. Instead 
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of inversion reducing the own-age bias, Perfect & Moon found that inverting the faces 
in fact magnified it.  These results suggest that a configural-expertise account of the 
own-age bias may not be appropriate.  
However, before one accepts this interpretation, it should be noted that a recent 
study has found a very different pattern of results.  In direct support of a perceptual 
expertise account, Kuefner et al (2008) demonstrated that while undergraduates 
exhibited a classic own-age bias for upright faces, this bias was completely eliminated 
when the faces were inverted.  These findings are in line with the results of the current 
study. 
The second type of explanation that was outlined in the introduction was in 
terms of "social categorisation": that in-group faces are processed more deeply, and 
hence more efficiently, than out-group faces (e.g. Levin, 1996, 2000; Sporer, 2001). 
Again, this type of theory can account for the own-race bias; but it is clear that theories 
based solely on concepts of differential processing of in-group and out-group faces are 
not supported by the present findings. Particularly problematic for Sporer's In-
group/Out-group Model is the finding that trainee teachers performed better with 
children‘s faces (an "out-group"), than faces of their own age group (their ―in-group‖).  
The only way that the IoM could explain these results is if the children‘s faces, which 
are clearly important to the trainee teachers, were being categorised by them as ―in-
group‖.  This seems unlikely, as the inclusion of people into one‘s in-group is usually 
based on self-referential information and shared characteristics that are deemed socially 
important (as suggested by List, 1986).  Clearly, since this study has shown that 
exposure is important and self-referential age information is not, as currently formulated 
the IoM is not a plausible explanation of the own-age bias. 
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 The third explanation outlined in the introduction emphasised the importance of 
motivation to attend to faces. This theory can successfully account for the current results 
(and explain the own-race bias, see Wright, Boyd & Tredoux 2003), correctly predicting 
that teachers and controls would be similar in accuracy with adult faces, but not with 
children's faces. Compared to the controls, the trainee teachers have higher exposure to 
children‘s faces on a day-to-day basis. However it is also likely that they have higher 
motivation to distinguish between these faces due to their occupational demands and 
thus are likely to attend to them to a greater extent.  More generally, motivation is likely 
to be a factor in the normally observed own-age bias, perhaps due to the social rewards 
and punishments associated with being able to effectively (or not) distinguish between 
and recognise people belonging to one‘s own age group. Thus the data could support an 
explanation of the own-age bias in terms of motivation and interest for the faces.  
In summary, the present findings suggest that contact plays an important role in 
mediating the own-age bias in face recognition. At present, it is difficult to choose 
between a perceptual expertise explanation (at least, one that assumes expertise is not 
maintained in the absence of exposure) and a motivational account. One way to do this 
would be to manipulate motivation and current exposure independently; research which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  Further research could also investigate how 
manipulations of configural/holistic information affect the processing of faces of 
different ages, as in both the Kuefner et al (2008) and deHeering and Rossion (2008) 
studies discussed above. This would provide further insight into the possible role of 
perceptual expertise in the own-age bias, and research to this effect is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 The preceding chapter demonstrated the important role that contact plays in the 
own-age bias in face recognition.  In line with previous research, Experiment 2 found 
that high occupational exposure to other-age faces resulted in the elimination of the 
own-age bias (e.g. Kuefner et al, 2008).  However, while this illustrates that an 
experience-based account of the own-age bias may provide an appropriate explanation 
of this phenomenon, it does not shed any light on the specific aspects of this experience 
that might be important. For example, it is likely that the two groups have similar 
experience with own age faces.  However, while teachers have higher exposure to 
children‘s faces on a day-to-day basis compared to the controls, it is also likely that they 
have higher motivation to distinguish between those faces due to their occupational 
demands.  Thus teachers are likely to attend to children‘s faces to a greater extent than 
controls, giving them a higher quality of exposure as well as quantity.   
 To try and understand what aspects of contact may be responsible for the own-
age bias, it is worth consulting the plethora of existing research on the own-race bias 
investigating the same issue.  The role of contact in the own-race bias is something that 
has received a lot of attention in the face recognition literature, producing mixed results. 
The main prediction of the contact hypothesis is that individuals with more interracial 
experience will show a reduced cross-race effect (i.e. the relative difference between 
own-race and other-race face recognition will be diminished) compared to those with 
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less interracial experience.  This theory has been investigated throughout the own-race 
bias literature using three main paradigms which will be reviewed below. 
 
4.1.1. Self-Report Measures of Contact 
Contact level has most frequently been ascertained through some form of self-
report measure, generally asking about various aspects of contact, in an attempt to get a 
good representation of a participant‘s experiences with other race members. However, 
studies investigating the relationship between self-report measures of inter-racial 
contact and the magnitude of participants‘ own-race bias have yielded inconsistent 
results.  For example, while some studies have found a significant relationship between 
these two variables (e.g. Byatt & Rhodes, 1998; Carroo, 1986, 1987; Lavrakas, Buri & 
Mayzner, 1976; Lindsay et al., 1991; Slone et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2003), others 
have not (Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Cross et al., 1971; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; 
Walker & Hewstone, 2006).   
One possible explanation for the inconsistencies found in the own-race bias 
literature may be due to the measures of contact that have been used.  For example, self 
report measures are notoriously prone to biases in self-presentation and demand 
characteristics, particularly when investigating sensitive issues such as other inter-racial 
experience and attitudes (Valentine, Chiroro, & Dixon, 1995).  In addition, such 
measures may be distorted by inaccuracies of memory, resulting in potentially large 
amounts of error in exposure information.  Thus, future research may benefit from the 
use of more observable indexes of contact (Slone et al, 2000) that can be independently 
measured and/or corroborated. 
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Another potential reason why conflicting results have been found could be due 
to the way that different researchers define and try to measure ―contact‖.  These studies 
tend to use cumulative, quantitative measures of contact and assume that the 
relationship between this and the own race bias is a linear one.  This is an unfounded 
assumption.  It is perfectly plausible that there may be a contact level at which 
performance for other-race faces becomes equal to that of own-race faces, and contact 
above and beyond this level results in little recognition improvement. It may also be that 
using cumulative inter-racial experience scores as an index of contact may not be 
tapping into the important dimensions of experience necessary to eliminate the own-
race bias in face recognition.   
As Slone et al (2000) pointed out, contact can be conceptualised and measured 
according to two distinct dimensions: quantity and quality of contact.  In addition, the 
measure of quantitative exposure can also be broken down into two, more specific 
components.  Firstly, amount of contact could refer to the amount of time spent with the 
faces of a particular group (i.e. the frequency of exposure).  Secondly, it could denote 
the quantity of facial exposure in terms of the number of faces one has encountered (i.e. 
the variability of faces seen). Considering the complexity of ―contact‖ as a variable, it is 
hardly surprising that studies investigating self-reported exposure have yielded 
inconsistent results.   
One of the main problems with trying to measure a multifaceted variable such as 
contact is that, just as it has no single unified definition, it also has no single measure 
which researchers have used to quantify/qualify it.  As such, self-report measures of 
contact have varied considerably, with some asking only one or two questions about 
inter-group experience (e.g. Byatt & Rhodes, 1998) and others using in-depth 
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questionnaires comprising items referring to a number of qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of this variable (e.g. Brigham et al, 1993; Slone et al, 2000).  But even in the 
latter case, it is easy to see why significant relationships have not always been found 
between contact and the magnitude of the in-group bias.  For example, the most 
commonly used of these measures, developed by Slone et al (2000), did not attempt to 
separate out the component parts of frequency, variability and quality of exposure. 
Instead they used a composite score containing all three (albeit separated across 
different social settings).  As such, independent variations along these three components 
make it unlikely that the resultant score will represent a meaningful, linear measure of 
contact.  Thus, studies using self-report measures of contact are unlikely to yield 
reliable conclusions about the impact of contact on own-group biases.
9
  The types of 
problems encountered by studies using self-report measures are various and plenty.  
When considering the role of contact in the own-age bias, it may therefore be more 
prudent to place more weight on studies using less problematic study designs. 
 
4.1.2  Operationalising Contact 
 A second, more successful technique that has been used to investigate the 
influence of contact in terms of the own-bias literature is a method that operationalises 
contact into ―high‖ and ―low‖ exposure groups, based on prior knowledge of 
                                                 
 
9
 Interestingly though, these studies have provided support for the idea that recent exposure is most 
important in the mediation of own-group biases (at least in terms of the own-race bias: Byatt & Rhodes, 
1998; Slone et al, 2000). 
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participants‘ social, occupational or geographical surroundings (as in Experiment 2; 
Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Cross et al., 1971; Feinman & Entwisle, 1976; Kuefner et 
al, 2008; Li, Dunning, and Malpass, 1998; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003).  The most 
common outcome of these types of studies is that contact does indeed appear to play a 
role in these own-group biases (but see Ng & Lindsay, 1994 for conflicting results). 
However these types of studies make it difficult to establish what aspect(s) of contact 
is/are at play in the mediation of these effects.  For example, those who attend a multi-
racial college or who have high inter-age group exposure are likely to differ from those 
who do not in terms of frequency, variability and quality of inter-group experience.   
 However, at least two studies in the own-race bias literature have used this type 
of paradigm to tease apart the effects of quality and quantity of inter-racial contact with 
some success.  Chiroro and Valentine (1995) and Wright, Boyd and Tredoux (2003) 
identified participants who had similarly high contact to other-race faces in terms of 
frequency and variability (in that they attended the same mutli-racial college), but who 
were likely to have differed in terms of the quality of interactions that they had with 
other-race faces as a result of wider political and social factors.  Both authors found an 
asymmetrical own-race bias in these groups which they hypothesized was the result of 
the qualitatively different motivations of the two groups to attend to other-race faces 
(see section 1.8.1.1. for a more in depth discussion of these fndings).  Thus quality of 
contact may be an important factor in the own-race bias. 
 
4.1.3.  Training Methods 
A third method that has been employed to investigate the role of contact in the 
own-group bias literature is that of using facial training paradigms.  In terms of the 
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own-race bias, these studies have yielded relatively successful results, producing 
evidence of a significantly reduced own-race bias following training with other-race 
faces (e.g. Elliott, Wills & Goldstein, 1973; Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Hills & Lewis, 
2006; Lavrakas, Buri & Mayzner, 1976; Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon, 1973; but see 
Brigham, Bennett and Butz, 2005 for conflicting findings).  These studies have 
highlighted the important role of recent quantitative inter-racial exposure in the 
reduction of the own-race bias.  However some have also shown the role of more 
qualitative elements to be important, demonstrating training to be significantly more 
effective when motivational and/or attentional manipulations accompany exposure.  For 
example, Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon (1973) gave participants a visual training task 
where they had practice at (and either electric shock, verbal or no feedback for) an own- 
and other-race discrimination task comprising more than 200 faces.  After only one 
hour‘s training, participants‘ own-race biases were significantly reduced, albeit 
temporarily, and this reduction was particularly evident in the electric shock feedback 
condition.  As such, it is highly likely that participants in this condition were more 
motivated to attend to the faces and make correct responses than those in either the 
verbal or no feedback condition. 
In a more recent study, Hills & Lewis (2006) demonstrated that the type of 
attention paid to faces is an important factor in the own-race bias.  As part of their 
training, Caucasian participants were asked to shift their attention to either 
diagnostically African-American features, non-critical facial features or to non-facial 
features. While exposure time to other-race faces was the same in all three conditions, 
the other-race effect was only ameliorated for participants who were in the first 
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condition.  This suggests that quality of exposure may have a more important role to 
play in the own-race bias than quantity.   
 
4.1.4  Contact and the Own-Age Bias 
To date, two studies (other than that described in Chapter 3) have investigated 
the role that other-age contact may play in the own-age bias.  First, Kuefner et al (2008) 
operationalised participants into two groups: high and low contact with other age faces 
(i.e. undergraduate students or primary school teachers).  Using an inversion paradigm, 
the authors asked the two groups to recognise adult and children‘s faces.  When the 
faces were upright, the low contact group performed most accurately with own-age 
faces, while the high contact group were similarly accurate for both stimuli groups.  The 
authors also found that inverting the faces produced a greater inversion effect for adult 
faces compared to child faces in the low contact group, while the inversion cost was 
similar for both facial age groups for the high contact participants.  These results appear 
to support a contact hypothesis for the own-age bias, specifically indicating that a 
perceptual expertise explanation may be appropriate. 
A second study by deHeering and Rossion (2008) also operationalised 
participants into high and low contact groups using primary school teachers and 
similarly aged controls.  In this case, the authors did not investigate the own-age bias in 
terms of recognition accuracy, but using a face matching task with a composite face 
paradigm (see Section 1.2.1).  Participants viewed pairs of child and adult composite 
faces (comprising different individuals in the top and bottom halves of the faces that 
were either presented in alignment or not) and were asked to indicate whether the 
individuals in the top halves of the faces were the same or different.   
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In line with a perceptual expertise account of the own-age bias, the low contact 
group‘s performance was significantly more impaired by face-half alignment when the 
composite faces comprised adult faces compared to when they comprised child faces.  
In contrast, the high contact group showed no significant difference in their 
performance for the two composite face types.  In addition, using a self-report measure 
of contact deHeering and Rossion (2008) found that the amount of experience the high 
contact group had with children was significantly correlated with the size of the 
difference in their composite face effect for own- and other- age faces, providing further 
supporting evidence for the role of expertise in the own-age bias.  
Both of the above studies provide support for a perceptual expertise, contact-
type account of the own-age bias.  In addition, the finding that amount of experience 
was significantly correlated with differential composite face effect magnitude 
(deHeering and Rossion, 2008) also sheds some light on the aspect of contact that might 
be import in the own-age bias.  Specifically, a correlation of this nature appears to 
suggest a quantitative, rather than qualitative, relationship between the two variables. 
However, as the high contact participants in both of the above studies were 
primary school teachers who differed from the low-contact participants in terms of the 
frequency and variability (as well as quality) of contact they had with children, it is 
unclear which of these two quantitative aspects of contact is likely to be most important 
in the mediation of the own-age bias.  The purpose of this current chapter was to try and 
establish what aspects of contact may play an important role in the own-age bias in face 
recognition, using the own-race bias literature as a useful starting point.  By 
operationalising contact type according to frequency and variability, this chapter sought 
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to tease apart the various components of contact involved in the own-age bias, while 
avoiding the use of potentially troublesome self-report measures.   
 
4.2. Experiment 3 
 
In Experiment 3, two aspects of quantity of exposure were examined.  In order 
to establish this, the difference between primary and secondary school teachers‘ ability 
to recognise child (11 year olds) and own-age faces was investigated.  The main reason 
for this was that while both groups of teachers would have relatively high contact with 
that age group of children, the nature of the contact differs somewhat.  In the UK, 
primary school teachers teach one class for the whole year, (i.e. they have a core group 
of around 30 pupils who they see almost daily).  In contrast, secondary school teachers 
are responsible for teaching their subject, and therefore teach a range of classes and year 
groups.  As such, primary school teachers tend to have more face-to-face contact with 
their students in terms of frequency, but they see less of a variety of that age group than 
secondary school teachers (largely due to the fact that secondary schools are bigger and 
have several classes making up one year group).  Thus if contact frequency is the crucial 
aspect of other-age experience needed to eliminate the own-age bias, then the primary 
school teachers should show a smaller own-age bias than the secondary school teachers.  
If however, variability of contact is more important, then the opposite pattern should be 
observed.   
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4.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used, with teacher group as the between subjects variable 
(with three levels: controls, primary teachers and secondary teachers) and age of facial 
photograph as the repeated measures variable (child – 11-12 years old and adult – 20-30 
years old).  Measures of accuracy and reaction time (RTs) were taken for the dependent 
variables.   
 
4.2.2. Participants 
There were 88 participants in total; however two of the primary school teachers‘ 
data had to be excluded as they had never taught Year 6 before.  A further two controls 
had to be excluded, as they had recent experience working with primary school aged 
children.  Included in the analysis were 27 primary school teachers (22 females, total 
mean age = 28.78, SD = 3.08, range = 22-33 years), 29 secondary school teachers (18 
females, total mean age = 28.93, SD = 2.33, range = 23-32 years) and 28 controls (18 
females, total mean age = 27.00, SD = 2.92, range = 21-32 years).   Participants were a 
combination of trainee and qualified teachers.  Controls were recruited through the 
University of Sussex research participation volunteer pool.  Teachers were recruited 
through a number of methods: (1) emailing people who were currently taking part in a 
PGCE at the University of Sussex, (2) emailing people who had successfully completed 
their PCGE at the University of Sussex, (3) emailing local schools asking for volunteers 
to take part.  All of them had recent experience with teaching children in Years 6 and 7 
within their schools.  All participants were paid £5 for their time.   
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4.2.3. Materials 
Digitized photographs of 64 Caucasian faces were taken (32 males and 32 
females). Half were between 11-12 years old and were obtained with parental 
permission. The other half of the photos were of 20-30 year olds and were taken from 
the CAL/PAL face database (Minear & Park, 2004).  There were two photographs of 
each individual, one in a smiling pose and the other neutral.  As with the previous 
experiments, all photographs were close up, frontal face images without glasses, 
jewellery, facial hair or other identifying features.  The photograph were all converted 
to greyscale and edited to a standard size (300 x 350 pixels) using Adobe Photoshop 
software.  The background of each picture and any information outside of the head 
outline and the contour of the chin were removed and made solid white (see Figure 2.1. 
for an example of the stimuli used).  
 
4.2.4. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. 
 
4.2.5. Results 
Since there was no effect of pose type or gender on accuracy, data were 
collapsed across these variables for the purpose of analysis. 
 
4.2.5.1. Accuracy – Discriminability 
Hit rates, false alarm rates, d-prime and c response bias scores were calculated to 
investigate accuracy and can be seen in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy and c response criterion scores 
Teacher Photograph Hit False Alarm  Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Primary   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Own Age 0.79 0.12 0.18 0.07 1.83 0.57 0.03 0.31 
  Children 0.83 0.09 0.21 0.12 1.89 0.64 -0.06 0.30 
Secondary               
  Own Age 0.83 0.11 0.17 0.08 2.06 0.56 -0.04 0.30 
  Children 0.79 0.11 0.19 0.11 1.81 0.58 0.05 0.32 
Control               
  Own Age 0.81 0.08 0.20 0.08 1.81 0.43 0.02 0.21 
  Children 0.73 0.10 0.22 0.09 1.46 0.52 -0.07 0.17 
 
Figure 4.1. shows the mean d‘ score for both experimental groups for the 
stimulus conditions.  Both groups appear to have been able to identify whether or not a 
face was familiar across all conditions at above chance levels (d‘ > 0).   
 
 
Figure 4.1  The effect of face age on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different groups (error bars show 
mean ±1 standard error) 
  
A two-way mixed ANOVA (three levels of group x two levels of face age) 
revealed that there was no significant main effect of group on d‘ accuracy scores (F(2, 
81)=3.03, p>.05, ηp
2
= .07).  However, there was a significant main effect of face age 
(F(1,81)=7.32, p<.01, ηp
2
= .08) such that own-age faces were remembered significantly 
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better (mean = 1.91, .53) than children‘s faces (mean = 1.72, .60).  In addition, there 
was a significant interaction between these two variables (F(2,81)=3.40, p<.05, ηp
2
= 
.08).   
Follow up univariate ANOVAs revealed that while all three groups performed 
similarly for own age faces (F(2, 81)=1.80, p>.05, ηp
2
= .04), there was a significant 
effect of group for their performance with child faces (F(2, 81)=4.24, p<.05, ηp
2
= .10).  
Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that this was the result of the primary school teachers 
performing significantly more accurately than the control group (t(53)=2.73, p<.05).   
Individual Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests
10
 (new α = .017) for each 
experimental group revealed that the effect of face age was only significant for the 
control group (t(27)=2.95, p<.01, d= .77).  While neither of the teacher groups 
exhibited a significant own-age bias (primary school teachers: t(26)=-.76, p=.45, d=-.10 
; secondary school teachers: t(28)=1.81, p=.08, d=.44), effect sizes suggest that this bias 
was eliminated to a greater extent for the primary school teachers.  In fact, Figure 4.1 
shows that while secondary school teachers still performed slightly better with own-age 
faces, the opposite was true for the primary school teachers.   
 
4.2.5.2. Accuracy – Response Bias 
Figure 4.2. shows the mean c score for both experimental groups, for the two 
face age stimulus conditions.  As with the previous studies the c values were very close 
to 0 (no scores exceeding ± .07), suggesting that there is very little response bias in this 
                                                 
 
10
 All follow-up tests in this study are 2-tailed. 
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study.  In fact, one-sample t-tests revealed that the magnitude of response bias only 
differed from 0 in one condition; when controls were recognizing children‘s faces 
(t(27)=-2.25, p<.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.2  The effect of face age on c response bias scores for the different experimental groups (error bars 
show mean ±1 standard error) 
 
 A 2x3 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions 
(largest F=1.57). 
 
4.2.5.3. Latency 
To minimize the variability often found in reaction time (RT) data, the same 
procedure was used as in Experiments 1 and 2.  2.2% of the primary school teachers‘ 
responses, 2.2% of the secondary school teachers‘ and 2.3% of the controls‘ responses 
were replaced in this way. Corrected mean RTs are shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age stimuli for the three groups 
(bars show mean ±1 standard error).  
 
 Mean RTs for correct responses were entered into a mixed 2 x 3 ANOVA with 
face age and group as variables of interest.  While there was no significant main effect 
of group (F<1), the effect of face age reached significance (F(1,81)=6.10, p<.05, ηp
2
= 
.07): participants responded to own-age faces faster than children‘s faces (mean = 
977.68, 132.76; mean = 1000.93, 137.06 respectively).  In addition, there was a 
significant interaction between these two variables (F(2,81)=5.21, p<.01, ηp
2
= .11).   
Follow up univariate ANOVAs revealed that all three groups performed 
similarly for both own age (F(2, 81)=1.66, p>.05, ηp
2
= .04) and children‘s faces (F <1).  
Individual Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests (new α = .017) for each experimental 
group revealed that the effect of face age was only significant for the control group 
(t(27)=-4.76, p<.001, d= -.31).  While neither of the teacher groups exhibited a 
significant own-age bias (primary school teachers: t(26)=1.21, p=.24, d=.19; secondary 
school teachers: t(28)=-1.85, p=.08, d=-.27), effect sizes suggest that this bias was 
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eliminated to a greater extent for the primary school teachers.  As with the accuracy 
data, Figure 4.3 shows that while secondary school teachers still performed slightly 
better with own-age faces, the opposite was true for the primary school teachers.   
 
4.2.6. Discussion 
 Results from Experiment 3 show that while controls exhibited a significant own 
age bias, both in terms of accuracy and response speed, neither of the teaching groups 
showed any such effect.  However the effect sizes indicate that the magnitude of the 
own-age bias (or lack thereof) was smaller for primary school teachers in both cases.  In 
addition, only the primary school teachers performed significantly better than controls 
for children‘s faces, although this pattern was only seen in terms of accuracy.  This is 
consistent with the notion that frequency of exposure to other-age faces may play a 
more crucial role in the elimination of the own-age bias than the variability of faces 
seen.   
 However, while this study sought to separate two types of quantitative contact, it 
may be that the results reflect a more qualitative measure.  As primary school teachers 
tend to have more face-to-face contact with a smaller amount of students than secondary 
school teachers, it may be that the quality of the contact that they have with children is 
more personal and of a higher quality than the student-teacher interactions experienced 
in secondary schools.  In order to tease apart these factors, future research in this area 
could attempt to specifically operationalise contact according to qualitative exposure to 
other-age faces, while keeping the more quantitative dimensions constant.  For example, 
as with the previously mentioned own-race bias studies (e.g. Chiroro & Valentine, 
1995; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003), this type of study could take two groups of 
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participants who both have high levels of contact with other-age faces, but who vary in 
terms of the quality of the interactions they have with these faces (e.g. teachers and 
school janitors).   
However, one problem with this type of study, and one of the shortcomings of 
Experiment 3, is that while it can control for the quantity of contact participants have 
with faces (to a degree), it does not account for the myriad of other variations that might 
naturally occur between two different occupational groups.  As such, in order to try and 
separate out the effects of quantity and quality of inter-age group exposure on face 
recognition, Experiment Four used a more controlled, lab-based ―training‖ study to 
manipulate participant‘s exposure to other-age faces and their motivation to differentiate 
them.  
 
 
4.3. Experiment 4 
 
4.3.1. Design 
A mixed design was used, with training group as the between subjects variable 
(with four levels: no training, exposure, motivation and motivation and exposure) and 
face age as the repeated measures variable (with two levels: child – 8-11 years old and 
young adult – 18-25 years old).  Measures of accuracy and reaction time (RTs) were 
taken for the dependent variables.   
 
4.3.2. Participants 
There were 120 participants in total, split equally into the four training groups 
(see Table 4.2 for their demographic information).  All participants were students from 
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the University of Sussex, who either received research credits (in the control and 
exposure conditions) or were paid (in the motivation conditions) for their participation.  
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of the four training conditions, 
depending on whether they were recruited from the psychology research participation 
pool, or from the paid volunteer pool. 
 
Table 4.2.  Age and gender information for the participants in the 4 training groups  
 N Age 
 Female Male Mean SD Range 
Motivation 21 9 21.63 3.02 18-28 
Motivation & Exposure 23 7 21.63 2.50 18-27 
Exposure 25 5 20.10 2.20 17-27 
Control 19 11 20.40 1.83 18-25 
      
4.3.3. Materials 
Digitised photographs of 166 Caucasian male faces were used, 83 of children 
(aged 7-11 years old) and 83 of young adults (aged 18-25 years old).  All photographs 
were close up, frontal face images without glasses, jewellery, facial hair or other 
identifying features.  Each photograph was then converted to greyscale and edited to a 
standard size (300 x 350 pixels) using Adobe Photoshop software.  The background of 
each picture and any information outside of the head outline and the contour of the chin 
were removed and made solid white.  102 of the faces were used for the exposure phase 
and were obtained from a professional photographer while the remaining 64 faces were 
used for the recognition phase and were the same as the faces used in Experiment One.  
The number of faces from each age group was split equally in both phases. 
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4.3.4. Procedure 
Participants took part in the study individually and were all instructed that they 
were going to take part in a face processing experiment.  The instructions were different 
for each condition and were presented on the computer screen. 
 
4.3.4.1. Control Condition 
 Participants were told that they would be shown a number of facial photographs 
and were instructed to try and remember them as best they could, in order to recognise 
them later.  Participants were then presented with 32 of the photographs (16 from each 
age group) in a random order at a 3 second rate, using E-Prime. This was followed by a 
five-minute filler task in which participants had to remember a series of digits (the digit 
span task from the WAIS-III).  The recognition procedure was the same as in the 
previous three experiments.   
 
4.3.4.2.  Motivation Condition 
 In addition to receiving the instructions that were given in the control condition 
before the learning phase, participants in the motivation condition were told that they 
would receive a monetary reward for each face they correctly recognized (as 
performance-dependent monetary incentives have been shown to increase motivation to 
perform well on cognitive tasks: Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Stone & Ziebart, 1995).  
Participants were reminded of this again immediately before the recognition phase.  In 
addition, following each response, they received computerized feedback with regards to 
how much money they had won (feedback is also believed to serve as an additional 
motivating factor; e.g. Bandura & Cervone, 1986; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
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4.3.4.3. Exposure Condition 
 Before the learning and recognition phases, participants in this condition were 
exposed to 102 additional faces (51 in each age group).  For the exposure phase, three 
faces belonging to the same age group were shown on the computer screen next to each 
other.  Which faces appeared next to which was randomised within each age group and 
each face appeared twice (appearing in a different triad of faces with each presentation).  
In total there were 68 screens, each of which appeared for 12 seconds and they were 
shown in 4 randomised blocks.  To ensure that the participants actually processed the 
faces, they were asked to make personality judgements about them (e.g. Bower & 
Karlin, 1974; Coin & Tiberghien, 1997; Sporer, 1991).  Participants were asked to 
decide which of the three faces they believed was the most popular amongst their peers 
and they responded by pressing the computer key 1, 2 or 3.  Following this, the 
participants took part in the same procedure as for the control condition. 
 
4.3.4.4. Motivation & Exposure Condition 
 As in the exposure group, participants in this condition were shown 102 faces 
before the learning and recognition phases.  The presentation method was identical to 
that described above and only differed in terms of the instructions given about the 
judgments they had to make about the faces.  Instead of having to make personality 
decisions about the faces, participants were instructed to look at the sets of faces on the 
screen and asked to identify what information would be most useful in individuating 
those faces.  In addition, they were informed that after the initial phase they would be 
given a face recognition test (using a different set of faces) in which they would be 
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awarded a sum of money for each of their correct responses.  As such, they were 
encouraged to establish the best way to identify faces, as this would result in a higher 
monetary reward. Following this, the participants took part in the same procedure as for 
the motivation condition. 
 
4.3.5. Results 
As with the previous experiments, hit rates, false alarm rates, d-prime and c 
response bias scores were calculated to investigate accuracy and can be seen in Table 
4.3.  Since there was no effect of pose type on accuracy, data were collapsed across this 
variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
Table 4.3.  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy and c response criterion scores 
Training Photograph Hit False Alarm  Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Control   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Own Age 0.77 0.09 0.22 0.10 1.58 0.45 0.02 0.25 
  Children 0.73 0.09 0.29 0.13 1.22 0.50 -0.03 0.24 
Motivation               
  Own Age 0.78 0.12 0.24 0.13 1.66 0.66 -0.01 0.37 
  Children 0.75 0.10 0.25 0.13 1.44 0.53 0.02 0.32 
Exposure               
  Own Age 0.74 0.15 0.21 0.12 1.64 0.85 0.07 0.31 
  Children 0.69 0.13 0.26 0.15 1.26 0.68 0.08 0.33 
Motivation & 
Exposure  
              
Own Age 0.75 0.14 0.22 0.14 1.62 0.54 0.07 0.43 
  Children 0.73 0.12 0.23 0.12 1.45 0.64 0.09 0.30 
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4.3.5.1. Accuracy – Discriminability 
Figure 4.4. shows the mean d‘ score for the four experimental groups, for the 
two stimulus age groups.  All groups performed above chance levels (d‘ > 0).   
 
 
 Figure 4.4  The effect of face age on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different training groups (error 
bars show mean ±1 standard error).  Asterisks represent significance for the differences in accuracy between 
the two face ages (Bonferroni corrected alpha:   = p<.0125). 
  
A two-way mixed ANOVA (four levels of group x two levels of face age) 
revealed that there was an overall significant main effect of face age (F(1,116)=22.33, 
p<.001, ηp
2
= .16) on d‘ accuracy scores, with performance being better for own age 
faces.  However, there was no significant main effect of group and no interaction 
between the two variables (F<1 in both cases).   
As specific a priori hypotheses were made about the fact that training might 
differentially affect the magnitude of participants‘ own-age bias, despite the fact that no 
significant interaction was found between group and face age, individual contrasts were 
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performed to investigate the extent of the own age bias for each age group
11
. These 
revealed an interesting pattern (and are illustrated in Figure 4.4.).  Paired t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrected alphas (new α = .0125) demonstrated that while participants were 
significantly better at recognising own age faces in the ―control‖ and ―exposure‖ 
conditions (t(29) = 3.13, p<.01, d = .76; t(29) = 2.87, p<.01, d = .48 respectively), no 
such own-age bias was present in either the ―motivation‖ or ―motivation and exposure‖ 
condition (t(29) = 1.89, p=.07, d = .37; t(29) = 1.51, p=.14, d = .29 respectively).  
Therefore, while it seems likely that motivation to attend to faces is more important in 
mediating the own age bias than simple exposure to other age faces, it was the 
combination of both factors that produced the lowest effect size.   
 
4.3.5.2. Accuracy – Response Bias 
Figure 4.5. shows the mean c score for both experimental groups for the two 
face age stimulus conditions.  As with the previous studies the c values were very close 
to 0, suggesting that there was very little response bias in this study.  In fact, one-sample 
t-tests revealed that the magnitude of response bias did not differ from 0 in any of the 
conditions (t range=-.58 - 1.59). 
                                                 
 
11
 See Crookes and McKone (2009) for a similar justification regarding a priori hypotheses. 
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Figure 4.5  The effect of face age on c response bias scores for the different groups (error bars show mean ±1 
standard error) 
 
 A 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (F<1 
in all cases). 
 
4.3.5.3. Latency 
Again, variability in reaction time (RT) data was reduced using the same method 
as in the previous studies.  2.6% of the control group's responses, 2.4% of the 
motivation group‘s, 2.5% of the exposure group‘s and 2.5% of the motivation and 
exposure group‘s reaction times were replaced in this way. Corrected mean RTs are 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age stimuli for all groups (bars 
show mean ±1 standard error). Asterisks represent significance for the differences in reaction times for the 
two face ages (Bonferroni corrected alpha: * = p<.0125). 
 
The two-way ANOVA for reaction time data revealed that there was an overall 
significant main effect of face age (F(1,116)=11.74, p<.001, ηp
2
= .09) with participants 
responding faster to own age faces.  However, there was no significant main effect of 
group (F(1,116)=2.01, p=.12, ηp
2
= .05) and no interaction between the two variables 
(F<1).   
While no significant interaction was found between group and face age, 
individual contrasts investigating the extent of the own age bias for each age group 
revealed an interesting pattern (as illustrated in Figure 4.6.).  Paired t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections (new alpha = 0.0125) demonstrated that while participants were 
significantly faster at correctly recognising own age faces in the ―control‖ and 
―exposure‖ conditions (t(29) = -2.62 p=.01, d = -.17; t(29) = -2.88, p<.01, d = -.24 
respectively), there was no such own-age bias present in either the ―motivation‖ or 
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―motivation and exposure‖ condition (t(29) = -2.26, p=.03, d = -.14; t(29) = .30, p=.77, 
d = .03 respectively).   
 
4.3.6. Discussion 
 Results from Experiment 4 demonstrated that while exposure to other-age faces 
did not significantly reduce the own-age bias, motivation to attend to the faces did 
appear to mediate this bias.  However, it seems that a combination of both exposure to 
faces and motivation to attend to those faces yielded the most successful elimination of 
the own-age bias, causing participants to respond similarly to own- and other- age faces 
both in terms of accuracy and response speed.  It is of note, however, that due to the fact 
that there was no significant effect of or interaction with group, interpretation of the 
individual t-tests should be taken with caution (even with the conservative Bonferroni 
corrections). 
 
4.4. General Discussion 
 
 Previous research has illustrated the importance of contact with out-group (i.e. 
other age, or other race) faces in reducing own-group processing biases.  For example, 
contact has been shown to reduce both the own-age bias (e.g. Kuefner et al, 2008; 
Harrison & Hole, 2009) and the extensively researched own-race bias (e.g. Byatt & 
Rhodes, 1998; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Li, Dunning, and Malpass, 1998; Malpass, 
Lavigueur, & Weldon, 1973; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003).  However, while contact 
appears to mediate the magnitude of these own-group biases, little research has 
investigated exactly what it is about contact that exerts these effects.  While researchers 
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acknowledge the fact that contact has both qualitative and quantitative elements, few 
have attempted to separate these two aspects. 
 Experiment 3 sought to investigate the role of two quantitative aspects of contact 
in mediating the own-age bias: frequency and variability of other-age faces seen.  The 
results showed that the own-age bias was eliminated in both of the groups with high 
inter-age group contact, despite them having different exposure types to other-age faces.  
While secondary school teachers have more experience with a wider variety of faces, 
they have less time spent with these children than the primary school teachers.   
While neither teaching group showed an own-age bias, effect sizes suggested 
that this bias was eliminated to a greater extent amongst the primary school teachers.  
The finding that only this teaching group performed significantly more accurately than 
controls for the children‘s faces also supports this claim. These results suggest that time 
spent with other age faces may play a more important role in moderating the own-age 
bias than the amount of faces one has experience with.  However, it is possible that 
these findings may reflect a difference in the quality of experience that the two sets of 
teachers have with other-age faces, rather than the quantity (or some other systematic 
difference between these two occupational groups, see Section 4.2.6.).  As primary 
teachers teach one class throughout the school year, it is likely that the quality of the 
interactions they have with their students is different from those experienced by the 
secondary teachers who see a wide range of classes for only a couple of hours a week.   
 In the own-race bias literature, there are a couple of studies that have provided 
evidence for the important role of contact type, as opposed to level, in moderating the 
own-race bias (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Hills & Lewis, 2006).  Specifically, these 
studies suggest that motivational and attentional factors may be crucial in mediating 
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such own-group effects.  In order to try and disambiguate the findings of Experiment 3 
and to try and establish whether quality or quantity (or both) is important in the 
mediation of the own-age bias, Experiment 4 used a training paradigm to try and shed 
some light on this issue.  By giving participants either prior exposure to other-age faces, 
or increasing their motivation to attend to these face, this study found that exposure 
alone was not enough to eliminate the own-age bias.  In contrast, increasing 
participants‘ motivation to attend to the faces did appear to mediate this bias (both in 
terms of accuracy and reaction time).  However, it seems what was most effective in the 
elimination of the own-age bias (judging by the reported effect sizes) was a combination 
of both exposure to other-age faces and motivation to attend to those faces. 
 Before one accepts this interpretation of the results, it is important to consider 
the limitations of this study.  Firstly, it should be noted that only participants in the 
―motivation‖ and ―motivation and exposure‖ conditions received feedback for their 
responses, and as such these two experimental conditions were systematically different 
from the other two conditions.  It may, therefore, be that this addition of feedback 
elicited differential response strategies in the participants rather than increasing their 
motivation to attend more and perform well.   
In addition, when considering these results, it is important to note that there is a 
great difference between real-world contact with different groups of faces and that 
which is experienced in a laboratory training study.  While this study purported to be 
investigating the role of motivation, exposure and a combination of these factors in the 
own-age bias, it is worth considering how successful these manipulations actually were 
at representing these factors.  Firstly, how likely is it that the motivations associated 
with remembering faces in a social setting will be similar to those one has for receiving 
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a relatively small monetary reward?  As a recent study by Brase (2009) points out, 
motivations elicited by monetary incentives on cognitive tasks are unlikely to be 
generalisable to other tasks or contexts.  In addition, is the viewing of triads of faces for 
12 second intervals really tantamount to real-world social exposure to faces?  
 Another potential difficulty with interpreting the findings from this study is due 
to the different instructions that were given to the participants in the different 
experimental groups.  Given that the instructions for each task were qualitatively 
different, it is possible that they elicited differential encoding or performance strategies.  
In particular, in the ―motivation and exposure‖ condition, the instructions given 
specifically encouraged participants to attend to individuating facial features, which the 
instructions for the other conditions did not.  As such it is possible that the reduction of 
the own-age bias in this condition was the result of participants being encouraged to 
actively individuate other-age faces.  The consequence of specifically eliciting 
individuation strategies for other-age faces will be discussed further in the next chapter 
and the implications of this in terms of Experiment 4 will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
So while it may be relatively uncertain exactly what mechanisms are responsible 
for the reduction of the own-age bias in the ―motivation‖ and ―motivation and 
exposure‖ conditions, one thing is evident: qualitative aspects of exposure have an 
important role to play in mediating the magnitude of the own-age bias.  In a similar way 
to Hills & Lewis‘ (2006) findings with regard to the own-race bias, this study found that 
in the two exposure conditions, despite exposure time to other-age faces being equal, 
the own-age bias was only ameliorated for participants who received additional 
instructions designed to elicit more motivation to attend to the facial features most 
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appropriate for identification.  Thus it seems that quality of exposure may have a more 
important role to play in the own-age bias than quantity (at least when quantity is over a 
relatively short time frame). 
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Chapter 5  
 
5.1. Experiment 5: Introduction 
  
 On a daily basis, we tend to come into contact with a large array of faces, either 
personally or through the media.  However, there is evidence that we process some 
faces in a different manner to others.  As this thesis has demonstrated, we appear to 
have better recognition memory for faces belonging to our own-age group.  In addition, 
previous research has shown that we are better at recognising faces belonging to our 
own racial group compared to those of another race (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for 
review).  Why this might be the case remains unclear.  In terms of the own-age bias, 
Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that it is likely that recent contact with faces of a certain age 
group mediates our ability to recognise those faces.  Similarly, contact appears to play a 
significant role in the own-race bias, accounting for a small, but significant proportion 
of the variance in this effect (Meissner & Brigham, 2001).  Further exploration into 
what it is about the nature of contact that is important for the mediation of these biases 
appears to suggest that it is the quality of our experience with faces (e.g. our motivation 
to attend to some groups of faces over another) that may play a crucial role in the own-
age (see Experiment 4) and own-race (e.g. Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Li, Dunning, and 
Malpass, 1998; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 1999) biases.  However, what guides this 
motivation to pay attention to some faces over others remains unexplained (at least, 
when these faces are unfamiliar to us; the social rewards and punishments associated 
with familiar face recognition are obvious).  
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 One social-cognitive explanation of why the own-age or own-race biases may 
occur is based on research in the social psychology literature that has demonstrated our 
tendency to group people into categories, according to whether they belong to our social 
in-group or out-group (e.g. Tajfel, Billing, Brundy & Flament, 1971). Exactly what 
constitutes an ―in-group‖ or ―out-group‖ is unclear, but the dimensions according to 
which these categorisations take place are likely to be based on socially salient cues that 
are relevant to the self (e.g. race, age, gender etc.).  It is this process of social grouping 
that is thought to have an impact on the way in which we subsequently process a face.  
Out-group members tend to be thought of at a categorical level (e.g. in terms of the 
social categories to which they have been assigned, e.g. age, gender, race) at the 
expense of more individuating information, while in-group members are individuated 
(e.g. Bodenhausen, MaCrae & Hugenberg, 2003). 
 The influence of categorising stimuli according to in- and out- groups has been 
repeatedly seen outside the face processing literature, and has important cognitive, 
motivational and behavioural consequences (e.g. Tajfel et al, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986).  It is perhaps best characterised by the out-group homogeneity effect; the 
tendency to perceive members of out-groups as being more homogenous than members 
of in-groups (Judd and Park, 1988).  More recently, the effects of these categorisations 
have been directly investigated in the face processing literature.  For example, 
Bernstein, Young and Hugenberg (2007) presented participants with faces that were of 
the same race, gender and age-band (to eliminate categorisation or experience effects 
with these groupings), but which differed in terms of the labels given to them.  Faces 
were either labelled as being from the same university as the participants, or from a rival 
university, to elicit in- and out- group categorisations accordingly.  The authors found 
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that merely categorising faces according to university affiliation in this way was enough 
to facilitate better recognition of in-group members compared to out-group members.  
Bernstein et al (2007) also replicated these findings in a second study, using bogus 
personality types as the categories of interest. 
 So in/out group categorisation clearly seems to have an influence on face 
recognition, but the mechanisms that might underlie these effects are unclear.  In terms 
of the own-race bias, Levin (1996; 2000) suggested that the recognition deficit for other 
race faces occurs as a result of people automatically emphasising visual information 
specifying race (e.g. skin tone) at the expense of individuating information.  
Specifically, people code race-specifying information in other-race faces as a salient 
facial feature.  Levin (1996) based this theory on the finding that in addition to 
exhibiting a cross-race recognition deficit, almost paradoxically, participants were faster 
at identifying the race of other race faces (the Other-Race Classification Advantage; 
ORCA).  Levin hypothesised that race was treated as a salient feature in other-race 
faces, but not in own-race faces.  Once the presence of this racial feature is detected, 
visual processing does not progress much further, meaning individuating facial 
information is not encoded.  As own-race faces have no other-race-specifying feature, 
individuating information is successfully processed.   
 MacLin and Malpass (2001) demonstrated the importance of race-specifying 
cues in face recognition by using ambiguous race faces that were artificially given either 
a typically African-American or Hispanic hairstyle.  Despite the same faces being used 
equally to represent either ―Black‖ or ―Hispanic‖ faces, the authors found that the 
presence of a hairstyle typical of the participant's race was enough to elicit an ―own-race 
bias‖ in these faces, supporting Levin‘s race feature hypothesis.   
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 In regard to the own-age bias, a feature processing theory could also be applied.  
It could be that age is coded in a similar manner according to the presence or absence of 
age-specifying information.  For example, skin surface texture cues have been identified 
as important in the perception of age (Burt & Perrett, 1995; George & Hole, 2000; 
Nkengne et al, 2008), thus the presence or absence of wrinkles could serve as such a 
categorising feature.   
 An alternative way in which categorisation may elicit poorer recognition for out-
group members may be more to do with motivation and attention.  For example, Rodin 
(1987) suggested that categorising a target as belonging to an out-group might reduce 
one‘s motivation to attend to that face, and can lead to one cognitively disregarding that 
face (essentially rendering the individual invisible).  As out-group faces are likely to be 
less socially salient to us, the need and motivation to process those faces further is 
reduced, thus individuating information is likely to be encoded to a lesser degree than 
that for more socially important in-group faces.  This theory gained some support in 
terms of the own-race bias from a recent study by Hugenberg, Miller & Claypool 
(2007).  They found that informing participants about the own-race bias and instructing 
them to attend closely to the individuating characteristics of other-race faces at the 
encoding stage was enough to eliminate the own-race bias.  This suggests that the own 
race bias may at least in part arise from motivational (and associated attentional) 
differences elicited from social categorisation. 
 In practice it is difficult to distinguish between a race-feature type hypothesis 
and a more motivational account of the social categorisation processes involved in own-
group biases.  In fact, more recent accounts have suggested that the two may not be 
separable, combining them into a more comprehensive theory of ingroup/outgroup 
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categorisation, as can be seen in Sporer‘s (2001) in-group/out-group model (IoM) of 
face recognition (see Figure 5.1 for a summary of this model).  Thus, regardless of the 
specific mechanisms underlying social categorisation, recent research has suggested that 
this process may be at least partly responsible for producing the own-group biases seen 
in face recognition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Sporer’s (2001) In-group/out-group model of face recognition. 
 
In terms of this thesis, if it is the case that the own-age bias is due (at least in 
part) to social categorisation, then the process of categorisation should be enough to 
elicit a recognition difference between in- and out- group faces.  Thus, the labelling of 
faces according to an in-group category should result in better recognition of those faces 
compared to those labelled as out-group members.  In addition, reducing the social 
salience of one social category (in this case, age) should be enough to reduce or even 
eliminate the own-age bias.  In contrast, increasing the salience of an alternative social 
cue (in this case, gender) should facilitate an own-gender bias in face recognition.   
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In addition, more specific predictions can be made in terms of the underlying 
mechanisms that may be at play in this social categorisation.  If a feature processing 
theory analogous to Levin‘s (1996; 2000) race-feature hypothesis is responsible for the 
own-age bias in face recognition, then one would expect to see faces belonging to one‘s 
own group (either age or gender) to be classified slower than those belonging to the out-
group.  In addition, this out-group classification advantage should be directly related to 
the degree of in-group bias; the larger the classification advantage, the bigger the deficit 
in correctly recognising them should be. 
 
5.2. Method 
 
5.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used.  There were two between subjects variables: 
categorisation group (with two levels: age categorisation and gender categorisation) and 
gender (male and female).  There were also two repeated measures variables: face age 
(with two levels: own-age – 20-30 and other-age - 11-12) and face gender (own-gender 
and other-gender). Measures of accuracy and reaction time (RTs) were taken for the 
dependent variables.   
 
5.2.2. Participants 
There were 68 participants in total, who were randomly assigned to the two 
categorisation groups (see Table 5.1 for their demographic information).  All were 
psychology students from the University of Sussex who received research credits for 
their participation.   
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Table 5.1  Age and gender information for the participants in the two categorisation groups 
Group Gender N Mean Std. Dev Range 
Gender Female 17 20.06 2.46 18-27 
 Male 17 20.82 2.63 18-26 
Age Female 17 21.47 2.76 18-27 
  Male 17 20.47 2.90 18-26 
 
5.2.3. Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiment 3.  To ensure the faces 
belonging to both age groups and genders were similarly distinctive, 12 volunteers (6 
male, 6 female, aged 18-27 years old) rated each face on a 5 point scale (1 = ―not at all 
distinctive‖, 5 = ―extremely distinctive‖).  A mixed 2 (participant gender) x 2 (face age) 
x 2 (face gender) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions, (F<1 for 
all) suggesting no differences in distinctiveness for the facial stimuli used for the 
different ages, genders and combinations of the two factors. 
For ease of interpretation, the gender of the facial stimuli was classified into 
own and other gender groupings, meaning that responses to male faces were classified 
as ―own gender‖ responses for male participants and ―other gender‖ for female 
participants (and vice versa for female faces). 
 
5.2.4. Procedure 
For the initial learning phase, participants were presented with 32 upright 
photographs (16 from each age group, within which there were half from each gender) 
in a random order at a 3 second rate, using EPrime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools). 
The participants were instructed to classify the faces according to either their gender or 
age group (depending on the group they had been assigned to) as quickly and as 
accurately as possible using the computer keyboard.  Following the learning phase, 
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participants completed a five minute filler task.  This was a simple digit span task taken 
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (Wechsler, 1998).  The subsequent 
recognition test followed the same procedure as in the first three experiments in this 
thesis.   
 
5.2.5. Results 
Since there was no effect of pose type on accuracy, data were collapsed across 
this variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
5.2.5.1. Accuracy – Discriminability 
Hit rates, false alarm rates, d-prime and c response bias scores were calculated to 
investigate accuracy and can be seen in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2.  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy and c response criterion scores 
for the two categorisation groups 
 
    Age Classification 
Photograph 
Age 
Photograph 
Gender 
Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Own Age   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Own Gender 0.80 0.10 0.20 0.12 1.90 0.53 0.01 0.36 
 Other Gender 0.77 0.12 0.21 0.13 1.73 0.66 0.04 0.35 
Children          
 Own Gender 0.75 0.15 0.25 0.20 1.56 0.78 0.00 0.43 
  Other Gender 0.74 0.16 0.27 0.19 1.47 0.75 -0.02 0.47 
    Gender Classification 
Photograph 
Age 
Photograph 
Gender 
Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Own Age   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Own Gender 0.77 0.14 0.26 0.15 1.60 0.81 -0.04 0.36 
 Other Gender 0.78 0.13 0.26 0.13 1.58 0.68 -0.07 0.33 
Children          
 Own Gender 0.76 0.14 0.32 0.20 1.37 0.76 -0.12 0.46 
  Other Gender 0.75 0.13 0.33 0.18 1.27 0.79 -0.13 0.34 
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Figure 5.2. shows the mean d‘ score for both categorisation groups for the own 
and other age and gender faces.  Both groups appear to have been able to identify 
whether or not a face was familiar across all conditions at above chance levels (d‘ > 0).   
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Figure 5.2  The effect of face age and gender on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different categorisation 
groups (error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
  
A 2 (group) x 2 (gender) x 2 (face age) x 2 (face gender) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a highly significant effect of face age (F(1,64)=11.99, p=.001, ηp
2
= .16) with 
increased accuracy for own-age faces (mean = 1.70, .07) compared to other-age faces 
(mean = 1.42, .08), consistent with an own-age bias in face recognition. There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions.  
 These results suggest that in terms of accuracy, both categorisation groups 
exhibited a significant own-age bias.  However, Bonferroni corrected follow-up paired 
t-tests (corrected α=.025) showed that while this was true for the age categorisation 
group (t(33)=2.37, p<.025), this pattern only reached nominal significance for the 
gender categorisation group (t(33)=2.09, p=.04).   
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5.2.5.2. Accuracy – Response Bias 
Figure 5.3. shows the mean c score for both experimental groups for the two 
face age stimulus conditions.  As with the previous studies the c values were very close 
to 0, suggesting that there is very little response bias in this study.  In fact, one-sample t-
tests revealed that the magnitude of response bias only differed from 0 in the gender 
classification group for the other age, other gender faces (t(33)=-2.24, p<.05). 
 
Figure 5.3  The effect of face age and gender on c response bias scores for the different categorisation groups 
(error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
 
 A 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions 
(largest F=2.55). 
 
5.2.5.3. Latency 
To minimize the variability often found in reaction time (RT) data, particularly 
long RTs were adjusted using the method described in the previous experiments.  2.1% 
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of the age classification and 2.3% of the gender classification group‘s responses were 
replaced in this way. Corrected mean RTs are shown in Figure 5.4. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Own
Gender
Other
Gender
Own
Gender
Other
Gender
Own Age Children
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
m
s
)
Classification Age
Classification Gender
 
Figure 5.4  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age and gender stimuli for both 
categorisation groups (bars show mean ±1 standard error).  
 
 The four-way mixed ANOVA for reaction time data revealed a significant main 
effect of face age (F(1,64)=4.96, p<.05 ηp
2
=.07) with participants performing 
significantly faster for own-age faces (mean=881.41, 21.55) than other-age faces 
(mean=901.54, 20.92).  As with the accuracy data, no additional main effects or 
interactions were found (largest F=2.42).  
 These results suggest that in terms of reaction time data, both categorisation groups 
exhibited an own-age bias.  However, when investigated using Bonferroni corrected follow-up 
t-tests, only a nominally significant own-age bias was only found in the age categorisation 
condition (age categorisation: t(33)=-2.10, p<.05; gender categorisation condition: t(33)=-1.13, 
ns), but this did not survive Bonferroni correction.  
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5.2.5.4. Classification Data 
 Figure 5.5. shows the mean classification reaction times for the two 
experimental groups.  Individual paired t-tests revealed a significant other-group 
classification advantage for both the gender (t(33)=-2.19, p<.05) and age (t(33)=-3.06, 
p<.01) classification groups.  That is, participants in both conditions were faster at 
classifying faces as being out-group members than they were at classifying in-group 
membership. 
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Figure 5.5  Mean reaction times for classification responses for in- and out- group faces (error bars show mean 
±1 standard error).  
  
To assess whether the observed other-group classification advantages were 
related to the degree of own-group bias, separate indices were created.  Firstly, a 
classification advantage score was calculated for each participant, by subtracting the 
response speed for other-group faces from that for the own-group faces, so that a larger 
number indicated a larger other-group classification advantage.  In addition, own-group 
bias scores were calculated for each participant by subtracting their d‘ accuracy score 
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for other-group faces from that for the own-group faces.  In this case, a larger number 
represented a large own-group bias in face recognition accuracy.  A similar own-group 
bias index was created using reaction times, however in this case larger biases were 
represented by smaller numbers (specifically, more negative numbers).  If the own-
group classification advantage is indicative of the own-group bias magnitude, then one 
would expect to see a significant correlation between these measures.  However this was 
not the case.  Pearson correlations revealed no significant relationships (largest r = 
|.13|). 
 
5.3. Discussion 
 
This study found that overall participants exhibited an own-age bias in face 
recognition, regardless of the categorisation group into which they were placed (both in 
terms of accuracy and reaction time).  However, when broken down into analyses for 
the two categorisation groups, a significant own-age bias was only exhibited for the age 
categorisation group in terms of accuracy.  These results alone give mixed support for a 
social categorisation explanation of the own-age bias: the lack of a face-age x group 
interaction for either accuracy or reaction time data suggest that classification of a face 
according to a dimension other than age does not reduce the salience of the age cues.  
However, when broken down into individual follow-up tests, the own-age bias only 
holds true for the age-classification group (suggesting categorisation may have a role to 
play).  These apparently contradictory findings are likely to be a product of the small 
sample size (and resultant loss of power) when the groups are separated out, and 
conservative corrections applied to the individual follow-up tests.  Thus, in this case, 
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more sway may be given to the significant overall face age effects, and lack of group 
interactions. 
What is most striking from these results, however, is that no evidence of an 
own-gender bias was found, not even when classification was according to own- or 
other- gender.  These results are contrary to previous research that has found an own-
gender bias in face recognition (e.g. Wright and Sladden, 2003) or classification effects 
according to other deliberately labelled in- and out- groups (Bernstein et al, 2007) 
according to socially salient categories.  Based on these findings, it therefore appears 
unlikely that categorisation according to groups such as age and gender is likely to be 
responsible for the previously witnessed own-group biases. 
The assumption that the own-age bias should have been diminished as a result of 
categorisation according to another dimension assumes that the processing of age may 
not occur (or occurs to a lesser extent) as a result of age cues being incongruent to the 
task (i.e. classifying gender).  However, this may not be the case.  In a recent event-
related potential study investigating the implicit and explicit categorisation of age and 
gender, Wiese, Schweinberger and Neumann (2008) found that gender information was 
only processed when the task was dependent on gender categorisation.  In contrast, age 
information appeared to be processed regardless of whether this categorisation was task-
relevant or not.  As such, it is possible that faces were still being processed according to 
own- or other-age regardless of the fact that the task at hand did not demand this.  In 
this way, the lack of face-age x group interaction witnessed in this study does not 
necessarily provide evidence against a social categorisation account of the own-age 
bias, but may be due to the fact that participants were classifying faces according to age 
in both experimental groups. 
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Nevertheless, there is one fundamental problem with this study which makes it 
difficult to draw such conclusions; only undergraduate participants were included.  Thus 
one interpretation of the overall own-age bias found above may be that the own-age 
faces in this study were somehow more distinctive or memorable than the children‘s 
faces.  Although this is an unlikely explanation, as distinctiveness ratings for the 
different groups did not significantly differ from one another.  In addition, the same 
stimuli were used in Experiment 4, in which some of the participants recognised the 
children‘s faces at a similar (or indeed a higher) level of accuracy to the own-age faces. 
This makes it unlikely that the own-age faces in the present experiment were somehow 
intrinsically easier to recognise.  However, in order to draw firmer conclusions about 
the role of social categorisation in the own-age bias (or lack thereof), future research 
should aim to include two age groups of participants in order to obtain a full-cross over 
effect.   
Although not central to any of the hypotheses, an additional finding of this study 
was that participants in the age categorisation group performed generally more 
accurately than the gender classification participants.  Why this might be the case is 
unclear, however it may be that age classification requires slightly deeper processing 
than gender as the clues to age may be more subtle than the cues to gender.  For 
example, while subtle cues contained in the skin surface texture are central to age 
perception (e.g. George & Hole, 2000), perception of gender relies on broader, more 
noticeable facial cues (e.g. facial hair, eyebrows, jaw line).  Indeed, the idea that age 
categorisation may involve deeper processing certainly seems to be reflected in the 
classification reaction times (see Figure 5.5) where age classifications were noticeably 
slower than those made for gender.  
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The hypothesis that classification of out-group members would be faster than 
classification of in-group members was supported.  However, this other-group 
classification advantage did not appear to be significantly related to the degree of own-
group bias exhibited.  As such these findings do not directly support a specific feature-
processing account of the own-age bias, similar to that offered by Levin (1996; 2000) 
for the own-race bias, as this would predict a significant relationship between the two 
phenomena. 
It is difficult to conclude exactly what role social categorisation plays in the 
own-age bias.  The finding that other-group members are classified faster than in-group 
members, and the fact that the own-age bias was not significant for the own-gender 
classification participants in terms of the reaction time data, suggest that social grouping 
may play a slight role in this effect.  However there is more evidence against such an 
account than there is for it.  Instead, it might be worth considering what other cognitive 
mechanisms might be at play, indeed it may be that these biases arise from a 
combination of social-cognitive mechanisms. 
One of the most prevalent explanations of own-group biases (and one that will 
be directly addressed in the following chapter) is that of a perceptual expertise account.  
Essentially this is a perceptual learning account that suggests that through experience 
with faces belonging to our own in-group, we establish enhanced perceptual processing 
skills for these types of faces.  Social in- and out-group classifications are likely to drive 
the experience we subsequently have with such faces (e.g. Tajfel, Billing, Brundy & 
Flament, 1971; Sporer, 2001), thus such an account still has room for social 
classification processes.   
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In terms of this study, if a perceptual expertise account was likely to offer a 
suitable explanation of the own-age bias, then one might expect to see an own-age bias 
in face recognition regardless of the initial categorisation strategy.  This is because we 
tend to spend more time with, and have more social interest in, faces belonging to our 
own age group, while, generally speaking, we have a similar amount of experience with 
both genders.  Indeed this pattern seems to be more reflective of the above results.  Thus 
such an account may be applicable to the own-age bias.  As such, the next chapter will 
address the role of perceptual expertise in the own-age bias. 
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Chapter 6  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
As adults, we are experts at face recognition.  However there are some faces 
which we are more expert at recognising than others.  For example, over four decades of 
research has demonstrated that we are better at recognising faces belonging to our own 
racial group compared to those of a different, less familiar race (see Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001).  While this ―own-race bias‖ is probably one of the best replicated 
phenomena in the face recognition literature, the reasons why it occurs are less clear.  
Perhaps the best known explanation of this effect is an experience-based account.  That 
is, we tend to be better at recognising own-race faces as a result of the fact that we have 
relatively more experience with these faces.  This type of explanation has received 
support from research showing that the own-race bias can be temporarily eliminated 
following a couple of hours of training with other race faces (e.g. Elliott, Wills & 
Goldstein, 1973; Malpass, Laviguer & Weldon, 1973; Hills & Lewis, 2006) and even 
reversed when we experience a large amount of exposure to other-race faces in 
childhood (Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra & de Schonen, 2005).   
More recently researchers have shown differences in the recognition ability for 
other groups of faces with which we have differential experience: different age groups.  
This thesis, as well as previous research, has suggested that we are better at recognising 
own-age faces compared to those belonging to another age group (see Chapter 2 and 
Section 1.7 for a review).  This ―own-age bias‖ has been found in both adults (e.g. 
Wright & Stroud, 2002) and children (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005).  Similar to 
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research on the own-race bias, it has been suggested that this difference in recognition 
performance may be the result of the differential (recent) experience we have with 
different age groups (e.g. Harrison & Hole, 2009; Kuefner et al, 2008).  However, what 
is less clear is how this contact may result in these differing levels of recognition 
performance; specifically, with regard to what mechanisms may underlie this effect. 
In terms of the own-race bias, the most commonly cited account of the memory 
advantage for own-group (i.e. own-race) faces is the perceptual expertise hypothesis 
(e.g. Rhodes et al, 1989).  The crux of this explanation is that the relatively increased 
experience we have with own- compared to other- race faces leads to the development 
of more proficient processing strategies for them.  Exactly what these strategies may be 
is still a heavily debated issue, however the most prevalent proposition in the literature 
suggests that this increased exposure to own-race faces leads to more expert processing 
of those faces.  As configural processing is thought to be at the heart of expert face 
processing (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), it may be that same-
race faces are processed in a more efficient, configural manner than other-race faces.   
One paradigm that has been used repeatedly to illustrate the relationship between 
configural processing and expertise is that of the inversion effect (Yin, 1969; see 
Section 1.2.).  In their seminal study on the effects of expertise, Diamond and Carey 
(1986) showed that dog experts‘ ability to recognise dogs was affected by inversion to a 
similar extent as faces.  In contrast, dog novices showed the typical disproportionate 
effect of inversion for faces.  As such, they concluded that the more expertise one has 
with a class of stimuli, the more inversion disrupts the processing of that stimuli as a 
result of heavy reliance on configural processing for those objects of expertise.   
Recently Diamond and Carey‘s (1986) results, and accordingly their expertise 
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hypothesis, have been cast into doubt (e.g. Robbins & McKone 2007; McKone & 
Robbins, 2007). Nevertheless some additional studies have found evidence that 
inversion effects can be affected by expertise (e.g. Bruyer and Crispeels,1992; Gauthier 
et al, 2000; Gauthier & Bukach, 2007; Rossion et al, 2002). 
Therefore, if the own-race bias is the result of greater expertise with own-race 
faces, one would expect to see the recognition of these faces impaired to a greater extent 
than those of another race when turned upside-down.  This has been found to be the 
case (Rhodes et al, 1989; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004).  Indeed this configural-
expertise account has also gained support from studies that have shown that own-race 
faces are processed less holistically than other race faces, as demonstrated by 
differential composite and part-whole face effects (e.g. Michel, Caldara & Rossion, 
2006; Michel et al, 2006; Tanaka et al, 2004, see Section 1.8.1.2. for further discussion 
of this). 
In terms of the own-age bias in face recognition, little research has been carried 
out investigating the potential perceptual/cognitive mechanisms that may be responsible 
for producing such an effect.  When Experiments 6 and 7 were carried out, only one 
such study had attempted to explore this issue.  Following the same logical arguments 
used to try to explain the own-race bias, Perfect and Moon (2005) sought to investigate 
the effect of inversion on young- and older- adult faces with similarly aged participants.  
While a perceptual-expertise account of this effect would predict a greater disruption of 
own-age compared to other-age face recognition following inversion, the opposite 
pattern was in fact observed.  This pattern of results is difficult to explain (particularly 
without reaction time data available to gain a fuller picture of the participants‘ 
behaviour), although it is of note that the authors made no attempt to control for the 
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experience participants had with other-age groups.  Thus, it is possible that differential 
other-age experience may account for such findings.   
In a more recent study, Kuefner et al (2008) investigated the role of expertise in 
other-age face recognition by looking at the effect of inversion on own-age faces and 
children‘s faces with teachers (other-age experts) and undergraduates (other-age 
novices).  Novices exhibited the classic own-age bias for upright faces, but this 
difference disappeared when the faces were inverted.  Notably, the inversion cost 
(percentage decrease in accuracy following inversion) to own-age faces was about 
double that for children‘s faces.  For the expert group no own-age bias was present in 
upright faces and inversion affected both groups of faces equally.  In contrast to Perfect 
and Moon‘s findings, these results directly support a perceptual-expertise account of the 
own-age bias.  However it should be noted that the age of the teachers who took part in 
this study (24-56 years old) was not successfully matched to the ―own-age‖ faces 
viewed (20-30 years old).  The latter pattern may therefore be the result of participants 
in effect viewing two other-age face groups. 
Thus, the only two studies investigating the effects of inversion on own- and 
other- age faces have yielded inconsistent results.  As such, the primary aim of this 
chapter was to establish which of these two studies is likely to best represent the 
processes involved in the own-age bias in face recognition. Specifically, Experiments 6-
8 sought to establish whether this bias is likely to be the result of enhanced perceptual 
expertise for own-age faces.  
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6.2. Experiment 6 
 
An inversion paradigm was used to investigate whether a perceptual-expertise 
account, similar to that offered for the own-race bias (e.g. Rhodes et al, 1989), may 
offer an appropriate explanation of the own-age bias..    
 
6.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used, with one between subjects variable: group (three 
levels: children; adults with high contact with children; and adults with low contact with 
children) and two repeated measures variables: age of photograph (two levels: child – 8-
11 years old and young adult – 18-25 years old) and orientation (two levels: upright and 
inverted faces).  The dependent variables of interest were accuracy (d‘) and response 
bias (c) scores and response times (RTs).  
 
6.2.2. Participants 
There were 96 participants in total, including 32 children (mean age 8.75, SD 
.44, range 8-9 years, 17 girls, 15 boys), 32 in the high contact group (mean age 23.44, 
SD 2.12, range 21-28 years, 25 female, 7 male) and 32 in the low contact group (mean 
age 20.66, SD 2.06, range 18-27 years, 20 female, 12 male).  Young adult participants 
were all students from the University of Sussex.  The high contact group comprised 
trainee teachers on the primary PGCE or GTA courses who were paid £5 for their 
participation, while the low contact group were psychology students who received 
research credits for their participation.  The children were all recruited from Year 4 at 
Goldstone Primary School in Hove after obtaining parental consent. 
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6.2.3. Materials 
Photographs of 64 Caucasian males were taken. Half were between 8-11 years 
old, and half were between 18-25 years old.  All of the people in the photographs were 
recruited from outside of Sussex to avoid any of the faces being accidentally familiar.  
The children‘s pictures were obtained with parental consent and were taken at Malvern 
Wells Church of England Primary School in Worcestershire.  The adult male faces were 
obtained from students at Leeds University.  Two photographs were taken of each 
individual, one in a smiling pose and the other neutral.  All photographs were close up, 
frontal face images without glasses, jewellery, facial hair or other identifying features.  
Each photograph was then converted to greyscale and edited to a standard size (300 x 
350 pixels) using Adobe Photoshop software.  The background of each picture and any 
information outside of the head outline and the contour of the chin were removed and 
made solid white.  For all faces, both upright and inverted (upside-down) versions of the 
stimuli were created. 
 
6.2.4. Procedure 
For the initial learning phase participants were presented with 32 upright 
photographs (16 from each age group) in a random order at a 3 second rate, using 
Superlab 2.01. The participants were instructed to try and remember the faces as best 
they could, as they would later be asked to identify them.  Following the learning phase, 
participants completed a three minute filler task.  This was the F-A-S verbal fluency 
task (Benton & Hamsher, 1977), where participants were given a minute per letter to 
name as many words as possible that begin with either F, A or S.  This particular task 
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was chosen as it was thought to be of an appropriate level for both the adult and 
children participants.   
This was followed by the recognition test which consisted of 64 photographs, 32 
of which had previously been seen in their alternative pose during the learning phase 
(targets) and 32 of which were new (distractors).  For both the target and distractor 
faces, half were presented in the upright position, while the other half were inverted.  
Photographs appeared in a different random order for each participant and were 
counterbalanced with respect to pose, old/new status and, in the recognition phase, 
orientation.  Using the computer keyboard, participants were asked to indicate whether 
or not they recognised the individuals in the photos.  A fixation dot was displayed in the 
centre of the screen for 500ms before each face appeared.  The photographs appeared 
individually and the rate of presentation was determined by the participant‘s speed of 
response, with each face remaining on the screen until either a response was made or for 
a maximum of 2500ms.   
 
6.2.5. Results 
Since there was no effect of pose type on accuracy, data were collapsed across 
this variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
6.2.5.1. Accuracy – Discriminability 
Estimates of d‘ accuracy were calculated from the proportions of hits and false 
alarms investigated above.  Table 6.1. shows the proportions of hits and false alarms, d‘ 
and response bias scores for the different participant groups. As with the previous 
chapters, in calculating d' a flattening constant was used (as in Wright & Sladden, 2003) 
so that z scores could be calculated when the hit or false alarm rate was either 0 or 1. 
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Table 6.1.  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy scores and response bias scores 
 
    Upright Faces 
Participant   Photograph  Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Children Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Adult 0.58 0.13 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.39 -0.04 0.31 
 Children 0.66 0.16 0.38 0.12 0.79 0.80 -0.06 0.19 
Low Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.82 0.10 0.29 0.11 1.59 0.51 -0.20 0.29 
 Children 0.69 0.10 0.31 0.10 1.01 0.37 0.01 0.21 
High Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.80 0.12 0.28 0.07 1.56 0.62 -0.17 0.25 
 Children 0.81 0.09 0.23 0.08 1.72 0.47 -0.07 0.25 
    Inverted Faces 
Participant   Photograph  Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Children Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Adult 0.49 0.15 0.44 0.18 0.15 0.54 0.11 0.40 
 Children 0.54 0.15 0.42 0.12 0.32 0.53 0.05 0.24 
Low Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.68 0.12 0.32 0.12 1.02 0.53 0.00 0.27 
 Children 0.60 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.76 0.62 0.12 0.27 
High Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.70 0.14 0.29 0.12 1.16 0.58 0.01 0.30 
  Children 0.69 0.13 0.29 0.10 1.11 0.43 0.04 0.27 
 
 
Figure 6.1. shows the mean d‘ score for both experimental groups for all 
stimulus conditions.  While both adult groups appear to have been able to identify 
whether a face was familiar or not across all conditions at above chance levels (d‘ > 0), 
children performed close to chance levels in all but the upright child‘s face condition.  
One-sample t-tests revealed that for inverted young adult faces they were not 
performing significantly differently from chance levels (t(31)=1.61, p=.12).  With this 
in mind, one should be cautious when interpreting the children‘s results in this study. 
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Figure 6.1  The effect of face age and orientation on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different contact 
groups (error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
  
 A 3 (group) x2 (face age) x2 (orientation) mixed ANOVA showed that while 
there was no significant main effect of face age (F<1), there was a significant main 
effect of inversion (F(1,93)=119.18, p<.001, ηp
2
=.56).  There was also a significant 
main effect of group on accuracy scores (F(2,93)=54.81, p<.001, ηp
2
=.54).  Post hoc 
Bonferroni tests revealed that this was as a result of the children performing 
significantly worse than both of the adult groups (p<.001 in both cases) and due to the 
high contact adult group performing significantly more accurately than the low contact 
adult group (p<.01).   
There were also a couple of higher order interactions.  Face age significantly 
interacted with group (F(2,93)=13.84, p<.001, ηp
2
=.23) with those in the low contact 
group performing more accurately for young adult faces (mean = 1.30, .59) than the 
children‘s faces (mean = .89, .52), while children (young adult face mean = .25, .48; 
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children‘s face mean = .56, .71) and the high contact group (young adult face mean = 
1.36, .63; children‘s face mean = 1.42, .55) showed the opposite pattern.   
 A significant three-way interaction between group, face age and orientation was 
also observed (F(2, 93)=5.97, p<.01, ηp
2
=.11) and is illustrated in Figures 6.1. and 6.2.  
Figure 6.2. shows the magnitude of inversion deficit (d‘ accuracy for upright faces 
minus d‘ accuracy for inverted faces) for all face ages.  From the graphs it appears that 
while the low contact group show a larger inversion deficit for young adult faces than 
children‘s faces, the children and the high contact group show the opposite pattern.   
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Figure 6.2  The effect of face age on the magnitude of the inversion effect for the different contact groups (bars 
show ±1 standard error and measurements are in terms of d’) 
 
 Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests carried out on the inversion deficit scores 
revealed a significant effect of face age for the low contact group (t(31)=2.88, p<.01) 
with participants showing a significantly larger inversion deficit for faces of their own 
age group.  In contrast, the high contact group and the children showed no significant 
effect of face age (t(31)=-1.82, p=.08; t(31)=-1.65, p=.11 respectively). 
 Separate one-way ANOVAs showed that while the inversion deficit for the 
children‘s faces was similar for all three groups (F(2, 70.95)=2.64, p=.08, ηp
2
=.05), 
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there was a significant effect of group on the inversion deficit scores for young adult 
faces (F(2, 93)=7.49, p<.001, ηp
2
=.14).  Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that this was 
as a result of the children having a significantly smaller inversion deficit than the low 
contact group (p<.001). 
 A further hypothesis of this study was that if the own age bias is mediated by 
expertise and can therefore be characterised by an ability to efficiently use the 
configural cues in the faces, then the own-age bias (as indexed by the group x face age 
interaction) should only be present when faces are in the upright position.  As inversion 
disrupts the configural information of the face, the effects of expertise should be 
eliminated when the faces are presented in the upside-down orientation.  To investigate 
this specific hypothesis and to further analyse the above 3-way interaction, separate 
ANOVAs were carried out for the upright and inverted stimuli. 
 
6.2.5.1.1. Upright Trials 
 The two-way mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores for upright faces found no 
effect of face age (F<1), however there was a main effect of group (F(2, 93)=47.45, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.51) which Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed was the result of the high 
contact group performing significantly better than the low contact group (p<.01), who 
were in turn more accurate than the children (p<.001).  In addition, and consistent with 
the own-age bias there was a significant face age x group interaction (F(2, 93)=22.23, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.32).  As illustrated in Figure 6.1., follow up paired t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction (new α=.017) revealed that this significant interaction was due to the low 
contact group performing significantly more accurately with young adult faces than 
children‘s faces (t(31)=5.35, p<.001), while the children showed the opposite pattern 
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(t(31)=-3.14, p<.01) and the high contact group showed no significant difference in their 
performance for the two facial stimuli groups (t(31)=-2.10, p<.05).  
 
6.2.5.1.2. Inverted Trials 
 As with the upright trials the ANOVA revealed no effect of face age (F<1), but 
a significant main effect of group (F(2, 93)=41.49, p<.001, ηp
2
=.47).  In this case, 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that this effect was the result of the children 
performing worse than both of the adults groups (p<.001), who performed similarly to 
one another (p>.05).  In contrast to the upright faces, no significant interaction between 
face age and group was found (F(2, 93)=2.89, p=.06, ηp
2
=.06).   
 
6.2.5.2. Accuracy – Response Bias 
 Estimates of response bias (c) were calculated from the hit and false alarm rates 
and can be seen in Figure 6.3.  As with the previous experiments, it is worth noting that 
the c values are very close to 0, suggesting that there is very little response bias in this 
study.   In fact, one-sample t-tests revealed that the magnitude of response bias only 
significantly differed from 0 in the high contact group for the upright young adult faces 
(t(31)=-3.87, p=.001); and in the low contact group for the upright young adult faces 
and inverted children‘s faces (t(31)=-3.89, p<.001; t(31)=2.59, p<.05 respectively).  
None of the observed biases for the children significantly differed from 0 (t range = -
1.89 - 1.63). 
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Figure 6.3  The effect of face age on c response bias scores for the three contact groups (error bars 
show mean ±1 standard error) 
 
 A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant effects of face age 
(F(1,93)=3.13, p=.08, ηp
2
= .03) or group (F< 1), but a significant main effect of 
orientation was found (F(1,93)=80.20, p<.001, ηp
2
= .46) with responses to upright faces 
generally being more liberal (mean = -.08, .26) than responses to inverted faces (mean = 
.06, .29).  Only one significant interaction was found between face age and orientation 
(F(1,93)=4.53, p<.05, ηp
2
= .05) such that while inverted faces produced similarly small 
conservative response biases for both young adult faces (mean = .05, .32) and children‘s 
faces (mean = .07, .26), young adult faces (mean = -.13, .29)  resulted in a more liberal 
response criterion than children‘s faces (mean = -.04, .22) when the stimuli were 
upright. As with previous experiments it is difficult to interpret these findings 
confidently, due to the small magnitude of response bias patterns (i.e. none of the mean 
values fall outside c = ± 0.20) suggesting that these finding may not be all that 
meaningful. 
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6.2.5.3. Latency 
 Mean RTs for correct responses were entered into a mixed 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with group, face age and orientation as variables of interest.  This revealed significant 
main effects of face age (F(1,93)=4.20 p<.05, ηp
2
=.04), orientation (F(1,93)=56.58, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.38) and group (F(2,93)=13.49 p<.001, ηp
2
=.23), which Bonferroni post-
hoc tests revealed was due to the children performing slower than both of the adult 
groups (p<.001), who performed similarly to one another (p>.05).  The pattern of main 
effects is illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
There were also a number of higher order interactions.  Face age significantly 
interacted with group (F(2,93)=4.94, p<.01, ηp
2
=.10) with those in the low contact 
group responding faster for young adult faces (mean = 1013.74, 347.33) than for the 
children‘s faces (mean = 1128.02, 350.76), while children (young adult face mean = 
1368.75, 278.70; children‘s face mean = 1364.28, 249.00) and the high contact group 
(young adult face mean = 1092.73, 262.67; children‘s face mean = 1091.12, 268.63) 
responded at a similar speed for both ages of face.   
In addition, there was an interaction between orientation and group 
(F(2,93)=5.50, p<.01, ηp
2
=.11) with both adult groups responding faster to upright faces 
than inverted faces (High Contact Group: upright mean = 1009.16, 260.88; inverted 
mean = 1174.72, 243.27; Low Contact Group: upright mean = 985.75, 304.99;inverted 
mean = 1156.01, 377.56) and the children responding at a similar speed to both (upright 
mean = 1342.41, 263.79; inverted mean = 1390.62, 262.53).  The reason for this latter 
pattern is unclear, although it is of note that while carrying out the study, it appeared 
that there were often time lags and inconsistencies between when a child made a 
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decision about the familiarity of a face and when they made the appropriate response.  
This is believed to be an issue, as the children often verbally commented on whether or 
not they recognised a face before pressing the corresponding button.  As such, reaction 
time data may not be all that reliable for this group. 
Finally, a significant three-way interaction between group, face age and 
orientation was also observed (F(2, 93)=3.58, p<.05, ηp
2
=.07) and is illustrated in 
Figure 6.4.  As with d‘ scores, inversion deficit scores were calculated (RT upright – RT 
inverted) and analysed.  Bonferonni corrected paired t-tests revealed a nominally 
significant effect of face age for the low contact group (t(31)=2.28, p<.05) with 
participants showing a significantly larger inversion deficit for faces of their own age 
group, however this finding did not survive the Bonferroni corrected alpha level 
(α=.017).  In addition, the high contact group and the children showed no effect of face 
age (t(31)=.04, p=.97; t(31)=-.71, p=.49 respectively).   
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Figure 6.4  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age stimuli for both age groups 
(bars show mean ±1 standard error). 
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 As with accuracy, analysis was separated for the upright and inverted trials in 
order to further investigate the three-way interaction. 
 
6.2.5.3.1. Upright Trials 
 The two-way mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores for upright faces found a 
significant main effect of face age (F(1, 93)=7.54, p<.01, ηp
2
=.08), with young adult 
faces (mean = 1085.27, 327.59) being correctly responded to faster than children‘s faces 
(mean = 1139.61, 312.71).  In addition, there was a main effect of group (F(2, 
93)=19.35, p<.001, ηp
2
=.29) which Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed was the result of 
the children performing significantly slower than both of the adult groups (p<.001) who 
did not significantly differ in overall response speed (p>.05).  In addition, and consistent 
with the own-age bias there was a significant face age x group interaction (F(2, 
93)=10.68, p<.001, ηp
2
=.19).  Follow up Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests revealed 
that this was due to the low contact group performing significantly faster with young 
adult faces (t(31)=4.03, p<.001) while the high contact group and children showed no 
such pattern (t<1 in both cases). 
 
6.2.5.3.2. Inverted Trials 
 Only one significant finding resulted from the ANOVA for the inverted trials, 
and that was for group (F(2, 93)=7.05, p<.01, ηp
2
=.13).  Again, Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests revealed that this effect was the result of the children performing slower than both 
of the adults groups (p<.001), who performed similarly to one another (p>.05).   
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6.2.6. Discussion 
Results from Experiment 6 showed that while both children (in terms of 
accuracy) and low contact adults (in terms of accuracy and RTs) exhibited an own-age 
bias for upright faces, high contact adults showed no own-age bias for either of the 
measures.  However, once faces were inverted, no significant interactions between face 
age and group were found.  This finding directly supports a perceptual-expertise 
account of the own-age bias.   
In addition, the low contact adult groups exhibited a greater inversion 
impairment for own-age faces, with which they had more experience (although this only 
reached nominal significance in terms of latency).  In contrast, the high contact adults 
showed no such pattern, which one would expect due to the high level of experience 
with both age groups.  Again, these findings support a perceptual-expertise explanation 
of the own-age bias.  However, it is of note that children did not exhibit a larger 
inversion deficit of own-age faces.  This may be due to an increased reliance on featural 
processing in the age group which is less dependent on expertise and less effected by 
inversion (Mondloch et al, 2002). 
An additional finding of this study was that children‘s accuracy was affected by 
inversion to a similar extent as adults' for children‘s faces. However when the faces 
were of undergraduate age, the children exhibited less of an inversion deficit than the 
undergraduate participants.  This implies that past research with children suggesting that 
they process faces in a less configural manner than adults (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 
1986) may have been underestimating their face processing abilities (as has also been 
suggested by Flin, 1985, and George, Hole & Scaife, 2000).   
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However, as noted above, the children‘s results in this study should be taken 
with caution, as d‘ analysis revealed that they were performing close to chance levels in 
all but the upright child‘s face condition.  This may have been due to task difficultly.  
The study was originally designed for adult participants only, and thus the child group 
may have been disadvantaged.  For example, the experimenter noted that in comparison 
to adults, children failed to respond to considerably more faces in the 2.5 second 
interval that they were given in which to indicate whether or not they recognised a face.  
This could easily have biased the results.  In addition, this may go some way to 
explaining the lack of an inversion effect in the children's RTs.  It is possible that the cut 
off time of 2500ms may have resulted in the loss of longer response latencies being 
recorded for this age group.  Thus, in order to decrease task difficulty and to ensure all 
relevant data were recorded, Experiment 7 attempted to replicate this study, with the 
addition of longer face exposure times in the initial study phase and keeping the 
recognition phase faces on the screen until the participant made a response. 
 
6.3. Experiment 7 
 
6.3.1. Design 
The same experimental design was used as in Experiment 6. 
 
6.3.2. Participants 
There were 101 participants in total, however only the data from 99 participants 
were included in the analysis after 2 of the children had to be excluded for not following 
the instructions.  Included in the final analysis were 32 children (mean age 9.84, SD .51, 
range 9-11 years), 34 adults in the high contact group (mean age 21.87, SD 2.34, range 
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19-28 years) and 33 adults in the low contact group (mean age 22.28, SD 2.88, range 
19-29 years).  Low contact participants were all psychology students from the 
University of Sussex who received research credits for their participation.  High contact 
participants were initially recruited by emailing the PGCE and GTA courses.  However, 
most of the volunteers had been involved with the previous study, and thus had to be 
excluded from taking part.  Only 9 additional participants came forward from this 
group, and so recruitment had to take place in another way.  The remainder of the high 
contact participants were recruited by emailing the Sussex subject volunteer pool 
requesting participants who had current occupational experience with primary school 
children.  All members of this group were paid £5 for their participation.  The children 
were all recruited from Years 5 and 6 at Somerhill Primary School in Hove after 
obtaining parental consent. 
 
6.3.3. Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiment 6. 
 
6.3.4. Procedure 
The procedure was basically the same as Experiment 6, however some changes 
were made to the timing in order to make the study easier for the youngest age group.  
Only the following changes took place: the initial study time for the photographs was 
lengthened (times were increased by 1 second to 4 seconds) and in the recognition 
phase, faces always remained on the screen until a response was made.  All other 
aspects of the procedure remained the same. 
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6.3.5. Results 
Since there was no effect of pose type on accuracy, data were collapsed across 
this variable for the purpose of analysis. 
 
 
6.3.5.1. Accuracy – Discriminability 
Estimates of d‘ accuracy were calculated from the proportions of hits and false 
alarms.  Table 6.2. below shows the hit and false alarm rates, d‘ and response bias 
scores for the different conditions. As before, a flattening constant was used to allow d‘ 
scores to be calculated when the hit or false alarm rate was either 0 or 1. 
 
Table 6.2  Mean proportion of hits and false alarms, d’ accuracy scores and response bias scores 
 
    Upright Faces 
Participant   Photograph  Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Children Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Adult 0.65 0.15 0.39 0.13 0.75 0.75 0.04 0.20 
 Children 0.69 0.13 0.27 0.12 1.21 0.65 0.01 0.29 
Low Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.77 0.12 0.23 0.13 1.56 0.74 0.01 0.22 
 Children 0.72 0.15 0.31 0.18 1.20 0.96 0.07 0.19 
High Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.83 0.14 0.27 0.16 1.75 0.96 0.19 0.24 
 Children 0.80 0.13 0.22 0.12 1.78 0.84 0.03 0.20 
    Inverted Faces 
Participant   Photograph  Hit False Alarm Accuracy Response Bias 
Group Age Rate Rate (d') (c) 
Children Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Adult 0.62 0.10 0.41 0.10 0.55 0.44 0.03 0.15 
 Children 0.62 0.16 0.38 0.16 0.70 0.90 0.01 0.15 
Low Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.65 0.13 0.37 0.15 0.77 0.76 0.02 0.19 
 Children 0.63 0.11 0.35 0.17 0.78 0.79 -0.05 0.20 
High Contact Adults         
 Adult 0.70 0.18 0.35 0.14 0.98 0.84 0.08 0.26 
  Children 0.59 0.15 0.38 0.14 0.58 0.76 -0.06 0.17 
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Figure 6.5. shows the mean d‘ score for both experimental groups for all 
stimulus conditions.  All groups appear to have been able to identify whether a face was 
familiar or not across all conditions at above chance levels (d‘ > 0).   
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Figure 6.5  The effect of face age and orientation on mean d-prime accuracy scores for the different contact 
groups (error bars show mean ±1 standard error) 
  
 A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA showed that while there was no main effect of face age 
(F<1), there was a significant overall inversion effect (F(1,96)=125.76, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.57).  There was also a significant main effect of group on accuracy scores 
(F(2,96)=5.07, p<.01, ηp
2
=.10).  Post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that this was due to 
the children performing significantly worse than the high contact group (p<.01).   
There were also a couple of higher order interactions.  While orientation did not 
significantly interact with face age (F<1), it did interact with contact group 
(F(2,96)=10.13, p<.001, ηp2=.17) such that all groups performed with fairly similar 
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accuracy when the faces were upside down (high contact mean=.78, .82; low contact 
mean=.78, .77, children=.62, .71), however when the faces were upright the high 
contact group performed most accurately (mean=1.77, .89), followed by the low contact 
adults (mean=1.38, .87) followed by the children (mean=.98, .73).  In addition, face age 
significantly interacted with group (F(2,96)=7.17, p<.001, ηp
2
=.13) with the children 
performing more accurately for children‘s faces (mean=.95, .82) than the young adult 
faces (mean=.65, .62), while the high contact (young adult face mean=1.37, .97; 
children‘s face mean=1.18, 1.00) and low contact group (young adult face mean=1.17, 
.84; children‘s face mean=.99, .90) showed the opposite pattern.    
This was further qualified by a significant three-way interaction between group, 
face age and orientation (F(2,96)=3.81, p<.05, ηp
2
=.07) which is illustrated in Figures 
6.5. and 6.6.  Figure 6.6. shows the magnitude of inversion deficit (d‘ accuracy for 
upright faces minus d‘ accuracy for inverted faces) for all face ages.  From the graphs it 
appears that while the low contact group showed a larger inversion deficit for young 
adult faces than children‘s faces, the children and the high contact group showed the 
opposite pattern.   
193 
 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
High Contact Low Contact Children
In
v
e
rs
io
n
 D
e
fi
c
it
Young Adult Faces
Children's Faces
 
Figure 6.6.  The effect of face age on the magnitude of the inversion effect (d' for upright faces minus d' for 
inverted faces) for the different contact groups (bars show ±1 standard error) 
 
 Paired t-tests with Bonferroni corrections carried out on the inversion deficit 
scores revealed a nominally significant effect of face age for the high contact group 
(t(33)=-2.28, p<.05) with participants showing a significantly larger inversion deficit for 
children‘s faces than for the young adult faces.  However, this pattern did not survive 
the Bonferroni corrected alpha level (α=.017).  In addition, neither the low contact 
group nor the children showed a significant effect of face age on their inversion deficit 
scores (t(32)=1.70, p=.10; t(31)=-1.23, p=.23 respectively).   
 Separate one-way ANOVAs showed that there was a significant main effect of 
group on the inversion deficit magnitude for both the young adult (F(2, 96)=5.62, 
p<.01, ηp
2
=.11) and children‘s faces (F(2, 96)=7.52, p=.001, ηp
2
=.14).  Bonferroni post-
hoc tests revealed that for young adult faces, this was due to the children having a 
significantly smaller inversion deficit than both adult groups (p=.01 in both cases).  For 
the children‘s faces, this was the product of the high contact group being more affected 
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by inversion than either the children or the low contact group (p<.01) who showed 
similar inversion effects.  
 As with Experiment 6, this three-way interaction was further investigated to 
examine the hypothesis that the own age bias is mediated by expertise.  Again, if the 
own age bias can be characterised by an ability to efficiently use the configural cues in 
the face, as associated with expertise, then the own-age bias (as indexed by the group x 
face age interaction) should only be present when faces are upright.  As inversion 
disrupts the configural information of the face, the effects of expertise should be 
eliminated when the faces are inverted.  Thus, separate ANOVAs were carried out for 
the upright and inverted faces. 
 
6.3.5.1.1. Upright Trials 
 The two-way mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores for upright faces found no 
effect of face age (F<1), but there was a main effect of group (F(2,96)=10.97, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.19) which Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed was due to the high contact group 
performing significantly better than the children (p<.001).  In addition, and consistent 
with the own-age bias there was a significant face age x group interaction 
(F(2,96)=6.28, p<.01, ηp
2
=.12).  Follow-up Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests revealed 
that this significant interaction was due to the low contact group performing more 
accurately with young adult faces than with children‘s faces (t(32)=2.07, p<.05), while 
the children showed the opposite pattern (t(31)=-2.51, p<.05).  However, while these 
patterns were nominally significant, neither survived the Bonferroni corrected alpha 
level (α=.017).  In addition, the high contact group showed no difference in terms of 
accuracy for the two sets of faces (t(33)=-.20, p=.84).   
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6.3.5.1.2. Inverted Trials 
 As with the upright trials the 2 x 3 ANOVA revealed no effect of face age 
(F=1.10). Although in this case there was also no effect of group (F<1).  However, a 
significant interaction between face age and group was found (F(2,96)=4.15, p<.05, 
ηp
2
=.08).  Follow-up t-tests revealed no differences in accuracy for young adult or 
children‘s faces for either the low contact or children groups (t<1 in both cases).  
However the high contact group were significantly more accurate with inverted young 
adult faces than with children‘s faces (t(34)=3.98, p<.001).  There is currently no 
explanation offered as to why this latter finding might have occurred.  However it might 
be of note that while there was a significant difference in the high contact group‘s 
performance with adult and children‘s faces, when the group differences were analyzed 
within facial stimuli type, one-way ANOVAs revealed that there was no effect of 
contact group on accuracy for either children‘s (F<1) or young adult faces 
(F(2,96)=3.00, ns). 
 
6.3.5.2. Accuracy – Response Bias 
 Estimates of response bias (c) were calculated from the hit and false alarm rates 
and can be seen in Figure 6.7.).  As with the previous studies the c values were very 
close to 0, suggesting that there is very little response bias in this study.   In fact, one-
sample t-tests revealed that the magnitude of response bias only significantly differed 
from 0 in the high contact group for the upright young adult faces (t(33)=4.51, p<.001), 
and in the low contact group for the upright children‘s faces (t(32)=2.13, p<.05).  None 
of the observed biases for the children significantly differed from 0 (t range=.20 - 1.23). 
 
196 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7  The effect of face age on c response bias scores for the three contact groups (error bars 
show mean ±1 standard error) 
  
 A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of face age (F(1,96)=9.66, 
p<.01, ηp
2
=.09) with responses to young adult faces (mean=.06, .22) generally being 
more conservative than those to children‘s faces (mean=.002, .21).  A significant main 
effect of orientation was also found (F(1,96)=5.86, p<.05, ηp
2
=.06) with responses to 
upright faces generally being a bit more conservative (mean=.06, .23) than responses to 
inverted faces (mean=.006, .19).  In this case, there was no significant effect of contact 
group (F(2,96)=1.63, ns). 
 Only one significant interaction was found. This was between face age and 
group (F(2,96)=5.79, p<.01, ηp
2
=.11) such that while the high contact group and 
children performed more conservatively for young adults faces (mean=.14, .25; 
mean=.04, .17 respectively) than children‘s faces (mean=-.01, .19; mean=.008, .23), the 
low contact group responded in a similar way to both types of stimuli (mean=.01, .20 
for both face ages).  As with the previous studies, finding meaning in these results is 
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difficult due to the small magnitude of response bias patterns (i.e. none of the mean 
values fall outside c=± 0.20). 
 
6.3.5.3. Latency 
 Mean RTs for correct responses were entered into a mixed 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with group, face age and orientation as variables of interest.  No significant main effect 
of face age (F(1,96)=3.17 p=.08, ηp
2
=.03) was found, however there was a significant 
inversion effect (F(1,96)=56.58, p<.001, ηp
2
=.38) with faster responses to  upright faces 
(mean=1132.69, 399.69) than to inverted faces (mean=1329.86, 440.94).  A significant 
effect of contact group was also found on reaction time (F(2,96)=3.62 p<.05, ηp
2
=.07), 
which Bonferroni t-tests showed was due to the children responding more slowly than 
both of the adult groups (p<.05), who performed similarly to one another (p>.05).  The 
pattern of main effects is illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
There were also a couple of higher order interactions.  Face age significantly 
interacted with group (F(2,96)=6.78, p<.01, ηp
2
=.12), with the low contact group 
performing faster with young adult faces (mean=1076.01, 447.52) than with the 
children‘s faces (mean=1215.98, 459.71), while children (young adult face 
mean=1386.13, 537.37; children‘s face mean=1362.51, 438.43) and the high contact 
group (young adult face mean=1184.05, 301.79; children‘s face mean=1174.80, 295.50) 
showed the opposite pattern.   
This interaction was further qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between group, face age and orientation (F(2,96)=4.05, p<.05, ηp
2
=.08), illustrated in 
Figure 6.8.  As with d‘ scores, inversion deficit scores were calculated (RT upright – RT 
inverted) and analysed.  Bonferroni paired t-tests revealed a nominally significant effect 
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of face age for the low contact group (t(32)=2.05, p<.05) with participants showing a 
significantly larger inversion deficit for young adult faces than children‘s faces.  
However, this pattern did not survive the Bonferroni corrected alpha level (α=.017).  In 
addition, neither the children, nor the high contact group showed a difference in the 
magnitude of inversion deficit for the two sets of facial stimuli (t(31)=-1.69, p=.10; 
t(33)=-.02, p=.98, respectively).   
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Figure 6.8  Mean reaction times for correct responses for the different face age stimuli for the three contact 
groups (bars show mean ±1 standard error). 
 
 As with accuracy, analysis was separated for the upright and inverted trials in 
order to further investigate the three-way interaction. 
 
6.3.5.3.1. Upright Trials 
 The two-way mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores for upright faces found a 
significant main effect of face age (F(1,96)=6.24, p<.05, ηp
2
=.06), with young adult 
faces (mean=1105.64, 407.14) being correctly responded to faster than children‘s faces 
(mean=1321.07, 473.64).  In addition, there was a main effect of group (F(2,96)=5.17, 
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p<.01, ηp
2
=.10) which Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed was due to the children 
responding significantly more slowly than both of the adult groups (p<.05) who did not 
significantly differ in overall response speed (p>.05).  In addition, and consistent with 
the own-age bias, there was a significant face age x group interaction (F(2,96)=17.22, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.26).  Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that this significant interaction was 
due to the low contact group responding significantly faster with young adult faces 
(t(32)=4.74, p<.001) than with children‘s faces.  In contrast, children and the high 
contact group performed at a similar speed for both facial age groups (t(31)=-1.81, 
p=.08; t(33)=-.36, p=.72 respectively). 
 
6.3.5.3.2. Inverted Trials 
 No significant main effects or interactions were found for the inverted faces (all 
F's < 1.02).  This is consistent with an expertise related account of the own-age bias in 
face recognition.   
 
6.3.6. Discussion 
Experiments 6 and 7 both demonstrated that the low contact adult groups 
exhibited a greater inversion deficit for own-age faces, with which they had more 
experience, in terms of accuracy (in Experiment 6) and faster reaction times (in 
Experiment 7; reaching nominal significance in Experiment 6).  Why these results are 
not consistent between experiments is unclear, although it is of note that trends in the 
expected direction were observed.  As such, the use of a larger sample size may yield 
more consistent results in the future.   
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Inversion deficit scores for the children and high contact adult were not 
significantly different for the different stimuli ages.  While no difference would be 
expected for the high contact group, due to high levels of experience with both facial 
age groups, one may have expected to see a larger deficit for own-age faces for 
children.  However the absence of this finding may not serve as evidence against a 
perceptual-expertise account, but may instead be due to this age group‘s increased 
reliance on featural cues when recognising faces (Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer, 
2002).   
In addition, while high contact adults performed similarly for both ages of facial 
stimuli, low-contact adults showed enhanced recognition accuracy (in Experiment 6) 
and faster reaction times (in both Experiment 6 and 7) for own-age faces when they 
were presented upright.  However, this pattern was eliminated when they were 
presented upside-down.  Children also exhibited this pattern in terms of accuracy in 
Experiment 6, although this was not replicated in Experiment 7 and did not extend to 
reaction time data (possibly because reaction times may not accurately represent 
performance in this age group, as discussed in Experiment 1).   
These findings appear to lend some support to a perceptual-expertise account of 
the own-age bias.  If the own age bias is mediated by perceptual expertise, it can be 
characterised by an ability to more efficiently use the configural cues in the faces with 
which we have more experience.  As inversion disrupts the configural information of 
the face, then enhanced performance for own-age faces should only occur when faces 
are in the upright position, which was the case for the low-contact adults.  While 
children only showed this pattern in terms of accuracy in Experiment 6, the lack of 
replication may be due to typically less developed configural processing abilities in this 
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age group (e.g. Mondloch et al, 2002).  In accordance with perceptual-expertise theory, 
the high-contact group were not expected to exhibit an own-age bias due to high contact 
with both age groups used as stimuli. 
However, inferring greater configural coding of own-age faces based on the 
elimination of the own-age bias after face inversion (as well as larger inversion 
decrements for own-age faces) may be problematic as this assumes that inversion 
selectively disrupts configural information (Diamond & Carey, 1986).  This may not be 
the case, as previous studies have shown that inversion also impairs featural/component 
coding, albeit to a lesser extent (e.g. Mondloch et al, 2002).  Thus the presence of an 
inversion effect may not simply reflect a disruption of configural processing, but may in 
fact be the result of ―some unknown combination of impaired configural, component, 
and holistic coding‖ (Rhodes, Hayward & Winkler, 2006).  As such, while it is fair to 
suggest that own-age faces are usually processed more efficiently than other-age faces 
as a result of differential experience, the results from these experiments do not 
necessarily shed light on the specific processing benefits that arise as a result of this 
expertise.  In order to investigate this issue further, Experiment 8 sought to explore 
participants‘ sensitivity to the configural information contained in own- and other- age 
faces. 
As face experts, we are very sensitive to small changes made to the spatial 
configuration of the facial features (Friere et al, 2000; Haig, 1984; 1986; Hosie et al, 
1988; Kemp et al, 1990; Leder et al, 2001; Mondloch et al, 2002).  For example, Haig 
(1984; 1986) and Hosie et al (1988) demonstrated that we are able to detect changes to 
the positioning of the eyes, nose and mouth that are so slight that they are approaching 
the threshold of our visual acuity (corresponding to alternations of a magnitude as little 
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as approximately 4-6% of the inter-pupillary distance).  Not only that, but more recent 
studies have shown that our ability to detect these changes (particularly those made to 
the position of the eyes and the nose) improves as a function of facial familiarity (e.g. 
Brooks & Kemp, 2007; O‘Donnell & Bruce, 2001).  Thus, if the own-age bias in face 
recognition is the result of perceptual expertise
12
, reflected in enhanced configural 
processing for own-age faces, one would expect us to be more sensitive to configural 
changes made to own-age faces compared to faces that belong to a younger or older age 
group.   
 
6.4. Experiment 8 
 
In order to assess whether the own-age bias is a result of an increased ability to 
successfully use the configural information in own-age faces, this study sought to 
directly manipulate this information, rather than inferring selective configural disruption 
from inversion.  To do this, configural changes were made to a set of photographs of 
faces by altering the spatial arrangements between the facial features (e.g. moving the 
eyes up or down within the face).  These changes ensured that while the configural 
information of the face was altered, the component information remained the same. 
Previous studies which have investigated participants‘ configural sensitivity 
have blocked the stimuli according to the type of feature changes that were made to the 
face (e.g. Haig, 1984; Kemp et al, 1990).  Participants were therefore aware of what 
                                                 
 
12
 Perceptual expertise in this case being the product of relatively more experience, and therefore more 
familiarity, with own-age faces (with the added caveat that it may be recent exposure to own-age faces 
that is important in the own-age bias; see the introduction of this chapter for a discussion of this).  
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types of changes were likely to occur and as such it is possible that they were able to 
develop a strategy to detect these changes by focusing on those individual features 
alone.  Indeed, Barton, Keenan & Bass (2001) found that participants were significantly 
better at detecting feature displacements when they knew which facial features were 
most likely to be altered.  Therefore, in order to better test configural sensitivity, this 
study presented the changes in a randomised, non-blocked order, preventing participants 
from being able to work out which feature change was likely to occur. 
In this study, undergraduates viewed own-age and other-age (child) faces.  
Children were not used as participants as the length of the task was thought to be too 
long to hold their attention.  If the own-age bias is a result of perceptual expertise, it is 
hypothesised that participants will be more sensitive to the configural changes made to 
own-age faces.  Specifically, participants should have a lower threshold at which they 
can identify the changes made to own-age compared to other-age faces.   
 
6.4.1. Design 
A repeated measures design was used, with two variables of interest: degree of 
spatial change (four levels: 1, 2, 4 and 8% of the inter-pupillary distance) and the 
feature changed (three levels: eye separation; vertical eye position; vertical nose 
position).  Correct responses and reaction time data were used as dependent variables. 
 
6.4.2. Participants 
Initially 30 participants took part in this study; however two of them had to be 
excluded as their overall performance was at chance levels and their reaction times were 
too fast, suggesting they were not paying due attention.  Of the 28 remaining 
participants there were 11 males (mean age 22.64, SD 2.77, range 19-28 years) and 17 
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females (mean age 21.76, SD 2.73, range 18-30 years) who were locally recruited 
undergraduate students from the University of Sussex. 
 
6.4.3. Materials 
Digital photographs of 48 males were collected and used as the basis for stimuli.  
The photographs were equally divided into two age categories: children (9-12 years old) 
and undergraduates (19-25 years old).  All photographs were close up, frontal face 
images without beards, glasses or other paraphernalia.  For each photograph, four 
configurally changed images were created.  There were six possible configural changes: 
eyes moved up or down, eye separation increased or decreased, or nose position moved 
up or down.  For the purpose of analysis, these were treated as only three types of 
feature change: eye separation, vertical eye position and vertical nose position
13
.  The 
magnitude of these changes were made in terms of a percentage of each face‘s inter-
pupillary distance (IDP); either 1, 2, 4 or 8% (see Figure 6.9. for examples of the stimuli 
used). As such, there were 24 possible changes available to each face.  Each of the 
changes were used equally (4 times each), but they were randomly assigned to the facial 
stimuli.  Once the changes had been made, all photographs were then converted to 
greyscale and edited to a standard size of 350 x 300 pixels.  The background of each 
picture and any information outside of the head outline and the contour of the chin was 
removed and made solid white.   
 
                                                 
 
13
 Initial analysis showed that sensitivity to changes were the same along these dimensions, regardless of 
which direction they were in, thus the six feature changes were collapsed into three for ease of analysis 
and interpretation 
205 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 An example of the possible changes made to the photographic stimuli. From left to right: the 
original photograph, eyes moved up by 4% of the IPD, nose up by 8% of the IPD,  eye separation increased by 
2% of the IPD and nose moved down by 8% of the IPD.  
 
6.4.4. Procedure 
In order to see if we are more sensitive to configural changes made to own-age 
faces than to other-age faces, a face matching task was used.  For each trial triplets of 
faces were presented to the participants on a computer screen. The triplets consisted of 
the original facial photograph, which appeared at the top of the screen, with two 
versions of that photograph appearing directly beneath it.  These two faces were slightly 
misaligned to hinder horizontal scanning.  Of the two lower pictures, one was identical 
to the original, while the other had been changed using one of the 24 possible configural 
alterations (see Figure 6.10 for example stimuli).  Which configural change the 
photograph was subjected to was randomly assigned. Participants were asked to identify 
which of the two faces had been changed, as accurately and as quickly as possible using 
the computer keyboard.  There were 192 trials in totals, and these trials were split into 
four blocks of 48 with equal amounts of each age group in each block.  The order of the 
blocks and faces within each block were randomised and the position of the target face 
was counterbalanced to avoid any response bias.   
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Figure 6.10 An example of a triad of faces. The target face in this set of stimuli is positioned in the 
bottom left and has had the nose moved up by 8%.  The final stimulus size was 910 by 910 pixels 
(32.1cm high) with a viewing distance of 45cm making the visual angle 39.26°.  
 
 
6.4.5. Results 
There was no effect of position of target face, or gender on either accuracy or 
reaction time, so data were therefore collapsed across these variables for the purpose of 
analysis. 
 
6.4.5.1. Accuracy 
 A three-way repeated measures ANOVA (two levels of face age x three levels of 
feature change x four levels of pixel change) was carried out on the percentage of 
correct responses that were made.  Firstly, a significant main effect of face age was 
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found (F(1,27)=13.85, p=.001, ηp
2
=.34) with significantly more correct responses being 
made to own age faces (63.28%) than to children‘s faces (58.48%).  There was also a 
significant main effect of feature type (F(2,54)=12.89, p<.001, ηp
2
=.34), which 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed to be the result of significantly more correct 
responses occurring for changes in eye separation (66.52%) compared to vertical 
changes in the positioning of either the eyes (57.42%) or the nose (58.71%).  In addition 
to this there was a further significant main effect of spatial change level
14
 (F(2.13, 
57.60)=53.62, p<.001, ηp
2
=.67). Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that this was the 
result of accuracy increasing as the magnitude of spatial change increased.  All 
differences were significant (p<.001) except for the difference between 1 and 2 % of the 
IPD changes (p=.74), which were close to chance. 
 While there was no interaction between face age and feature change (F(2, 
54)=2.60, p<.13, ηp
2
=.07), there was a significant interaction between face age and 
spatial change level (F(2.19, 59.05)=4.94, p<.01, ηp
2
=.16) which is illustrated in Figure 
6.11.  In addition to this, there was a significant interaction between feature type and 
spatial change (F (6, 162)=2.41, p<.05, ηp
2
=.08), however the three-way interaction did 
not reach significance (F (6, 162)=1.88, p=.09, ηp
2
=.07). 
                                                 
 
14
 Mauchley‘s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for pixel change level 
(χ²(5) =14.43, p<.05) and for the interaction between this variable and face age (χ²(5) =15.74, p<.01).  As 
a result, reported degrees of freedom are corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates.  
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Figure 6.11  The effect of face age and magnitude of configural changes made (in % IPD) on the mean 
percentage of correct responses made (error bars show mean ±1 standard error).  Asterisks indicate whether 
or not performance was significantly different from chance performance using one-sample t-tests (*** = 
p<.001; ** = p<.01). 
 In order to further investigate the interaction between face age and spatial 
change level, a series of follow-up paired samples t-tests were carried out, with face age 
as the variable of interest for each level of configural change.  Only one significant 
result was found at the 4% level (t(27)=6.18, p<.001), showing that significantly more 
correct responses were made for the own age faces (68.60%) than the children‘s faces 
(55.51%) when changes of the magnitude of 4% of the IPD were made to the target 
faces.  Responses were similar in all other cases (largest t=1.05).  These findings 
suggest that the threshold to detect configural changes in own age faces may be lower 
than that for other age faces, consistent with a perceptual expertise account of the own-
age bias. 
 This idea is further supported by a series of one-sample t-tests, illustrated in 
Figure 6.12., that were used to investigate whether performance for the different 
stimulus conditions was significantly different from chance.  For the own age faces, 
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performance was only at chance performance when the magnitude of configural change 
was 1% (t(27)=1.01, p=.32), however for children‘s faces performance was at chance 
level for both 1 and 2% changes (t(27)=-.59, p=.56; t(27)=1.40, p=.17 respectively).  
Thus, undergraduates were able to detect configural changes made to the face at a level 
significantly better than chance for alterations made at a barely noticeable magnitude of 
2% of the IPD.  This was not true for children‘s faces until alterations were of the 
magnitude of 4% of the IPD. 
 
Figure 6.12  The effect of feature type and magnitude of configural changes made (in % IPD) on the mean 
percentage of correct responses made (error bars show mean ±1 standard error).  Asterisks indicate whether 
or not performance was significantly different from chance performance using one-sample t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction (** = p<.001;* = p<.01). 
 
 In order to further investigate the feature type x spatial change level interaction a 
series of follow up one way ANOVAs were carried out with face age as the variable of 
interest for each level of configural change.  The only significant result was found at the 
8 % change level (F(2, 54)=18.14, p<.001 ηp
2
=.40), which Bonferroni post hoc tests 
showed was the result of  eye separation changes producing significantly more correct 
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responses than either the eyes or nose being moved vertically within the face (p<.001 in 
both cases).   
 
6.4.5.2. Latency 
 As with the accuracy data a three-way repeated measures ANOVA was carried 
out on the reaction time data for correct responses.  In this case, no significant main 
effect of face age was found (F<1).  However there was also a significant main effect of 
feature type (F(2,54)=12.89, p<.001, ηp
2
=.34), which Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed 
to be the result of significantly faster reaction times occurring for changes in eye 
separation (mean = 3425.74, 2778.56) compared to vertical changes in the positioning 
of either the eyes (4027.44, 2931.75) or the nose (3993.70, 3410.59).  In addition, there 
was a further significant main effect of spatial change level
15
 (F(1.90, 49.39)=7.97, 
p=.001, ηp
2
=.24). Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that this was the result of reaction 
times for faces with configural changes of a magnitude of 8 % of the IPD being 
significantly faster than at all of the other change levels (p<.01 in all cases).  No other 
differences in response speed were found and there were no significant interactions 
between any of the variables (largest F=1.81).  These findings suggest that the 
differences in accuracy cannot be explained in terms of a speed-accuracy trade off. 
 
                                                 
 
15
 Again, Mauchley‘s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for pixel change 
level (χ²(5) =14.43, p<.05) and so reported degrees of freedom are corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates.  
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6.4.6. Discussion 
Experiment 8 sought to investigate whether a configural-expertise account of the 
own-age bias was plausible, by using a paradigm that specifically manipulated the 
configural information in the face while preserving the featural information.  The results 
found that, in terms of accuracy, undergraduates were significantly more accurate than 
chance at detecting changes made to own-age faces at a lower level than that for other-
age faces (2%, compared to 4% of the IPD).  In addition, at a level close to that 
identified by Haig (1984) as where configural alterations become just noticeable (4% of 
the IPD), participants were significantly more accurate at detecting changes made to 
own- compared to other- age faces.  Thus participants appeared to have a lower 
threshold at which they were able to detect configural changes made to own-age faces 
and were more accurate at detecting the subtle changes made to them.  
 
6.5. General Discussion 
 
This chapter aimed to investigate whether a perceptual expertise explanation, 
characterised by increased configural processing for own-age faces, offers an 
appropriate account of the own-age bias in face recognition.  Using an inversion 
paradigm similar to that used to investigate the role of expertise in the own-race bias 
(e.g. Rhodes et al, 1989; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004) Experiments 6 and 7 found 
that this might be the case.  Low-contact adults showed better recognition accuracy (in 
Experiment 6) and faster response times (in both Experiment 6 and 7) for own-age faces 
when they were presented upright; a pattern that was eliminated when the faces were 
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inverted.  Children showed the same pattern in terms of accuracy for children‘s faces in 
Experiment 6.  In contrast, the high contact group exhibited no such pattern.   
The fact that inverting the facial stimuli eliminated the pattern of enhanced 
recognition for faces with which participants had high levels of experience, in most 
cases eliminating the face age x group interactions completely, supports the notion that 
the own-age bias is mediated by perceptual expertise.  This finding is in direct 
opposition to that reported by Perfect and Moon (2005), who found that inverting their 
faces increased the own-age bias.  Instead, these results favour the findings of Kuefner 
et al (2008), who found a similar pattern of results to those seen in this chapter.  Thus, it 
appears that a perceptual expertise account of the own-age bias may offer a satisfactory 
explanation of this effect. 
However, inversion studies alone are not enough to allow us to conclude that 
own-age faces are processed in a more configural manner than other-age faces.  As 
discussed above, previous research has indicated that inverting a face not only disrupts 
the configural information in that face, but also the featural information, although to a 
lesser degree (Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer, 2002).  Thus, to be able to make claims 
about the role of configural processing in the own-age bias, one needs to look at 
manipulations that tap into those processes alone. 
In order to do this, Experiment 8 investigated undergraduate‘s sensitivity to 
small configural changes made to the face.  It was found that participants had a lower 
threshold for detecting these subtle changes when faces belonged to their own age 
group, compared to those belonging to a different age group.  In addition, participants 
performed more accurately with own-age compared to other-age faces when the 
changes made were at the just noticeable level (4% of the IPD; Haig, 1984). This 
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finding suggests that participants were better able to use the configural information 
contained in own-age faces compared to other-age faces, directly supporting the 
configural-expertise account of the own-age bias.   
However, it is worth noting that only one participant group was included in this 
study.  As such it is possible that these results are the product of configural changes 
being generally harder to detect in children's faces than in adults' faces.  This does seem 
unlikely, due to the physiognomic difference between adult and children‘s faces.  For 
example, as discussed in Section 1.5.1., children‘s eyes appear relatively larger within a 
child‘s face, compared to an adult‘s face.  As such, slight movements to their eyes (as a 
proportion of their I.P.D.) would most likely represent a relatively larger change within 
the face as compared to that made for the adult.  However, in order to rule out the 
possibility that the findings of Experiment 8 were a product of the stimuli used, future 
research could investigate whether participants with high contact to children (such as 
teachers) show this increased sensitivity to configural changes made to own-age faces.  
If the own-age bias is the product of perceptual expertise, we would not expect this to 
be the case.   
However, the notion of greater configural processing for own-age faces has also 
gained support from a recent study which used a composite face paradigm (de Heering 
et al, 2008).  Using high- (teachers) and low- (undergraduates) contact participants, the 
authors investigated the composite face effect for adult and child faces.  While the low 
contact participants showed a much larger composite effect for adult compared to 
children‘s faces, no difference was found for the high contact group.  This finding 
suggested that due to enhanced configural processing for faces with which we have 
more experience, the low contact group was relatively unable to successfully use the 
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featural information in own-age faces to successfully identify the face halves.  The high 
contact group experienced the same problem for both face ages, as they had high levels 
of expertise with both age groups.  In contrast, as the low contact group had less 
experience with children‘s faces, they were more able to use the featural cues in the 
face.   
Thus, the results from the experiments in Chapter 6 support a perceptual-
expertise explanation of the own-age bias in face recognition, characterised by enhanced 
configural processing for own-age faces.  However, these studies are only investigating 
the perceptual mechanisms underlying the own-age bias.  They do not take into 
consideration more social or motivational models, and permit no conclusions about the 
role of these more qualitative aspects of experience with faces.  These different types of 
explanations are by no means mutually exclusive, and while this chapter leads us to 
conclude that own-age bias is likely to be the result of enhanced perceptual processing 
for own-age faces, it is possible/likely that social and motivational mechanisms and 
behaviours are what lead us to develop this perceptual expertise.  This idea merits 
further exploration and will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 : 
General Discussion 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
Previous research has suggested that we are better at recognising faces 
belonging to our own age-group compared to those of another age group (e.g. Anastasi 
& Rhodes, 2006).  This own-group recognition advantage is potentially analogous to 
that seen for other facial characteristics: the own race-bias (see Meissner & Brigham, 
2001) and the own-gender bias (e.g. Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). As such, the over-
arching aim of this thesis was to use research into these biases to try and establish the 
possible mechanisms that might be responsible for producing the own-age bias in face 
recognition. 
Perhaps the most well-known explanation of any of the own-group biases is that 
of the contact hypothesis (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 1985; in terms of the own-race 
bias).  Building on this idea, the first half of this thesis sought to investigate the role that 
contact may play in the own-age bias in face recognition.  However, as this type of 
theory is only a high level theory, it does not make any specific predictions about the 
mechanisms that may underlie this type of bias in face recognition; only that increased 
contact with a group of faces will lead to better recognition of those faces as a result of 
more familiarity with them.  As such, the second half of this thesis aimed to explore the 
possible cognitive, social and motivational mechanisms that may be responsible for 
producing the own-age bias in face recognition. 
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This chapter will provide an overview of the findings of the empirical studies 
carried out in this thesis and couch them in terms of the existing literature in the area.  
As a result, this chapter will also aim to establish what the most feasible explanation(s) 
of the own-age bias is likely to be.  Finally, limitations of this thesis and directions for 
future research will be identified and discussed.   
 
7.2 An Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition? 
 
 As has been discussed throughout this thesis, previous research has suggested 
that we are better at recognising faces belonging to our own age-group compared to 
those of another age group (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006).  However, not all work in 
this area has produced consistent results.  For example, of the studies that have 
investigated the own-age bias in different adult age-groups (for adult faces), some have 
found an own-age bias to be present in younger, but not older adults (e.g. Bartlett & 
Leslie, 1986; Fulton and Bartlett, 1991; Mason, 1986; Wiese et al, 2008), while others 
have found the reverse to be true (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006; Exp 2).  In addition, 
some have found a full cross-over effect, with an own-age recognition advantage for all 
adult groups (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006; Exp1; Perfect & Moon, 2005), while others 
have found no evidence of a bias at all (e.g. Memon, Bartlett, Rose & Grey, 2003).  As 
such, the current literature on the own-age bias in face recognition has produced 
extremely mixed results. 
 Research investigating the ability of children and adults to recognise child and 
adult faces, although a lot less studied, has proved similarly problematic.  Chung (1997) 
found evidence for an own-age bias in young adult participants (as did Kuefner et al, 
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2008), but not children, while Crookes and McKone (2009) found the opposite pattern.  
In contrast, Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) found that children and older adults both 
exhibited an own-age bias.  Thus, again, it is unclear whether an own-age face 
recognition advantage exists in these cohorts.   
 One of the possible reasons why such varied findings may have been produced 
could be explained by the presence of one simple, yet significant error in the literature.  
The majority of studies that have investigated the own-age bias in face recognition have 
largely failed to suitably match the age of their participants to the ages of the ―own-age‖ 
stimuli that they used (see Table 2.1. for a summary of these studies).  As such, it is 
questionable whether these studies could really be described as investigating an own-
age bias at all. 
 Of the above-mentioned studies, only 4 managed to successfully age-match their 
facial stimuli to their participants: Anastasi and Rhodes (2005; 2006 Exp 1), Kuefner et 
al (2008) and Perfect and Moon (2005).  Each of these studies found that all examined 
age groups were better at recognising own-age faces compared to other-age faces.  
However, while it is probably safe to conclude that the adults included in these studies 
exhibited an own-age bias, this is less certain for the child populations.  Even though 
Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) successfully matched the ages of their stimuli to their 
participants, their procedure presented a problem.  Asking participants to categorise 
faces at the encoding phase according to which age band the faces belonged to may 
have drawn participants‘ attention to age as a particularly salient facial cue, which may 
not ordinarily have occurred.  As categorising faces into own- and other- groups has 
been shown to encourage own-group biases in face recognition (e.g. Bernstein et al, 
2007) it could be that the resultant own-age bias was a product of this task, rather than a 
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natural phenomenon.  As such, Experiment 1 aimed to establish whether or not an own-
age bias was present in children and young adults when they were presented with 
matched-age stimuli and not asked to categorise them beforehand. 
 The main finding from the first experiment in this thesis was that both children 
and young adults exhibited a significant own-age bias in terms of accuracy (as measured 
by d-prime).  Analysis of hit and false alarm rates indicated that this was driven by an 
increased propensity for both age groups to correctly identify own- compared to other- 
age faces.  In contrast, false alarms showed no such effect (drawing parallels with the 
pattern of results found for the own-gender bias; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986).  While 
young adults also showed an own-age bias in terms of RTs, the trend for children to 
recognise own-age faces faster than other-age faces did not reach significance.  
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is unclear how representative RTs were of the 
child groups‘ actual ability. 
 Thus an own-age bias has been found to exist in both child and young adult 
populations, supporting the idea that this phenomenon is seen when ―other-age‖ faces 
comprise either younger or older faces (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; 2006 Exp 1; 
Kuefner et al, 2008; Perfect & Moon, 2005).  This pattern of results serves as a useful 
starting point for investigating why this bias in face recognition may occur, particularly 
if one draws parallels with the most commonly cited explanation proffered for a similar, 
more commonly observed bias: the own-race bias.  The fact that we are better at 
recognising faces of our own race in comparison to those of another race is most often 
explained in terms of the differential amount of contact that we have with different 
racial groups (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 1985).  As a result of spending more time with 
faces belonging to our own racial group, the theory is that we become more familiar 
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with these types of faces, and our memory and recognition abilities for these faces 
increases as a consequence.  A similar theory could be put forward to explain the own-
age bias.  It is possible that the own-age bias is the product of increased experience (and 
more familiarity) with faces that are similar in age to ourselves.  This is particularly 
likely to be the case in terms of the participants that were involved in Experiment 1 who 
were all recruited from settings where high own-age contact would be likely to occur on 
an almost daily basis: the children were recruited from a school, and the young adults 
from a university. 
 However, as appealing as the contact hypothesis may be, accepting such an 
explanation of the own-age bias is not as simple as it is for the own-race bias, namely 
due to the fact that unlike race, age is not a stable characteristic.  As adults, we have 
previously belonged to other, younger age groups.  Presumably this experience would 
allow us to gain enough familiarity with faces of younger age groups to allow high 
levels of recognition, to be achieved, similar to those for own-age faces.  However, 
Experiment 1, and previous studies that have used successfully age-matched stimuli, 
have shown superior own-age face recognition to occur even when other-age faces 
belong to a younger age group than the participants.  As such, for the contact hypothesis 
to apply we would need to include a caveat to this theory: that it is recent (socially 
salient) exposure that is most important in the mediation of the own-age bias. 
 
7.3 The Contact Hypothesis and the Own-Age Bias 
 
 Experiment 2 sought to directly investigate the role that inter-age group contact 
may play in the own-age bias in face recognition.  As highlighted above, contact-type 
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explanations have been used to try and explain other biases and have had some degree 
of success in terms of the own-race bias (see Section 1.8.1.1. and Meissner and 
Brigham, 2001).  However, support for this type of explanation for the own-gender bias 
is more mixed (see Clifford and Bull, 1978 for a discussion of this).  Equally, a contact-
type explanation could be put forward to explain the own-age bias in face recognition, 
with the caveat that it is recent exposure that may play an important role in this bias, 
rather than a more cumulative measure that is often seen in the own-race bias literature. 
 In order to test the influence of recent experience with different age groups on 
the own-age bias, Experiment 2 investigated the face recognition abilities of similarly 
aged participants who had either high (trainee teachers) or low (undergraduates) contact 
with other age faces (in this case, children).  The results showed that while the low 
contact group exhibited the typical own-age bias in terms of both accuracy and RTs, the 
trainee teachers showed no such bias, instead performing better for child faces than with 
own-age faces (although this pattern only reached significance for the RT data).  These 
findings give credence to the hypothesis that contact plays an important role in the own-
age bias in face recognition.  The lack of significant correlations between the self-
reported measure of contact and the magnitude of trainee teachers‘ own-age bias 
suggest that cumulative measures of contact may not be appropriate in explaining this 
bias (although self-report measures are notoriously problematic, and thus the lack of 
significant findings may have been a function of the tools used).  Thus it could be said 
that these results support the idea that recent contact with an age group is important in 
producing, or reducing, the own-age bias in face recognition. 
 The idea that recent exposure to (socially salient) own-age faces may be 
responsible for the production of the own-age bias is one that may also be able to 
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explain why previous research into this phenomenon has yielded such varied results (as 
discussed in the previous section).  Chapter 3 highlights this as being a possibility when, 
in a review of the existing papers investigating the own-age bias, it was found that of 
the participant groups that exhibited a significant bias, almost 90% were recruited from 
settings where they were likely to have experienced particularly high levels of exposure 
to own-age faces (e.g. universities, retirement homes).  In contrast, approximately 73% 
of the participant groups that showed no own-age bias were recruited from settings that 
were either unknown, or likely to have more varied levels of daily contact with own-age 
faces (e.g. from the local community, recruited through advertising).  Thus a contact 
hypothesis emphasising the importance of recent contact with faces does appear to be a 
valid possibility for explaining the own-age bias in face recognition. 
 As well as providing support for a contact-type explanation of the own-age bias, 
Experiment 2 also shed some light on the mechanisms through which contact might 
exert its effects.  However this will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the 
discussion.  Before considering the underlying mechanisms that may be responsible for 
producing the own-age bias, further consideration should be given to the role that 
contact plays in this phenomenon, specifically with a view to identifying exactly what it 
is about contact that is important for such a bias to occur. 
 
7.3.1  Qualitative versus Quantitative Aspects of Contact 
 As highlighted in Section 1.8.1.1. of this thesis, contact can be thought of in a 
number of ways.  Using Experiment 2 to illustrate this, it is fair to say that the trainee 
teachers and undergraduates differed in terms of the quantity of contact they had with 
children.  However, it is also likely that the two groups differed in terms of the quality 
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of contact they had with this age group, as trainee teachers are likely to have increased 
interest in, and thus more motivation to attend to them as a result of their occupational 
demands.  Thus contact could be conceptualized in terms of both quantitative and 
qualitative measures, the question is, which is likely to be most important in explaining 
the own-group biases seen in this thesis and the wider face recognition literature?   
 In terms of this thesis, Experiment 2 found that the quantity of time that trainee 
teachers had spent with other-age faces was not significantly related to the size of their 
own-age bias.  While this could be interpreted as evidence against the role of quantity of 
contact (alone) in the own-age bias, this may not be the case.  It could have been due to 
ceiling effects with both groups of faces, thus not allowing for enough variability in the 
participants‘ scores to yield meaningful results.  Alternatively, it may be that the 
assumption of a linear relationship between quantity of exposure and own-age bias is a 
faulty one.  It is entirely plausible that there is a threshold, above which exposure no 
longer exerts any effects.   
An additional reason for this finding may be due to the reliability (or lack 
thereof) of the contact measure used.  Self-report measures are notoriously problematic 
as they are easily distorted by inaccuracies of memory and response biases.  However it 
is also possible that the results may be due to the fact that the concept of contact is such 
a complicated one, with many different facets, that asking only one question about the 
amount of experience participants had with children may have been insufficient to 
gauge contact.  Thus, the types of problems encountered by studies using self-report 
measures are various and plenty.  As such, this thesis sought to investigate the relative 
importance of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of contact on the own-age bias 
using less problematic study designs. 
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Due to the plethora of problems associated with assessing contact through self-
report measures (see Section 4.1.1. for a more in-depth discussion of this), Experiments 
3 and 4 aimed to establish the important aspects of contact in mediating the own-age 
bias by attempting to tease apart the three components of exposure identified by Slone 
et al (2000): frequency, variability (both quantitative factors) and quality.  Experiment 3 
sought to tease apart the two aspects of quantity of exposure.  Using primary and 
secondary school teachers as participants, this study hypothesized that while primary 
school teachers are likely to have more frequent contact with their students than 
secondary school teachers, they see a smaller number of students; the variability of 
exposure is higher in the secondary school teachers.  Thus, finding a recognition 
difference between these two groups should shed some light on which of these two 
quantitative contact measures is more important in the own-age bias.   
Both teaching groups performed similarly for own-age and children‘s faces, 
suggesting a similar influence of the two quantitative measures of contact, although 
only primary school teachers differed from the controls in terms of accuracy scores.  In 
addition, the effect sizes for the non-existent own-age biases revealed that the own-age 
bias was eliminated to a greater extent in the primary school teachers; so much so that 
this cohort actually performed better with children‘s faces. While there are obvious 
limitations to how far non-significant findings can be taken in terms of meaningful 
interpretation, this pattern does suggest that further research might benefit from 
exploring the idea that frequency of other-age exposure may be more influential than 
variability of that exposure. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible that primary and secondary 
school teachers have a different quality of contact with their students due to differential 
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occupational demands (and thus any differences in their performance could be due to 
this factor).  Experiment 4 therefore sought to investigate the role of quantitative 
exposure and more qualitative aspects of this contact in the own-age bias.  As previous 
training studies with the own-race bias have implicated the importance of motivation 
and attention in reducing the own-race bias (e.g. Hills & Lewis, 2006; Malpass et al, 
1973), and as Experiment 2 highlighted the possibility that motivational factors play a 
important role in the own-age bias, motivational aspects of quality of contact were 
specifically manipulated by using monetary rewards for correct responses.  Visual 
experience with other-age faces was also investigated, as was a combination of these 
factors.   
The main finding of Experiment 4 was that while exposure alone was not 
enough to significantly reduce the size of the own-age biaghghns in face recognition, 
this bias disappeared for both the motivation condition (only when measured in terms of 
accuracy) and the combined "motivation and exposure" condition.  Thus, these results 
suggest that recent quantitative exposure alone is not enough to reduce the own-age bias 
in face recognition, however qualitative motivational/attentional aspects may be.  
Looking at the effect sizes (and considering the fact that the motivation condition only 
produced an elimination of the own-age bias in terms of accuracy, and not RTs), these 
finding suggest that it is a combination of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
contact that are most important in mediating the own-age bias.   
This hypothesis is mirrored in the own-race bias literature.  Hills and Lewis 
(2006) highlighted the importance of a combination of quantity of exposure and 
differential attentional strategies used for own- and other-race faces in the mediation of 
the own-race bias.  They found that simple exposure to other-race faces was not enough 
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to reduce the own-race bias.  However, when participants were additionally encouraged 
to attend to specific facial features that were particularly important for differentiating 
faces of that race (e.g. Ellis et al, 1975), this bias disappeared. 
Thus, the findings of Experiment 4 and Hills and Lewis (2006) suggest that 
recent exposure alone may not be sufficient to significantly reduce these own-group 
biases, instead highlighting the importance of motivational and attentional factors in 
these effects.  The similarity in these findings offer some support for the notion that 
these phenomena may be similar in terms of their genesis (at least to some degree).  
However, one aspect of Experiment 4 is at odds with a recent study from the social-
categorisation literature which found no influence of general motivation (without 
exposure) on the magnitude of the own-race bias in terms of accuracy.  Instead, 
Hugenberg et al (2007) found that informing participants of the own-race bias in face 
recognition and instructing them to attend specifically to individuating information for 
other races faces was sufficient to eliminate the cross-race effect.  The authors claimed 
that it is not motivation to remember faces that is important, per se; instead it is the 
attention paid to the most relevant features for the goal of individuation.  As these other-
race features are most likely the same as those participants were encouraged to attend to 
in the Hills and Lewis study, this may well be the most viable interpretation of these 
findings. 
Indeed, the hypothesis that the own-race bias is the product of differential 
attention paid to the most appropriate features for group-member individuation may also 
be relevant to explaining the own-age bias.  While Experiment 4 concluded that it is the 
combination of exposure and motivation that is most effective in eliminating this bias, 
there is an alternative interpretation of these findings.  The instructions given to the 
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participants in this group specifically encouraged them to identify the way in which sets 
of faces within each age band differed from one another and then use this information to 
best remember faces in the recognition test. Thus participants were encouraged to attend 
to individuating information more in this condition than any other.  As such, it is 
possible that the elimination of the own-age bias in this condition was the result of 
specifically eliciting an individuation strategy for out-group members, rather than 
increasing their motivation to attend to the faces per se.  However the elimination of the 
own-age bias in the motivation only condition in terms of accuracy scores suggests that 
motivational factors are likely to be involved, at least to some extent. 
Thus, from these results it is difficult to establish whether a motivation or 
individuation explanation of the findings is most appropriate (although if the own-race 
bias and own-age bias are truly analogous, one would assume it is the latter).  As such, 
it is necessary to consider these findings in terms of the possible mechanisms that may 
be responsible for producing such an effect.  While motivation may be an explanation 
for this effect in itself, individuation is suggestive of a more specific social-cognitive 
theory: a social categorisation theory.  If one can distinguish which of these hypotheses 
best fits the pattern of behaviours seen in terms of the own-age bias, then one might be 
able to tease these two explanations apart.  
 
7.4 Possible Mechanisms Underlying the Own-Age Bias 
 
 The over-arching aim of this thesis was to investigate the possible explanations 
of the own-age bias using accounts offered for other biases in face recognition as a 
useful starting point.  As established in the previous section, the account most 
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commonly put forward to explain the most frequently cited of these biases (the own 
race bias) is that of the contact hypothesis.  As Chapter 2 has highlighted (as well as 
other work by Kuefner et al, 2008) exposure to other-age faces mediates the own-age 
bias in face recognition.  In addition, in line with previously discussed work on the own-
race bias, it seems that quality, rather than quantity of exposure (although most likely a 
combination of the two) is what is important in the mediation of its effects (see Chapter 
3 and 4). However, exactly how contact exerts its effects remains unclear. Thus, in order 
to establish what underlying cognitive, social and/or motivational-attentional 
mechanisms are likely to be responsible for the production of the own-age bias, it is 
worth revisiting the theories put forward to explain other biases in face recognition, 
outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
7.4.1  A Motivational-Attenional Model 
 The first explanation of the own-age bias that is tackled experimentally in this 
thesis is that of a motivational/attentional account and it is possibly the simplest of the 
theories proffered to explain this phenomenon.  This type of explanation suggests that 
contact does not affect face processing per se, rather it is a reflection (or driver) of the 
degree of interest one has with one group of faces over another and the differential 
amount of attention subsequently allocated to them.  For example, Rodin (1987) 
suggested that we are ―attentional misers‖ when it comes to processing visual 
information. As such, we only assign attentional and cognitive resources to individuals 
who we perceive as important to us in some way.  In contrast, those who we are not 
driven to attend to are often cognitively disregarded, allowing us to direct our cognitive 
resources elsewhere.  The interesting thing about this type of theory is that it does not 
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specify exactly what features might serve as "disregard" cues.  They are not thought to 
be fundamental stable cues, instead they are thought to be goal-specific and as such vary 
from situation to situation.  Rodin herself states that disregard is likely to occur to 
people who are ―deemed unsuitable for our social purposes‖ and thus are dependent on 
social rewards and punishments associated with paying attention to one group of 
individuals over another. 
 In terms of the own-race bias, we have seen in Section 9.3. that attentional 
aspects are indeed likely to play a role in producing this bias.  Along a similar vein, an 
analogous motivational-attentional account could be put forward to explain the own-age 
bias.  Indeed, Rodin (1987) suggested that age would be a likely factor to serve as a 
disregard cue.  For example, she suggested that old age is likely to be such a cue in 
those who are not old themselves, as the elderly are unlikely to make suitable candidates 
for most types of social interactions and relations.  In terms of the own-age bias 
witnessed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, a similar type of explanation can be put forward.  
It is unlikely that children would meet the criteria for the social purposes of an 
undergraduate (and vice versa), and as such this type of theory would predict a full-
cross over effect, as was observed. 
 In addition, a motivational-attentional account, which emphasises the plasticity 
of disregard cues and the importance of situation-specific goals, could also happily 
account for the pattern of results witnessed in Chapter 3.  The occupational demands of 
teachers would likely dictate that children‘s faces should be allocated a significant 
amount of attention (something that is unlikely to be the case for undergraduates). In 
addition, the normal social rewards and punishments associated with the correct 
recognition of socially salient own-age faces is likely to be similar for both groups of 
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similarly aged participants. As such, this theory would predict the two groups to 
perform similarly for own-age faces, but differ for children‘s faces.  Specifically, the 
undergraduates would be expected to exhibit an own-age bias, while the teachers would 
not.  As seen in Experiments 2 and 3, this was indeed the case. 
 So a motivational-attentional account of the own-age bias in face recognition 
appears to fare relatively well in terms of the pattern of results found within this thesis.  
And, in Experiment 4, where motivational and exposure components of contact were 
pitted against each other, some support for this hypothesis was also garnered.  As 
discussed in the previous section, this study found that while exposure alone was not 
able to reduce the own-age bias, motivational aspects were able to achieve this 
(although this was not the case for the RT data).  However, the condition most 
successful at eliminating this bias was that which combined both motivational and 
experiential aspects of contact.  However, significant group by face age interactions 
were not found for either accuracy or reaction time data, so one needs to be careful not 
to overstate these findings. 
 In summary, it appears from Experiments 1-4 that a motivational account may 
be able to explain the own-age bias in face recognition.  However, the pattern of 
findings from Experiment 4 suggests that quantitative exposure factors may also be at 
play, when combined with the qualitative motivational drivers.  However, this is not the 
only interpretation of these results.  As suggested in the previous section, due to the 
nature of the instructions given in the combined motivation and exposure condition of 
this study, this pattern could also be accounted for by a social-categorisation model. The 
role of both this type of account and a more experience-based theory will be evaluated 
in the following sections of this discussion.  
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7.4.2  Social-Categorisation Model 
 As explained in Chapter 5, one class of theory that has been put forward to 
account for the own-age bias in face recognition is that of the social-categorisation 
model (e.g. Levin, 1996; 2000; Sporer, 2001).  This type of theory states that own-group 
biases (i.e. the own -race, -gender and -age biases) in face recognition occur as the result 
of our propensity to group people into categories according to whether or not they 
belong to our social in-group (e.g. Tajfel et al, 1971).  Specifically, in the social 
psychology literature Fiske (1993) suggested that people naturally tend to rely on 
fundamental cues such as race, age and sex when categorising others.  It is the social 
grouping which is thought to drive the way we subsequently process an encountered 
face.  At the core of this type of theory is the assumption that out-group members are 
thought of at a categorical level, at the expense of more individuating information, 
while in-group members are individuated (e.g. Bodenhausen et al, 2003). 
 A specific model that has been put forward to explain the better recognition of 
out-group faces in terms of the own-race bias, is that of Levin‘s (1996; 2000) race-
feature hypothesis.  Levin suggests that the social tendency that people have to think 
categorically about out-group members leads individuals to search for category-
specifying features (e.g. skin colour in the case of race) in other-race faces, to the 
detriment of more individuating information.  In contrast, as in-group members are 
thought of at the exemplar level, they are processed accordingly (see MacLin & 
Malpass, 2001; 2003).  Thus according to a social-categorisation model, these biases are 
not due to differential experience with faces, rather they are the result of differences in 
the social cognitions typically elicited when processing in-group and out-group faces.  
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As such, the role of contact in these biases in not one that affects face processing per se, 
instead it is more likely to reflect (or govern) in-group and out-group relationships.  
Levin‘s race-feature hypothesis (1996; 2000) was put forward to explain the co-
existence of two seemingly paradoxical phenomena: the own-race bias and the other-
race classification advantage (see Chapter 5 for further discussion of this). And while 
this theory is specific to the own-race bias, a similar type of hypothesis (i.e. one that is 
dependent on the existence of an out-group specifying feature) could easily be used to 
account for the own-age bias (relying instead  on age specifying information, such as 
skin texture).  In fact, one theory that has specifically built on Levin‘s work to 
incorporate other biases is that of Sporer's (2001) In-group/Out-group Model (IoM).  
Similarly to Levin, this model suggests that upon viewing an out-group face, it is 
automatically categorised as belonging to an ―out-group‖.  However, Sporer integrated 
more detailed cognitive elements into his theory, specifically hypothesising that while 
in-group faces are encoded in an automatic, configural manner (typical of expert face 
processing), the categorisation of  out-group faces results in a reduced, less efficient 
processing strategy for those faces (e.g. more feature-based processing) and as a direct 
result, recognition of those faces suffers. One of the interesting things about the IoM in 
terms of this thesis is that Sporer explicitly claims that it can be extended to explain 
other own-group biases in the face recognition literature, specifically the own-age bias 
(e.g. Wright & Stroud, 2002).  
Support for the idea that in-group faces are better remembered as a result of 
more individuating information being processed for them, compared to out-group faces, 
has come from a recent study by Hugenberg et al (2007).  As mentioned in Section 9.3., 
this study showed that merely altering the instructions that were given to participants 
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before an old/new face recognition task was enough to alter the size of the their own-
race bias.  Specifically, encouraging participants to think about individuating 
information of other race faces was enough to eliminate the own-race bias completely.  
In contrast, giving participants instructions that just encouraged them to attend closely 
to the faces (their so-called general accuracy motivation condition) did not affect the 
cross-race effect.  The authors concluded that while general motivation alone could not 
explain the own-race bias, a theory suggesting differential use of individuating features 
may be appropriate.   
However, it is worth considering how much motivation simple instructions are 
really likely to elicit in participants in Hugenberg et al‘s (2007) study in comparison to 
the social motivations that are likely to exist in the real world.  Instead, it may have 
been better to offer the participants some kind of reward (or punishment, like that seen 
in some training studies; Malpass et al, 1973) for correct/incorrect responses.  For 
example, Experiment 4 in this thesis showed that when monetary awards were given in 
reward for correct responses, motivation to perform well was enough to reduce the in-
group bias seen in terms of age group (at least in terms of accuracy).  However, the 
condition that proved most successful at eliminating the own-age bias was that which 
combined both motivation and exposure aspects of contact. The instructions given to 
participants in this condition specifically drew their attention to individuating 
information in a similar way to Hugenberg and colleague‘s own-race bias study.  As 
such, this latter finding could be interpreted as being consistent with Sporer‘s (2001) 
IoM, although the finding that motivation alone appeared to diminish the magnitude of 
the participants‘ own-age bias is problematic for this model. 
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 Theoretically, a social-categorisation type model could easily be applied to the 
own-age bias in face recognition, especially given the fact that age has been identified 
as one of the fundamental criteria according to which we automatically categorise 
people (Fiske, 1993).  This type of explanation has also been shown to be flexible 
enough to account for in-group biases outside of the own-race bias literature.  For 
example, Bernstein et al (2007) demonstrated categorisation effects for artificially 
assigned grouping categories, in addition to those that naturally occur.  Specifically, 
they found that randomly labelling faces according to university affiliation or a 
personality type that was either congruent or incongruent to that of the participants, 
significantly affected the participants' recognition of those faces.  Those perceived as 
belonging to the participants‘ in-group were better remembered than those who were 
not.  This study provided evidence that merely labelling a face as being an in-group 
member is enough to elicit an in-group bias. 
 If a social categorisation account can satisfactorily explain the own-age bias in 
face recognition, then the labelling of faces as in-group members (i.e. belonging to the 
same age group as themselves) should result in better recognition for faces assigned to 
that in-group compared to those labelled as out-group members.  In addition, reducing 
the social salience of one social category (i.e. age) while increasing that of another (i.e. 
gender) should be enough to reduce an own-age bias, and facilitate an own-gender bias 
in face recognition.  Experiment 5 investigated these specific predictions and found that 
they were not supported.  Participants performed more accurately for own-age faces 
regardless of whether they initially classified faces according to age or gender (although 
improved performance for own-age faces did not reach significance in terms of RTs for 
the gender classification group). Most problematic for a social-categorisation 
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explanation is the fact that there was no evidence of an own-gender bias in participants 
who initially categorised faces according to gender.  However it is possible that this is a 
result of gender being a less salient social categorisation cue than age.  If this is the 
case, then it could be that age was being implicitly categorised as the most salient in-
group/out-group dimension, even when the explicit categorisation task demanded 
categorisation according to gender.   
This notion has gained some support in an ERP study investigating the implicit 
and explicit processing of age and gender cues (Weise et al, 2008).  In this study the 
authors found that even when age classification was incongruent to the task, participants 
still processed this cue.  In contrast, gender was only processed when the task 
specifically demanded it.  Thus it is possible that the social-categorisation process was 
responsible for the observed pattern of results in Experiment 5, with age information 
serving as the categorisation dimension. However, previous research that has 
demonstrated mere in-group/out-group labelling effects according to bogus, and 
therefore relatively unimportant, social dimensions (e.g. Bernstein et al, 2007) make this 
justification of the findings a little less plausible.  
 An additional problem for a social-categorisation hypothesis was the finding that 
the own-group advantage for classifying own-age faces was not significantly related to 
the size of the own-age bias exhibited, as an out-group feature processing account 
would hypothesise (e.g. Levin, 1996; 2000).  However Sporer‘s IoM, which does not 
necessarily rely on feature categorisation, may still be able to account for the own-age 
bias in face recognition.   
However, this thesis has produced two patterns of results that the IoM struggles 
to explain.  Firstly, Sporer‘s model (illustrated in Figure 5.1) specifically predicts that in 
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addition to a recognition advantage for in-group faces, one should also see a more 
conservative response criterion for those faces (as often seen in the own-race bias 
literature, see Meissner & Brigham, 2001).  Consistently throughout this thesis no such 
effect has been found.  In addition, the finding that teachers recognise children‘s faces 
as accurately as own-age faces (Experiments 2 and 3) also presents a problem for this 
type of model.  If in-group faces are classified according to socially important self-
referential information (Fiske, 1993; List, 1986) then it is highly unlikely that children 
would be classified by young adults in the way.  Thus, the results in this thesis are not 
consistent with the IoM or Levin‘s out-group feature hypothesis (1996; 2000).  As such, 
it seems unlikely that an in-group/out-group social categorisation model can account for 
the own-age bias in face recognition.  
 
7.4.3  A Perceptual Expertise Model 
The final type of account that has been put forward to explain the own-age bias 
in face recognition is one that suggests that increased exposure to own-age faces allows 
us to develop more proficient processing strategies for those faces (see Chapter 6).  This 
type of explanation has most commonly been used to explain the own-race bias, with 
better own-race recognition for faces purporting to be the result of enhanced perceptual 
expertise for those, compared to other-race faces (e.g. Rhodes et al, 1989).  Exactly 
what these strategies may be is still debated in the literature, however this own-race 
recognition advantage is most likely to be the result of a more robust representation 
(e.g. Valentine, 1991) and/or enhanced configural/holistic processing of own-race faces 
(e.g. Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; see Section 1.8.3. for a discussion of the role of 
configural processing in expertise). 
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As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, while a perceptual expertise account of the 
own-race bias may be an intuitive one, it is less so when considering it as a suitable 
account for the own-age bias.  As this account is an experience based theory, it runs into 
similar problems as the contact hypothesis (see Section 9.3.).  Specifically, the fact that 
age is not a stable characteristic at first sight appears problematic.  Thus, while such 
explanations can provide a satisfactory account of why children or adults may be better 
at recognising own-age faces compared to those older than themselves (i.e. those 
belonging to an age band which they have not yet belonged to and thus have not had 
much experience of), they struggle to account for an own-age bias where other-age 
faces comprise those younger than the participants. This is because participants 
presumably had ample opportunity to develop the most effective mechanisms for 
processing younger faces when they once belonged to that age group.  However this 
type of explanation would be plausible if one allows for the possibility that it is recent 
exposure that is important in the development of and maintenance of this expertise.  As 
facial adaptation studies have shown that recent exposure can significantly affect our 
subsequent perception of faces (see Clifford and Rhodes, 2005), this type of caveat is 
certainly plausible.   
An "improved perceptual processing" account for recently encountered faces 
could put forward a number of predictions.  Firstly, this kind of theory would predict 
better recognition of own-age faces compared to those older than the participants (as 
seen in the child participants in Chapter 2).  And secondly, this would explain an own-
age bias in participants viewing own-age and younger faces, if their experience for the 
younger age group had not been maintained (as seen in the undergraduate participants in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5).  In addition, the large amount of experience that teachers have 
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with children‘s faces would be expected to result in perceptual expertise for these, as 
well as own-age, faces.  As such, this theory would predict a reduced (or absent) own-
age bias in face recognition in this group (as seen in Chapters 3 and 4). 
In addition to these predictions, if perceptual expertise is the mechanism 
underlying the own-age bias, then specific hypotheses can be made about the type of 
facial information that is being processed in own- and other- age faces.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, perceptual expertise is thought to be the result of being able to efficiently 
utilise the configural information contained in the face (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986).  
Therefore, if we are more expert with one group of faces than another, one might expect 
recognition of those faces to be impaired to a greater extent by manipulations that 
disrupt the configural information in these faces.  This has certainly been shown to be 
the case in terms of the own-race bias, with inversion, part-whole and composite effects 
(see Section 1.2. for a discussion of how these manipulations interfere with configural 
information in face processing) interfering with own-race face recognition to a greater 
extent than other-race face recognition (Michel et al, 2006a, 2006b; Rhodes et al, 1989; 
Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Tanaka et al, 2004, see Section 1.8.1.2. for further 
discussion of this). 
More recently, a similar pattern of results has been found with the own-age bias.  
For example, Kuefner et al (2008) showed that not only was the recognition of own-age 
faces more impaired by inversion than other-age faces, but the size of that inversion 
effect was mediated by inter-age group contact.  That is, while undergraduates appeared 
to be using the configural information to a greater extent in own-age, compared to 
children‘s face, those with high exposure to children‘s faces (i.e. teachers) showed 
comparable inversion effects for both age groups.  However, as pointed out in Chapter 
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6, it is possible that this latter pattern was the product of two ―other-age‖ effects, as the 
age of the facial stimuli in the ―own-age‖ group was not successfully matched to that of 
the high contact participants.  
Using successfully matched age stimuli, Experiments 6 and 7 sought to replicate 
this pattern of results and extend the findings to include children.  In line with previous 
chapters an own-age bias was found in terms of accuracy (and RTs in Experiment 7) for 
the children and low contact adults, while no such bias was present in the high contact 
group.  In addition, and most important to the perceptual-expertise hypothesis is the fact 
that inversion eliminated the pattern of enhanced recognition performance for faces with 
which participants had most recent exposure.  These results, like those reported by 
Kuefner et al (2008), and seen in the own-race bias literature, suggest that the own-age 
bias in face recognition may be the result of enhanced perceptual processing for own-
age faces as a function of expertise.  In terms of the developmental psychology 
literature, children were found to be more affected by inversion for own-age, compared 
to other-age faces.  This suggests that past research which proposes children are 
relatively poor at recognising faces as a result of less developed configural processing 
strategies (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986) may have been underestimating their face 
processing abilities (as has also been suggested by Flin, 1985, and George, Hole & 
Scaife, 2000).   
However, as noted in Chapter 6, inversion has been shown to affect featural cues 
(albeit to a lesser degree) as well as configural information (Mondloch, Le Grand, 
Maurer, 2002).  Thus, to draw firm conclusions about the role of configural processing 
in the own-age bias, one needs to consider manipulations that tap into these processes 
while keeping more featural processes constant.  To this end, de Heering et al (2009) 
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used a composite face paradigm (like that described in Section 1.2) to investigate the 
mechanisms involved in the own-age bias.  The authors found that while participants 
who had low inter-age group experience showed a higher composite face effect for 
own-age faces than children‘s faces, teachers (the high contact group) exhibited no 
difference between the two groups.  These findings are indicative of enhanced 
configural processing for faces with which we have more experience, with configural 
processes overriding participants‘ ability to successfully use the identifying featural 
information in these faces. 
To extend these findings, Experiment 8 investigated undergraduate‘s sensitivity 
to small configural changes made to the face (like those used by Friere et al, 2000; Haig, 
1984; 1986; Hosie et al, 1988; Kemp et al, 1990; Leder et al, 2001).  In this study, 
changes were made to the vertical positioning of the eyes and nose, as well as the 
interpupillary distance (I.P.D.).  The magnitude of these changes were so small that they 
were approaching the threshold of visual acuity (identified by Haig and Hosie and 
colleagues as equating to around a 4% change of the I.P.D.).  The purpose of this study 
was to investigate whether the threshold for recognising changes made to own-age faces 
was any lower than that for other-age faces (as an enhanced configural processing 
account of the own-age bias might predict).  This did appear to be the case, with 
participants being able to detect subtle changes at significantly better than chance at a 
lower level for own-age faces (2% I.P.D.) than other-age faces (4% I.P.D.).  In addition, 
participants performed significantly more accurately for own-age faces when changes 
were 4% of the I.P.D., the critical level previously identified as a ―just noticeable 
distance‖ (e.g. Haig, 1984).  Thus, when taken with the data from Experiments 6 and 7, 
it appears that a configural-expertise account of the own-age bias is supported. 
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However, at least one study has produced conflicting evidence, Perfect and 
Moon (2005).  As described in Chapters 1 and 6, these authors found that inversion not 
only failed to reduce the own-age bias in face recognition, but instead it magnified it.  
Why this might be the case is unclear, and without the inclusion of response speed data 
it is difficult to gain a complete picture of the participants‘ performance; only 
considering accuracy data may be masking important differences in the strategies 
employed by the different participant groups for faces of different ages (Bruce, 1982).  
However, as the authors did not attempt to control for participants‘ inter-age group 
experience, this pattern of results could have been a product of differential other-age 
experience (as this thesis has demonstrated that contact can have a significant influence 
on the magnitude of the own-age bias).  Indeed, the pattern of results seen in the Perfect 
and Moon study is certainly not supported by the work contained within this thesis.  
However, it is worth keeping the existence of these findings in mind when considering 
the possible mechanisms responsible for the own-age bias in face recognition.  
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7.5 Towards an Understanding of the Processes Involved in the Own-Age Bias 
 
This thesis has illustrated that contact plays an important role in the mediation of 
the own-age bias in face recognition (Chapters 2-4).  Using the theories put forward to 
try and explain other own-group biases in face recognition, this thesis specifically 
sought to investigate whether a perceptual-expertise, social-cognitive or motivational-
attentional account may best explain this phenomenon (Chapters 4-6).  The findings of 
the experiments contained within this thesis are summarised in Table 7.1.  Overall, the 
findings of this thesis seem to be most consistent with a perceptual expertise account 
(Experiments 6-8).  However, it also seems likely that motivation to attend to faces 
(particularly with the goal of individuation) is an important driving factor of this bias 
(Experiment 4).  Specifically, it is the combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of exposure that is likely to be most influential in mediating the own-age bias. 
One possibility that could explain the results contained within this thesis is that 
perceptual expertise may develop as a result of attention paid to certain groups of faces 
over others.  Which faces are attended to would essentially be driven by social 
motivations or situation-specific goals (as described by Rodin, 1987).  To this end, 
social-categorisation may play a role in orienting attention towards faces of specific 
social interest (an idea at least partially supported by the results of Experiment 5).  The 
idea that certain groups of faces are selectively attended to over others is one that has 
certainly been illustrated in terms of attractiveness (e.g. Langlois et al, 1987; Langlois, 
Roggman & Rieser-Danner, 1990).  Indeed, attractiveness is a social cue that Rodin 
predicts will serve as an important social attention or disregard cue.  It follows that this
Table 7.1  Summary of experiments and their findings   
* - indicates significance survived Bonferroni Correction                    
† - Original OAB only reached nominal significance (p<.05); the effect disappeared using the corrected α (p<.017) 
 
      Is there an OAB?   Which theory is supported by findings? 
  Group 
 
Corrected α d' c RT 
 
  
Experiment 1 
Young Adults 
 p=.05 (1-tailed) 
<.05* <.05* ≤.001* 
 
 Children 
 
<.001* ns ns 
 
Experiment 2 
High Contact Adults 
 p=.025 (2-tailed) 
ns ns <.001* 
 The Contact Hypothesis 
Low Contact Adults 
 
ns ns <.001* 
 
Experiment 3 
Control Group (LC) 
 
p=.017 (2-tailed) 
<.01* ns <.001* 
 
The Contact Hypothesis; highlights importance of frequency of 
contact 
Primary Teachers (HC) 
 
ns ns ns 
 
Secondary Teachers (HC) 
 
ns ns ns 
 
Experiment 4 
Control Group  
 
p=.0125 (2-tailed) 
<.01* ns ≤.01* 
 
The Contact Hypothesis; suggests quantitative aspects of exposure 
may not be as important as qualitative aspects of exposure.  
Support was found for a Motivation-Attention account of the OAB, 
but the most support was for an account that included both 
quantitative aspects of exposure and qualitative, motivational-
attentional aspects  
Exposure Group 
 
<.01* ns <.01* 
 
Motivation Group 
 
ns ns <.05 
 
Exposure & Motivation Group 
 
ns ns ns 
 
Experiment 5 
Gender Classifiaction 
 
p=.025 (2-tailed) 
<.05 ns ns 
 
Mixed support for Social Categorisation was found 
Age Classification 
 
<.05* ns <.05 
 
Low Contact Adults 
 
<.05 
 
<.001* 
 
High Contact Adults 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
      Does inversion eliminate OAB (if present upright)     
  Group 
 
Corrected α d'   RT 
 
  
Experiment 6 
Children 
 
p=.017 (2-tailed) 
Yes 
 
n/a 
 
Supports a Perceptual-Expertise Account Low Contact Adults 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
High Contact Adults 
 
n/a   n/a 
 
Experiment 7 
Children 
 
p=.017 (2-tailed) 
Yes†  
n/a 
 
Mixed support for Perceptual-Expertise was found Low Contact Adults 
 
Yes†  
Yes 
 
High Contact Adults 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
        % Correct   RT     
 Are participants more 
sensitive to facial changes 
made to own-age faces? 
      
Supports a Perceptual-Expertise Account Experiment 8 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
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increased visual input could lead to better representation (e.g. Valentine, 1991) and/ or 
enhanced configural/holistic processing of these faces (e.g. deHeering et al, 2008; 
Kuefner et al, 2008; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006; Rhodes et al.1989; 
Tanaka, Kiefer & Bukach, 2004).  However, there is little evidence of this in the face 
processing literature and work on potential memory advantages for attractive faces has 
produced inconsistent results (e.g. Sarno & Alley, 1997; Wickham & Morris, 2003).   
However it still seems probable that a combined model including both 
motivational and experiential aspects could adequately explain the own-age bias in face 
recognition.  Perceptual-expertise models are, by definition, dependent on experience 
with faces; and the faces with which we have experience are attended to as a result of 
our social goals and motivations (e.g. Hayden, Parikh, Deaner & Platt, 2007).  Thus it 
seems logical that both the level of motivation one has to attend to other-age faces 
(possibly determined by social categorisation), and the degree of expertise one has to 
discriminate between them, are factors that are likely to mediate the magnitude of the 
own-age bias.   
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7.6 Limitations and Future Directions 
 
While this thesis has highlighted the importance of contact in the own-age bias, 
and offers evidence that this phenomenon can be explained in terms of motivational and 
experiential factors, it is important to consider the limitations of such conclusions.  
Firstly, there is the issue of generalisability.  The majority of participants in this study 
had particularly high exposure to own-age faces on an almost daily basis (on account of 
attending university or school).  As contact with different age groups has been seen to 
play a role in mediating the own-age bias, it is likely that this would result in an 
exaggerated own-age bias for these cohorts (see Table 3.2 for a demonstration of this in 
the existing own-age bias literature).  As such, it is unclear how generalisable these 
findings are to populations where own-age contact is not as high, and inter-age contact 
is perhaps more varied.  This is an important issue to consider, as the majority of the 
population do not have such high levels of daily contact with own-age faces.  Thus 
future research should investigate the own-age bias in participants who have a variety of 
inter-age group contact.   
In addition, the experiments contained within this thesis were limited in that they 
only looked at the ability of young adults and children (aged between 8-11 year old) to 
recognise young adult and child faces.  As such it is difficult to draw broad conclusions 
that would encompass other age groups.  What can be said from these findings is that 
both age groups appeared to be better at recognising own-age faces (although children 
performed generally worse than adults).  In addition, both groups appeared to be more 
affected by inversion for own-age faces, suggesting greater expertise for those faces.   
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Whether these effects exist outside of these age groups is unknown, although 
previous research suggests that this is the case with middle-aged and older adult groups 
(e.g. Anstasi & Rhodes, 2005; 2006).  However, only three other studies have been 
carried out with child participants, all of which had methodological flaws (Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2005; Chung, 1997; Crookes & McKone, 2009).  As such, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether this phenomenon is present in younger children than 
in this study.  This would allow us to gain further insight into children‘s face 
recognition abilities with own-age faces.  This is important as this thesis, as well as 
other work by Feinman and Entwisle (1976) and George, Hole and Scaife (2000), has 
provided evidence that previous work tracking the development of children‘s face 
processing skill may have underestimated their abilities due to the use of facial stimuli 
belonging to a relatively unfamiliar age group (usually of young adult age).  In addition, 
this would add to the body of work that has been done on the development of other 
own-group biases in face recognition (e.g. Chance, Turner, and Goldstein, 1982; 
Corenblum & Meissner, 2006; Cross, Cross & Daly, 1971; Feinman & Entwisle, 1976; 
Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin & Moore, 2003; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Sangrigoli et 
al, 2005; O‘Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994) which can only add to our 
understanding of such effects. 
A further limitation of this thesis is in regard to the stimuli that were used.  
Again, only child and young adult faces were used throughout this thesis, thus it is 
unclear how these findings generalise to faces of other ages.  This may be a particular 
issue in this case, as it is unclear to what extent physical differences between the child 
and adult faces may be responsible for these findings.  For example, this thesis 
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consistently found an own-age bias in face recognition, while other studies (using only 
adult faces) have found more varied and inconsistent results (see Table 2.1).  It is 
possible that this is due to the fact that there are considerable structural differences 
between children‘s and adult‘s faces, whereas faces of adults at different ages are 
relatively similar (see Rhodes, 2009 and Section 1.5.1 for reviews).  Thus, it might be 
the case that the findings in this thesis are confined specifically to child and young adult 
faces.  As such, more work needs to be done with facial stimuli of various ages and 
participants from a range of age groups and contact settings in order to see how 
generalisable and robust the findings within this thesis are. 
In addition to finding an own-age bias in face recognition, this thesis found that 
this effect is mediated by contact.  Specifically, results appeared to support a perceptual 
expertise and motivational account of this bias.  Intuitively, it seems likely that 
motivation to attend to own-age faces, and the subsequent visual input from those faces, 
leads to the development of more efficient strategies to process faces belonging to one‘s 
own age group (namely using more ―expert‖, configural processing).  However, using 
the inversion effect to investigate this is slightly problematic, as inferring greater 
configural coding of own-age faces based on larger inversion decrements for those faces 
assumes that inversion selectively disrupts configural information (Diamond & Carey, 
1986).  Yet previous studies have shown that inversion also impairs featural/component 
coding, albeit to a lesser extent (e.g. Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer, 2002).  As such, 
the presence of an inversion effect may not simply reflect a disruption of configural 
processing, but may in fact be the result of ―some unknown combination of impaired 
configural, component, and holistic coding‖ (Rhodes, Hayward & Winkler, 2006).  The 
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final experiment in this thesis sought to rectify this issue by investigating participant‘s 
sensitivity to configural changes, while keeping the featural information constant.  
While it was found that participants were more sensitive to changes made to own-age 
faces compared to other age faces, supporting a configural-expertise account of the 
own-age bias, it is possible that these results are the product of configural changes being 
generally harder to detect in children's faces than in adults' faces.  To establish whether 
or not this is the case, future research could investigate whether participants of different 
ages, or those with high inter-age group contact, show this increased sensitivity to 
configural changes made to own-age faces. 
In addition, in order to gain further insight into the underlying mechanisms 
involved in the own-age bias, future research should consider studying the neural basis 
of this phenomenon. To date research on the own-age bias has mainly concentrated on 
the behavioural aspects of this memory bias and has suggested that it may be the result 
of increased exposure to and increased interest in faces of our own age (as demonstrated 
within this thesis). In terms of the own-race bias literature, differential activation of the 
fusiform face area (FFA) has been demonstrated for own- and other- race faces, with 
own race faces eliciting higher activation (Golby et al, 2001).  As noted in Section 1.1, 
while some researchers believe this area of the brain is an innate, highly specialized 
region for processing faces, others have demonstrated that it is not face-specific per se, 
rather it is an area involved in the individuation of members of a homogeneous class 
that, through practice, we have become experts at distinguishing between (Gauthier et 
al, 1999; Gauthier et al, 2000).  As such, the increased activation patterns Golbly et al 
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(2001) observed for own-race faces may have been result of greater expertise with those 
faces. 
Along similar lines as the Golby et al (2001) study, in order to further 
investigate whether or not the own-age bias is truly modulated by expertise, future 
research in this area could investigate the neural substrates underlying the differences in 
memory for own and other age faces.  Not only would this research shed further light on 
the cognitive processes involved in the own-age bias, but may also provide further 
insight into the role expertise has in FFA activation and face processing in general. If 
the OAB is truly moderated by expertise, then we would expect greater FFA activation 
for own-age faces than other-age faces (see Golby et al, 2001). 
 
7.7 Implications  
 
This thesis sought to investigate the own-age bias in face recognition using 
previous research into other, similar biases (i.e. the own-race bias and the own-gender 
bias) as a starting point.  While this thesis never claimed that these three biases were 
necessarily analogous, the work contained within the previous chapters has shed some 
light on this issue.  Throughout the own-race bias literature it has been noted that the 
recognition advantage for own-race faces is usually accompanied by a more 
conservative response criterion for those faces (e.g. Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer, 
2001).  However, while this thesis has demonstrated a similar own-group pattern in 
terms of increased accuracy for own-age faces, no parallel can be drawn in terms of the 
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response bias data.  Thus, it may be that the two biases are not a product of the same 
underlying mechanisms.   
While the pattern of increased accuracy for own-age faces without differential 
response criteria for own-age and other-age faces mirrors the pattern witnessed in the 
own-gender bias literature (e.g. Shapiro & Penrod, 1986), again it seems that these 
biases may not be analogous.  Research into the own-gender bias has suggested that a 
feature-based processing theory may best account for this bias (e.g. Wright & Sladden, 
2003), while this thesis has demonstrated that the own-age bias is most likely the 
product of increased motivation to attend to own-age faces, resulting in better configural 
processing for those faces.  As such, it seems that these three biases may not be 
analogous, as sometimes suggested in the face recognition literature (e.g. Sporer, 2001; 
Wright & Stroud, 2002).  However, this thesis did not seek to directly compare these 
biases in face recognition, so there is a limitation to the conclusions that can be drawn at 
this stage.  Before firm conclusions can be drawn about the relationships between the 
own-group biases in face recognition, further research need to be carried out.  
This thesis has demonstrated an own-age bias in face recognition in young 
adults and children for similarly aged faces and shown that this is mediated by inter-age 
group contact.  As Wright and Stroud (2002) pointed out, this effect could have 
important implications in terms of eyewitness testimony.  Most previous research 
investigating age effects in eye-witness testimony has only considered the age of the 
witness, and not that of the perpetrator, or an interaction between these two variables 
(see Section 1.7).  This thesis has provided evidence that this might be a mistake, as 
failing to account for an own-age bias in face recognition may mean that participant‘s 
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eyewitness abilities are being underestimated (as in Adams-Price, 1992; Bartlett & 
Leslie, 1986; Fulton & Batrlett, 1991). In terms of real-world implications, knowledge 
of the own-race bias has been crucial in the legal system where the possibility of 
identification errors is likely (e.g. Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Meisner & Brigham, 
2001; Sporer, 2001) and has been identified by expert witnesses as being a reliable 
enough phenomenon to be presented in court (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon, 2001).  
Similarly, if the own-age bias proves to be a robust finding, existing in a number of age 
groups in a variety of settings, then this has obvious implications for law enforcement as 
well as the justice system with regard to eyewitness testimony.  
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